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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an old saying that into every life some rain must fall. Yet 
a haunting question may be raised as to why some individuals seem to 
wither under the lightest of spring showers, whereas others stand firm in 
the face of the fiercest monsoons. After having worked with high-risk 
children for many years, it has become apparent to this investigator that 
there are children who grow up under horrendous home conditions 
involving abuse, neglect, serious illness, abject poverty or psychic traumas 
and yet somehow manage not only to "survive" but in certain instances 
even to thrive. In contrast, other children exposed to similar or even less 
harsh circumstances seem to be less resilient and therefore break under the 
strain. Are some individuals more vulnerable to stressful life events than 
others or are such observations merely illusions created by an observer's 
incomplete understanding of one's total life circumstance? 
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Background of the Study 
These thoughts, originally pondered more than a decade ago, led 
the investigator to casual unsystematic readings aimed at shedding light on 
issues related to the adaptive concept of emotional resilience. These 
intriguing early readings quickly escalated into an intensive systematic 
research inquiry which has involved journeying through a multitude of 
related - or in some cases apparently unrelated - literature fields. 
The original goal of this journey was the development of an 
instrument that would provide an objective assessment of one's level of 
emotional resilience. However, as the investigative journey unfolded 
through a series of logically related research fields, it seemed clear that a 
coherent theoretical perspective needed to be developed before 
constructing that instrument. 
Purpose and Overview of the Study 
The dual purpose of the study was to develop a viable theoretical 
perspective for the investigation of the concept of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency in children and to begin to operationalize this newly conceived 
theoretical construct via the development and validation of an objectively 
scored parent interview instrument, the Stressor Risk Scale (SRS). 
The first goal of the study, the development of a viable theory of 
emotional resilience, was conceptualized within the context of two broad 
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theoretical domains. It is believed that these two areas are critical for 
positive emotional development and the subsequent unfolding of a healthy 
self-concept. The first area of focus was related to the attachment process, 
while the second involved a region that the inve&tigator labeled adaptive 
control. It was assumed that these two areas are affected by environmental 
and genetic elements. The resultant interaction of these complex factors 
represented the essence of what will be formally labeled and defined in 
Chapter II as one's level of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. In Chapter II, 
the first goal was addressed by initiating an in-depth review and integration 
of the literature which was organized into three major subsections. The 
first major section deals with the self-concept and its theoretical antecedent 
processes of attachment and adaptive control. The second major section 
deals with theoretical and applied risk research. As a result of integrating 
these first two sections, a uniquely woven "fabric" of theory and research 
emerges to provide a theoretical framework in which to study Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency or one's ability to maintain mastery and competence 
in the face of exposure to stress. The resultant fabric serves as the 
structural foundation upon which the SRS is developed and as a backdrop 
upon which the primary research hypothesis of goal two is posed. The 
third major section of Chapter II provides a review of stress assessment. 
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This section provides the necessary transitional link between theory and 
assessment and thereby serves as a direct lead-in to Chapter III and 
methodology issues. 
The second goal of the proposed research study represents an 
initial step in operationalizing the notion of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. 
This focus directly involves assessment of stress exposure. Obviously, 
before one can validly assess an individual's level of emotional mastery in 
the face of stress, it is necessary to accurately gauge that individual's 
exposure to stress. Therefore, goal two of the study involves the 
development and validation of an objectively scored parent interview 
instrument, the Stressor Risk Scale. This measure will be designed to assess 
potential emotional vulnerability in the child as a function of stress 
exposure m three areas: perceived child personality-temperament 
characteristics, stress related life events history of the child and family, and 
parental personality characteristics and attitudes. 
Chapter III provides both a description of the research study, 
hypotheses related to addressing goal two, and an in-depth description of 
the SRS construction and design format. Chapter III also supplies a 
description of the pilot study. The concurrent validity study, which 
represents the major focus of this research project was designed to test the 
hypothesis that SRS scores will predict and differentiate among three 
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groups of children. By virtue of actual adaptive functioning in their 
respective school settings, these three groups are presumed to possess a 
low, moderate, or high-risk emotional and/or behavioral status. Within 
the context of this concurrent validity study, Chapter III also contains a 
description of the research method and design employed, sample selection, 
and procedures for data collection and statistical analyses. In Chapter IV, 
data from the concurrent validity study is presented and analyzed. Chapter 
V contains a summary of the concurrent validity study, conclusions, review 
of limitations, and suggested future research directions. 
Significance of Study 
In recent years, a growing body of research has established a 
strong link between stressful life events and the development of 
psychological disorders in adults (Kasi, Gore and Cobb, 1975; Lloyd, 
1980; Paykel, 1978; Rutter, 1983). In sharp contrast to these adult studies, 
there is a paucity of evidence regarding links of generalized stress and 
stressful life events to psychological disorders in children (Colton, 1985; 
Yamamoto, Soliman, Parsons and Davies, 1987). The further development 
and validation of the SRS could be viewed as a means of detailing such 
links and could also serve as a step toward providing researchers and 
practitioners with an empirically derived data base for use in related 
investigations. Furthermore, the elaboration of a coherent theoretical 
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perspective for studying Adaptive Emotional Resiliency and its subsequent 
role in underpinning the development of the SRS represents a first major 
step toward establishing a non-biased multi-dimensional assessment system 
aimed at empirically measuring a child's level of e:µiotional resilience on a 
vulnerable-invulnerable continuum. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SC~E DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction to the Study of Emotion 
In attempting to investigate the concept of . emotional resilience, 
researchers are likely to focus their initial interest on the term "resilience," 
since the term "emotional" may seem quite clear. However, throughout the 
20th century, social scientists have been unable to reach a consensus 
regarding the definition of emotion despite the near universal belief that a 
child's emotional development plays a key role in understanding overall 
development (Strongman, 1978). Plutchik (1980) illustrates this dilemma 
by reviewing 28 definitions of emotion. However, investigators need 
venture no further than to ordinary dictionaries published in the past 50 
years to appreciate the complexity involved in defining this concept. For 
example, Webster's Columbia Concise Dictionary (1939) defines emotion 
as "A moving of the mind or soul; a state of excited feeling of any kind, as 
pleasure, pain, grief, joy, astonishment; one of three fundamental 
properties of the human mind, the other two being volition and intellect" 
7 
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(p. 245). In more recent publications, definitions feature a stronger 
physiological focus. Emotion is defined in Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1967) as "a psychic and physical reaction 
subjectively experienced as strong feeling and physiologically involving 
changes that prepare the body for immediate vigorous action" (p. 271). 
Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976) defines 
emotion as "a physiological departure from homeostasis that is subjectively 
experienced in strong feeling" (p. 275). However, psychoanalytically 
oriented dictionaries typically view emotions as states of tension associated 
with instinctual drives such as sex or hostility (Loniffian Dictionary of 
Psychology and Psychiatry. 1984). Interestingly, the clearest lay person's 
view of this term may be illustrated in a relatively recent children's 
publication, Webster's New World Dictionary For Young Readers (1983), 
which defines emotion as "any of the ways in which one reacts to 
something without careful thinking" (p. 240). Although dictionary revjews 
do not represent a scholarly treatment of this concept, they do serve as a 
departure point for discussing historical issues which have contemporary 
relevance. 
Aristotle is considered to be the earliest major philosopher to have 
developed a theory of emotion which has had a significant impact on 
contemporary theorizing (Diamond, 1974). In the 4th century B.C., 
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Aristotle identified four structural components involving emotion; an 
object or stimulus which acts as an emotional triggering device, a 
perception and a cognitive evaluation of the triggering stimulus as being 
good or bad, a physiological state expressed as a feeling of pleasure or 
pain, and a pursuance or avoidance of the object or stimulus. More than 
2,000 years would pass before the next major theorist wrote about 
emotion. In the 17th century, Descartes offered a theory which suggested 
that emotion involved the excitation of the soul caused by a liquid body 
regulating substance called animal spirits (Strongman, 1978). Although 
considered the major theory of its era, Descartes' views apparently have 
had little impact on contemporary scientific theories of emotion. 
Nevertheless, Descartes' conception of emotions resulting in disorganized, 
chaotic behaviors because of a somewhat irrational soul may have had a 
monumental, albeit subtle, impact on the direction of contemporary lay and 
scientific thought for this area. 
A broader perspective for understanding Descartes' views may 
involve tracing the course of modem science and the scientific revolution. 
The prevailing viewpoint which fueled the scientific revolution between the 
years 1500 and 1850 suggested that the world was divided into two spheres: 
the physical world, composed of tangible objects, and the spiritual world, 
involving the abstract world of the mind and feelings which reflected the 
10 
human soul (Lynch, 1976). It was thought that the physical world could be 
measured scientifically, whereas the spiritual world could not. Because of 
this perceived dichotomy between mind and matter, the scientific study of 
emotions was largely ignored until the latter part qf the 19th century. At 
this point, Charles Darwin proposed that man had evolved from a lower 
species of animal. He also suggested that the expression of emotions in 
higher animals such as dogs or monkeys was similar. to the way that man 
expressed emotions (Darwin,1871, 1934). Although bitterly opposed by 
many religious groups, these revolutionary thoughts were quickly 
embraced by the scientific community and opened the door to the scientific 
study of emotions via animal experiments. 
Contemporary scientific approaches to the study of emotion 
typically have featured three directions. Because of the many definitions of 
emotion which focused on somatic or visceral changes, physiological 
approaches generally have been devoted to identifying the physiological 
correlates of emotion (Black, 1970). However, despite some promising 
studies that attempted to evaluate central nervous system and 
neurochemical reactions, no specific mechanisms have been found that 
directly trigger particular human emotional behaviors (Lewis and 
Michalson, 1983). Furthermore, much of this physiologically oriented 
research has involved nonhuman subjects, thus making the generalizability 
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of findings to humans quite speculative. 
Physiologically oriented investigators generally have been 
concerned with the underlying physical correlates related to emotions. 
However, theories generated from this approach have been highly 
inadequate in examining the subjective phenomenological experiences that 
are generated by human emotions. A cognitive approach therefore has 
been extensively utilized in accounting for the individual differences seen 
in emotional responsiveness (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Subsequently, 
there is widespread research support for the position that cognition is a 
necessary precondition for emotional responses to occur ( Arnold, 1970; 
Kagan, 1974; Lazarus, Coyne and Folkman, 1982; Mandler, 1980). 
Lazarus (1982) typifies the cognitive approach theorists by focusing on the 
role of cognitive appraisals, that is, the way individuals tend to interpret 
their own plight, in determining the type and degree of emotional 
responses. The bases for most cognitive appraisals are closely related to 
memories of past experiences. Thus, Lazarus views emotions as the 
outcome of a cognitive appraisal process that aims at adaptively copmg 
with various situations, particularly stressful events. Other major 
contemporary emotional theorists who subscribe to a cognitive approach 
focus on discrepancies rather than cognitive appraisals (Berlyne, 1970; 
Kagan, 1978). They consider emotions as products of certain 
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discrepancies between external events and internal representations or 
schemata. The type of emotion created is contingent upon how these 
discrepancies are perceived. Emotional adaptation, in this view, involves 
an individual's ability to assimilate an incongruous Qr unexpected event into 
an existing cognitive schema. 
In contrast to the perspective provided by the cognitive 
approaches, researchers such as Zajonc (1980) have. promoted the notion 
that emotions do not require cognitive appraisals since they seem to 
possess separate anatomical structures. Thus, motivational approaches to 
the study of emotion suggest at least a partially independent affective 
process that is presumably derived from biological instincts. In this view, 
emotions are equated with hedonistic drives or motives which are necessary 
for survival. Such biological explanations of emotion are associated 
primarily with two camps; the evolutionary theorists (Darwin, 1872; Izard, 
1977; Plutchik, 1980) and the psychoanalytic theorists (Freud, 1920; 
Rapaport, 1960). Some theorists have also advocated a mix of evolutionary 
and psychoanalytic principles (Bowlby, 1969, 1973). Motivational 
theorists suggest that emotions act as antecedents of action rather than as 
consequences of behavior (Zajonc, 1984). This "primacy of affect" 
position therefore implies that at times emotional states may produce 
cognitive behaviors rather than the reverse (Bower, 1981 ). 
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Perhaps Lewis and Michalson (1983) have proposed a more viable 
explanatory resolution to the controversy of cognitive versus emotional 
primacy. They have viewed these two processes as interacting in a complex 
fashion similar to the themes in a musical fugue. In this transactional view, 
one key element involves the interpretive-cognitive structure of the self 
which underlies emotional experience. The emergence of the concept of 
one's self seems to be an ingredient that is necessary in order for an 
emotional experience to occur (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 1979). However, 
maintaining an emphasis on the paramount importance of the self-concept 
construct, which resides at the core of a child's emotional development, is 
not a new and unique idea. Instead, it is a viewpoint that traditionally has 
been held by many personality theorists (Branden, 1969; Briggs, 1970; 
Combs and Snygg, 1959; Maltz, 1970; Rogers, 1951; Rosenberg, 1965). A 
more detailed discussion and analysis of the self construct is thus in order. 
Self-Concept Theory and Background 
Similarly to the rich historical background noted in theories about 
emotion, the concept of self has intrigued man for centuries. This 
fascination stems from the ancient writings of St. Augustine in the 4th 
century A.D. (Diggory, 1966). Early 20th century pioneers who studied 
the self construct included James (1890), Freud (1920), Adler (1927), 
Mead (1934), and Lewin (1935). Despite the efforts of these and other 
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individuals, Wylie (1961) points out that the self received little attention 
from the behavior oriented psychologists who dominated American 
psychology from the 1920's through the 1940's. In addition, Diggory 
(1966) suggested that much of the work done on the self construct during 
this period lacked rigorous experimental design and was therefore 
vulnerable to being unduly criticized or dismissed. Nevertheless, many of 
the early researchers provided significant insights- and guidelines for 
studying the self-concept. 
Several contemporary theorists have placed a central importance 
upon the self as a primary psychological entity. Carl Rogers developed a 
system of psychotherapy which he labeled as "client centered" (Rogers, 
1951). This system saw the structure of self formed basically as a result of 
interactions with the environment and, moreover, as a function of 
evaluational interactions with others. Rogers viewed the self as a 
phenomenological unit which developed from a pattern of conscious 
perceptions that was experienced by the individual. These perceptions 
were seen as having a strong bearing on the individual's subsequent 
behavior and adjustment. Rogers (1951) formally defined the self-concept 
as "an organized, consistent, conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of 
the characteristics of the 'I' or 'me' and the perceptions of the relationships 
of the 'I' or 'me' to others, together with the values attached to those 
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perceptions" (p. 498). He further noted that the self was a fluid and 
constantly changing gestalt, but that at any given moment it was also a 
specific entity which was at least partially definable in operational terms by 
means of some instrument. Rogers' insights had made such a great impact 
on integrating earlier notions regarding the self-concept that his entire 
theoretical framework became known as "self theory" (Patterson, 1961). 
Stanley Coopersmith was another notable and influential 
contemporary researcher in the field of self study. His theoretical 
formulations of self-esteem focused sharply upon the idea of self-evaluation 
or the esteem attached to the self (Coopersmith, 1959). According to 
Coopersmith (1967), self-esteem was: 
the evaluation which an individual makes and customarily maintains 
with regard to himself; it expresses an attitude of approval or 
disapproval and indicates the extent to which the individual believes 
himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy. In short, self-
esteem is a personal judgment of worthiness and is expressed in the 
attitudes the individual holds toward himself. It is a subjective 
experience which the individual conveys to others by verbal reports 
and other overt expressive behavior. (p. 5) 
In contrasting these prototypic formulations, certain 
commonalities become apparent. Both Rogers and Coopersmith suggest 
that the initial development of a favorable self-attitude is in great part 
determined by individuals' perceptions of how others are treating them. 
The self-image is therefore heavily laden with evaluative judgments 
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regarding perceived self-experiences. Furthermore, individuals tend to 
perceive experiences based solely upon their own unique subjective reality; 
subsequently, their present and future behaviors are largely a function of 
these idiosyncratic perceptions. Obviously, positive self-judgments are 
closely related to personal satisfaction and effective functioning. 
Despite these commonalities, however, some investigators have 
proposed that self-concept and self-esteem are separate and unique entities 
(Calhoun & Morse, 1977; Germain, 1978). The logic behind their 
definitive arguments seems less important than the idea that any attempt to 
differentiate these terms should be based upon the assumption that 
commonly accepted definitions of each exist. This, in fact, has not been 
the case. Although self-esteem typically has been used in a more 
molecular fashion, there is presently no single theoretical context in which 
either self-esteem or self-concept may be considered. Currently, scores of 
theories and definitions of these terms are found in the literature. Wylie 
(1974), summarizing her comprehensive review of work on the self-
concept, noted that theoretical definitions concerning the self have been 
"stretched to cover so many inferred cognitive and motivational processes 
that their utility for analytic and predictive purposes has been greatly 
diminished" (p. 317). Analogously, Coopersmith (1959) stated that "a 
clarification and definition of what is meant by self-esteem is essential" (p. 
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92). Adding to this confusion, a number of investigators have studied the 
self construct under other headings, such as: self-satisfaction, 
self-acceptance, self-favorability, self-actualization, and self-identity 
(Allport, 1961; Erickson, 1959; Goldstein, 1940). .Thus, many researchers 
have recognized that various self terms have become riearly impossible to 
differentiate since, in some cases, a particular term may have various 
meanings while, in other instances, a particular meaning may be attached to 
several terms (Wylie, 1989). 
Attempts to restore some order to this perplexing field have been 
made by Hall and Lindzey (1970), who reported that the term self as used 
in modern psychology has come to have two distinct meanings. On the 
one hand, it represents people's attitudes and feelings about themselves. On 
the other hand, it symbolizes a group of psychological processes which 
govern behaviors and adjustment. The first meaning reflects the self-as-
object definition, since it denotes the person's attitudes, feelings, 
perceptions, and evaluations of himself or herself as an object. In this 
sense, the self is what individuals think of themselves. The second meaning 
reflects the self-as-process definition. The self is a doer in the sense that it 
consists of an active group of processes such as thinking, remembering, and 
perceiving. A comprehensive definition of self-concept should therefore 
take into account and integrate the self-as-object and self-as-process aspects 
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of this complex construct. Joseph (1979) proposed such a definition in his 
efforts to develop a self-concept measuring device. He defined self-concept 
as: 
the way an individual perceives himself, his beh_aviors, how others view 
him, and the feelings of personal worth and satisfaction that are 
attached to these perceptions ... this personal judgment is based upon five 
general dimensions. However, these dimensions may not be considered 
equally important. The two dimensions that are of primary importance 
include: Significance - the extent to which we perceive ourselves as 
being valued by significant others; and Competence - the perceptions of 
being able to successfully perform and master environmental demands. 
In considering the dimension of Significance, we see that human beings 
tend to value themselves as they are valued... Competence may be 
considered a key area of self concept development in that even the very 
young child seems to innately experience a pleasurable sense of efficacy 
that accompanies his encounters with the environment... The remaining 
three dimensions of the self concept.. .. include: Power - the perceived 
ability to influence, manipulate, and control others; General Evaluative 
Co,ntentment - feelings of satisfaction with one's present life 
circumstance; and Virtue - perceived adherence to moral standards ... 
As a group, these three secondary dimensions are considered to be 
derivative or indirect expressions of the two primary dimensions of 
Significance and Competence ... the dimension of Virtue may be looked 
upon as a derivative of the Significance dimension. Analogously, the 
dimension of Power is basically an indirect expression of Competence 
and is therefore looked upon as its derivative. The dimension of 
General Evaluative Contentment (GEC) holds a special place in this 
schematic structure since it may reflect an individual's contentment or 
discontent with his Significance and/or Competence dimensions. (p. 8) 
If one embraces this general interpretation of the self-concept, it 
may be assumed that the attitudes that children hold toward themselves and 
the extent to which they value their own worth will significantly influence 
their emotional growth, academic achievement, interpersonal relationships, 
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and the outcome of major life expenences. The self-concept may, 
therefore, be considered the best single predictor of a child's ability to 
"succeed" as a human being. One key aspect of this view which has been 
extensively investigated relates to academic achieyement. In fact, many 
researchers have questioned the commonly held assumption that ability is 
the most important factor in achievement. Instead, a number of studies 
have supported the notion that students' attitudes may establish a limit on 
their ability to achieve in school (Bailey, 1971; Battle, 1982; Brookover, 
Thomas and Patterson, 1964; Coopersmith, 1967; Fink, 1962; Hirt, 1970; 
Purkey, 1970; Shaw, Edson and Bell, 1960; Silverman, 1964; Wattenberg 
and Clifford, 1964). Furthermore, there is considerable empirical 
evidence to suggest that even cognitive outcome variables such as grades in 
school are not good predictors of future occupational success (Berg, 1970; 
Jencks, 1972; McOelland, 1973). Thus, in order to evaluate the 
relationship between an individual's self-appraisal and functional behaviors 
such as academic achievement, the idea of consistency must be carefully 
considered as well. 
The consistency of global self-evaluations seems theoretically and 
empirically supported by prominent researchers (Combs and Snygg, 1959; 
Engel, 1959; Festinger, 1962; Horney, 1945; Jersild, 1952; Lewin, 1935; 
Rogers, 1951). Typically of these theorists, Lecky (1945) pointed out 
. 
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that the preservation of one's perception of one's self is the prime motive 
in all behavior. According to Lecky, self-consistency is necessary in order 
to maintain or preserve the identity of the self. Even individuals who 
believe that they are weak, incompetent, or immoral will adhere to these 
perceptions and bolster this picture of themselves · while refusing to 
acknowledge any perceptions that would suggest otherwise ( e.g., that they 
may be powerful, competent, or moral). Subsequently, experiences which 
are incongruent with an individual's self-concept tend to be denied 
regardless of their social character. The individual's self-image must be 
considered as both the product of past experiences and the producer of 
whatever new experience he or she may be capable of. Current behaviors 
therefore may be considered a direct expression of the self-concept. In 
light of this perspective, the idea that self-perceptions may have a 
significant bearing on critical adaptive behaviors seems quite reasonable 
(Antonovsky, 1974; Juhasz, 1989; Sroufe, 1978). 
Despite the support cited for the importance of the self-concept 
and general emotional development in children, social scientists and 
educators continue to emphasize the importance of cognitive variables in 
measuring the developmental status of children (Anderson and Messick, 
1974; Cohen, Montague, Nathanson and Swerdlik, 1988). This 
preoccupation with the importance of cognition has also manifested itself in 
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a variety of other ways; these range from practices seen in parental child 
rearing priorities to instructional teaching approaches utilized m many 
public schools. Furthermore, educational and social program 
accountability guidelines which have resulted from governmental policy 
reform directives have focused on promoting cognitively oriented 
outcomes (Lewis and Michalson, 1983). In contrast, critical aspects of 
competence involving key emotional variables . such . as the self-concept, 
social awareness, and interpersonal relatedness have been largely ignored 
in contemporary educational and social policy making (McOelland, 1973; 
Zigler and Trickett, 1978). Although it seems difficult to account 
definitively for this all consuming societal preoccupation with intelligence 
at the expense of adaptive emotional functioning, the earlier discussed 
Cartesian influence may have subtly predisposed the contemporary Western 
world toward downplaying the scientific and practical importance of 
various emotional processes. Despite this apparent cognitive "bias," 
however, in recent decades the notion that interpersonal relatedness may 
represent a critical aspect of human competence has received an increased 
level of attention (Anderson and Messick, 1974; Sroufe, 1979). Thus, a 
more detailed analysis of close emotional ties, or attachment, between 
individuals is required. One major task of this analysis should be to 
address how such attachments relate to competence and provide the initial 
foundation upon which the self-concept forms. 
Theoretical Antecedent Processes of the Self-Concept 
The Attachment Process - Foundational Structures 
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The image of a mother expertly caring for. her baby is so natural 
and pervasive that it has practically been "burned" into Western society's 
consciousness. It is assumed that mothers will supply food, shelter, and 
unlimited amounts of loving warmth to their newborns. This assumption 
follows from a more basic assumption that mothers are intrinsically 
capable of and motivated to care properly for and become instantly 
attached to their babies. But what are the effects on a child if an intimate 
attachment with one person does not form? Given the earlier discussion of 
Darwin, it is not surprising that one of the first research teams to shed light 
on this question was Harlow and Harlow (1969). Beginning in the 1940's, 
they conducted research regarding the effect of maternal deprivation on 
infant monkeys. What firsl came to the Harlows' attention was the 
observation that when physically healthy baby monkeys were separated 
from their mothers to avoid the spread of disease in the colony, they 
became withdrawn and antisocial. In attempting to discover what needs the 
mother monkey satisfied in her offspring and how an early separation from 
the mother would affect the baby, the Harlows placed baby monkeys in 
total isolation. These monkeys soon huddled in the corners of their cages 
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and engaged in self-destructive or bizarre behaviors. When some of the 
same monkeys had babies of their own, they often ignored or abused them. 
They did not know how to "mother" since they had never been mothered 
themselves. Although there were attempts to interv.ene therapeutically with 
the isolated monkeys, many did not recover. The Harfows concluded that 
mothering and intimate contact were crucial to the normal development of 
monkeys. 
The work of Spitz (1945, 1946) and Bowlby (1969) extended this 
animal research to humans. Spitz's observations of children living in an 
orphanage seemed to support the Harlows' theories of mothering. Although 
the physical needs of these children were being met, many were still 
unhealthy and, in fact, were not developing normally in either a physical or 
emotional sense, due in large part to staffing shortages. Spitz felt that for a 
majority of the orphaned children, staffing shortages resulted in a lack of 
consistent loving care from the same person. Bowlby's complementary 
research led him to observe that a baby's behavior is specifically designed 
to elicit an emotional closeness to the mother. Bowlby proposed that the 
attachment process begins with such visceral "overtures." In effect, the 
baby starts to single out a _ particular caregiver from all others and 
establishes a special vocal and body language with that person. Once the 
attachment begins, the relationship between the caregiver and the baby 
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normally expands and serves as a potent source of security and strength for 
the infant. Subsequently, this special attachment provides the child with the 
impetus for establishing rich interpersonal relationships with others over 
time. Therefore, both Spitz and Bowlby promoted the idea that an intimate 
relationship with a nurturing caregiver is essential to · an infant's overall 
development. 
Whereas Spitz and Bowlby saw the first year of a child's life as 
being the most critical period in developing a special relationship with a 
principal caretaker, the work of Klaus and Kennell (1976) accelerated this 
process dramatically. They posited a critical period between the first few 
minutes and the 12th hour after birth during which close physical contact 
between the infant and the parent was necessary if the appropriate bond 
was to be formed. Although Klaus and Kennell never specifically defined 
the term "bonding," they clearly were pointing to the aforementioned 
critical period concept as if it were a form of imprinting. The bonding 
process was discussed as being a close attachment which suggested "a 
unique relationship between two people that is specific and endures through 
time" (Klaus and Kennell , 1976, p. 18). The period of early contact was 
deemed special in that it could alter a mother's later behaviors. Early 
separations from mother during the immediate postpartum period could 
result in difficulties in establishing a normal or optimal mother-infant 
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bond. An initial failure could then lead to such extreme forms of disorders 
of mothering as abuse and neglect. This early period of contact was 
considered critical in promoting a close bond, because of a presumed 
special readiness on the part of both parents and _infants to communicate 
with each other. Infants were described as being in a state of "quiet alert" 
in the first moments after birth which made them- optimally open to the 
signals of others. 
Although this theory seemed to represent a radical view of how the 
mother-infant attachment process unfolds, other investigators such as 
Vemy (1981) have posited critical birth and prenatal experiences which are 
deemed to have primary importance in the attachment process and 
subsequent social-emotional development. Just as the emotional patterns 
after birth, as suggested by Bowlby, Klaus and Kennell, were presumed to 
have long term implications in shaping the mother-child relationship, so 
too were those before birth, according to Verny. Hence, the concept of 
intrauterine bonding has become very meaningful to a handful of non-
mainstream researchers and clinicians. These individuals believe that the 
bonding process after birth is in fact a continuation of the process that 
began in the womb. Although extrapolating a great deal from the 
literature, Verny (1981) has synthesized and provided some coherent logic 
for the work of these pioneers in prenatal psychology. 
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In studying this area, an intrauterine communication system must 
obviously be at work. Yet how could unborn children sense their mothers' 
thoughts and feelings? Furthermore, when would such a system be 
activated and how could it operate? To begin to answer these questions, 
Montagu (1962) noted that the most obvious type of physiological 
communication from mother to fetus involves anxiety and stress-related 
hormones. These hormones, released by the mother when she becomes 
fearful or upset, in turn pass through the placental barrier, upsetting the 
fetus as well. Possibility of this relationship was originally considered by 
Sontag (1944). During World War II, he noted that severe maternal 
anxieties, such as occasioned by thousands of pregnant women married to 
soldier husbands, could negatively influence fetal personality development 
by increasing maternal neurohormonal production ( e.g., adrenaline, 
noradrenaline, serotonin). This would flood the bloodstream, altering the 
mother's body chemistry and ultimately, the fetus' as well, which in turn 
would heighten the child's biological susceptibility to emotional stress. 
Subsequent growth would then be hindered by these prenatal experiences. 
Sontag (1963) eventually named this phenomenon somatopsychics. 
Somatopsychics represented the mirror image of psychosomatics 
because of the aforementioned hormonal imbalance. Thus, the child could 
become predisposed toward such psychological disorders as anxiety or 
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depression. Nevertheless, early in the pregnancy, these in utero 
hormonal "messages" seemed largely directed toward the fetus' body rather 
than his or her mind and could have resulted in physiological reactions. 
However, by the end of the second trimester, Sonti}g concluded, the fetus' 
brain and nervous system had gradually matured. Consequently, fetuses 
developed a relatively sophisticated awareness of their mothers' feelings as 
well as their own anxieties, fears and general emotional status (via the 
hormonal messages). Stott (1973) demonstrated this notion in a study 
which developed from the premise that a child's physical and emotional 
state at birth and in subsequent years could provide a measure which was 
reflective of the maternal messages received in utero. It was further 
reasoned that short-term maternal upsets would not affect a child as 
significantly as long-term ones. Obviously, the fetuses and newborn 
children in the study could not be interviewed regarding what feelings they 
sensed in utero , but like all human beings, they were subject to the 
psychosomatic effects of stressful negative experiences. No ill effects of 
either a physical or emotional nature were apparent in the children of 
women who had suffered fairly intense but brief stress during pregnancy. 
Therefore, the study supported Stott's premise. 
Interestingly, however, not all the babies whose mothers had been 
exposed while pregnant to intense long-term stresses were born sickly. 
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Closer examination revealed that the nature of the long-term stress was 
critical. For example, prolonged stress due to an illness of a close relative 
had little or no effect on the fetus. However, long-term personal stresses 
such as marriage difficulties which presumably. threaten the mother's 
emotional security did seem frequently to have a very negative effect on 
the fetus' subsequent physical and emotional status at birth. Stott (1973) 
concluded that fetuses may be able to perceive and accurately differentiate 
the nature of their mothers' distress and the extent to which this distress 
reflects a real threat to mother and themselves. Lukesch's study (cited in 
Vemy, 1981) supported Stott's research with a study that concluded that 
the mother's attitude toward her unborn child had the single greatest effect 
on how an infant turned out when other key prenatal factors were held 
constant. Subsequently, the children of accepting mothers who looked 
forward to their child's birth were much healthier emotionally and 
physically at birth and afterward than the children of rejecting mothers. 
Stott's (1977) follow-up study also supported the conclusion that, in 
determining infant risk outcome, the quality of a mother's relationship to 
her spouse or companion was second only to her attitude toward being a 
mother. Stott found that women who were involved in stormy marriages 
ran a 237 percent greater risk of bearing a psychologically or physically 
damaged child than women who enjoyed a secure relationship. This later 
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study pointed out that such widely recognized dangers as physical illness, 
smoking, and heavy physical work during pregnancy posed less risk to the 
unborn child than the aforementioned stresses. Stott added that the 
offspring of the high-risk mothers' group continu~d to be plagued with 
problems at five years of age ( e.g., many were acutely undersized, timid, 
and emotionally dependent on their mothers). 
If it is assumed that in utero or birth related expenences have 
long term implications with regard to an individual's social-emotional 
development, then an implicit acknowledgment regarding the existence of a 
fetal state of consciousness and the capability of a fetus to possess a long 
term memory must logically follow. Traditional cognitive psychology 
would probably reject such a notion, since it is widely believed that 
memory is dependent upon the child's cognitive development (Piaget and 
lnhelder, 1973). Therefore, the potential for possessing a functional 
memory seems unlikely prior to the development of object permanence 
which is seen well into the child's first year. However, some researchers 
have questioned the validity of this position; they have demonstrated the 
existence of memories in one-minute to sixty-minutes-old newborns and 
other perinatal populations (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). These 
investigators concluded that the information processing and memory 
capabilities of the young infant may be much more complex than had been 
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previously believed. Nevertheless, empirical evidence regarding the 
existence of a long term memory storage system is presumed not to exist in 
infants before six months of age (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). 
The basis for these conclusions rests primarily on the results of 
formal laboratory experimentation. Obviously, since the · fetus and newborn 
are limited with respect to understanding verbal directions and possessing 
discernable response modes, formal experimentation for these children has 
been greatly restricted. Yet Verny (1981) suggests that fetal consciousness 
and memory probably begin to develop in the sixth month of pregnancy. 
As had been discussed earlier, negative maternal hormonal messages 
transmitted to the fetus prior to the sixth month may have a largely 
physical impact. The ability of fetuses to perceive meaning and experience 
feelings from these messages are contingent upon their becoming 
neurologically mature. The fetal nervous system must be capable of 
transmitting sensations to higher brain centers which, according to Vemy, 
does not happen until the sixth or seventh month, when the ego starts to 
form. Maternally transmitted anxiety at this stage, within normal limits, is 
probably beneficial to the fetus since it begins to create an awareness of the 
fetus' own separateness. Perhaps the "normal" depression noted in infants 
during the first year of life by Mahler, Pine and Bergman (1975) is one 
effect of these prenatal anxiety experiences and, in fact, represents a 
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continuation of the individuation process as described by Mahler. 
In sharp contrast to Klaus and Kennell's position that the best 
period for bonding is seen in the first few minutes or hours after birth, 
Verny contends that the last two to three months of pregnancy is the 
optimum period for (intrauterine) bonding. At this · stage the fetus is 
maturationally ready for and optimally receptive and responsive to the 
mother's signals. Conversely, the fetus is more vulnerable at this stage 
should those signals prove to be negative. 
Verny supports the validity of these assumptions in a review of a 
number of case studies. Given the aforementioned concerns regarding 
formal experimentation in this area, such anecdotal evidence seems 
noteworthy. The following case is an example: 
Dr. David B. Cheek, in contrast, has focused his attention specifically 
on birth memories. In a remarkable clinical experiment done several 
years ago, he took four young men and women he had delivered during 
his years as an obstetrician in Chico, California, put them under 
hypnosis, and asked each to describe how his or her head and shoulders 
were positioned at birth. Positioning was selected as a measure of the 
reliability of birth memory because Dr. Cheek knew there was no way 
his subjects could know the answers beforehand. Information like this 
rarely finds its way beyond the obstetrician's delivery notes, and the 
delivery notes of these young men and women had been under lock and 
key in Dr. Cheek's files for more than two decades. They were the 
test's corroborating proof. In every case what the hypnotized patient 
told Dr. Cheek was confirmed by what he found in his files later (he 
was careful not to consult them beforehand for fear of leading the 
subjects on). Each man and woman accurately described how his or 
her head had been turned and shoulders angled at birth, and also the 
way he or she was delivered. (Verny, 1981, pp. 99-100) 
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In contrast to the amorphous state of the fetal and infant memory 
literature, the intriguing and provocative position that a mother-infant 
bond may develop in utero or in a relatively short period of time after 
birth has led to a flurry of research. The ramificati_ons of such notions are 
potentially far-reaching. Since the concept of intrauterine bonding is 
obviously more difficult to examine scientifically, a natural avenue of 
exploration has been to study the bonding process after birth. Once again, 
the Klaus-Kennell bonding premise suggests a critical period in the first 
few minutes or hours after birth. During that time close physical contact 
between the infant and the parent is necessary if the appropriate bond is to 
be formed. This early period is deemed special in that it can alter a 
mother's later behaviors. Therefore, early separations from the mother 
can result in bonding difficulties and possibly lead to serious disorders of 
mothering ( e.g., abuse, neglect). Against this theoretical backdrop, a 
number of early separation studies have compared the progress of groups 
of separated and non-separated infants and their mothers. 
Although the Klaus and Kennell theoretical framework of bonding 
was based largely on analogies made with the behaviors of newborn chicks 
and goats, in one study they observed two groups of mothers. Those in 
the first group were allowed to hold their babies for one hour immediately 
after birth and then again for extended periods on each of the next three 
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days. The second group of mothers were given routine hospital treatment: 
a glimpse of their baby at birth, brief contact for identification, and short 
visits of twenty minutes for feeding. When mothers and their babies were 
observed after one month, the doctors found that. the mothers who were 
given more time with their children immediately after· birth stood closer, 
engaged in more eye-to-eye contact, soothed their babies when they cried, 
and were more reluctant to leave their infants with -someone else (Klaus 
and Kennell, 1976). In a two year follow-up, the children who had been 
exposed to greater initial contact with their mothers demonstrated greater 
verbal abilities. When both groups of children were evaluated at five years 
of age, the children with extended contact scored higher on two language 
tests and manifested higher IQ scores. In a similar study, greater 
attachment behavior, longer breast feeding, and more rapid weight gains 
were seen in infants who had one hour of skin contact with their mothers 
immediately after birth (Hales, Trause, and Kennell, 1976). 
In contrast, the majority of studies in this area seem to suggest a 
pattern of findings which have been generally unsupportive of the research 
and theory generated by Kennell, Klaus and their associates (Egeland and 
Vaughn, 1981; Field, 1977; Leifer, Leiderman, Barnett and Williams, 
1972; O'Connor, Sherrod, Sandler and Vietze, 1978; Rode, Chang, Sroufe 
and Fisch, 1981; Seashore, Leifer, Barnett and Leiderman, 1973; Svedja, 
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Campos and Emde, 1980). Typically, these studies, which have examined 
varying lengths of separation and early contact, full term seriously ill and 
healthy babies, high-risk premature infants and mothers from white 
middle class and poor black welfare backgrounds, h.ave reported changes in 
the patterns of mother-infant interaction in the first· few months after 
reunion with the separated infant. The main changes in interaction that 
have been found after separation are reductions in: face-to-face interaction, 
affectionate holding, kissing and talking, and close attention paid to the 
babies during pediatric examinations. A common finding of possibly 
greater importance was that the mothers of separated infants suffered a 
reduced level of confidence in their own ability to adequately cope with 
their babies after discharge from the hospital. This was especially true if 
the child was their first. Nevertheless, by the time the children were one 
year old, the aforementioned problematic patterns of mother-infant 
interaction seemed gradually to have disappeared. Furthermore, at age one 
the separated infants did not manifest differences in attachment behaviors 
to their mothers. There was no evidence that limited contact after birth was 
directly implicated in the etiology of child abuse or neglect, although a few 
retrospective studies noted pathological parenting to be more common after 
early separation caused by perinatal complications (Klein and Stern, 1971; 
Shaheen, Alexander, Truskowsky and Barbero, 1968). 
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If indeed much of the research into bonding seems to suggest that 
either extended or lack of early neonatal contact with mothers may have 
short term effects that "wash out" over time (Chess and Thomas, 1982; 
Clark and Clark, 1979), what factors could then be considered critical for 
an optimal parent-child attachment to occur? Fraiberg (1977) and Hess 
(1982) have suggested that two critical conditions must be present; 
continuity and stability. Continuity was described- as consisting of a 
parent's predictable availability during the period of the child's needs. 
This would include both parent constancy and the amount of time necessary 
to allow for the repetition of parent-child interactions. Therefore, 
continuity is seen as a prerequisite in order for attachment to persist. The 
second condition, stability, determines the strength of the parent-child 
attachment. Stability may be viewed as the absence of serious 
environmental change or stress. For example, economic pressures ( e.g., 
lack of food, medical care, housing and other physical needs) may 
represent a major obstacle in establishing stability. 
Although research has not yet specified an acceptable minimum 
degree of continuity and stability required for attachment formation, 
Ainsworth and her colleagues have helped to shed light on this issue. They 
have accomplished this by means of the development of the Strange 
Situation Assessment Procedure, which assesses the attachment behaviors of 
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one-year-old children (Ainsworth, 1979; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and 
Wall, 1978). Ainsworth has suggested that there are distinct differences in 
the attachment quality of babies which may be attributable to maternal 
behaviors that interact with the baby's constitutional endowment. The 
overriding importance of this attachment involves the way infants organize 
their behaviors toward their mothers, since it also affects the way in which 
they organize their behaviors toward other aspects of their environment. 
Attachment organization then provides a core of continuity in development 
which may become for each individual his or her prototypical way of 
relating to others throughout life. The concept of attachment continuity is 
reflected in Ainsworth's observation that maternal behaviors and attitudes 
seen in the first three months of an infant's life are significantly correlated 
with the infant's attachment pattern classification assessed at 12 months of 
age (Ainsworth, 1979). Other researchers have also noted a general 
stability in the quality of the mother-infant attachment relationships 
between 12 and 18 months of age (Egeland and Sroufe, 1981; Rode, Chang, 
Sroufe and Fisch, 1981; Vaughn, Egeland, Sroufe and Waters, 1979). 
Sroufe (1979) further extended the concept of attachment 
consistency by noting that Ainsworth attachment patterns were highly 
s~able for a group of infants not only between 12 and 18 months, but also at 
2 years of age. The securely attached group exhibited more enthusiasm, 
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greater problem solving persistence, more positive affect, less oppositional 
behaviors, less frustration, less anger, and less distress. In another group, 
Sroufe conducted attachment ratings at fifteen months of age. A follow-up 
at 3 1/2 and 5 years of age revealed the securely ~ttached group as being 
peer leaders, more socially involved and rated by teachers as superior to 
poorly attached groups with regard to personal competence and resilience. 
However, these researchers also noted that for some children the quality of 
the attachment could change in a positive or negative direction. Consistent 
with the aforementioned criteria of continuity and stability, the securely 
attached groups were the most stable over time, yet stressful life events 
seemed potentially capable of undermining some secure attachments. 
Conversely, a reduction of stressful life events ( e.g., a less chaotic life 
style) in conjunction with increased family support had an apparent positive 
impact for some infants who initially were assessed as anxiously attached. 
The improved infants may have also been inherently more robust and 
resilient. Therefore, under certain circumstances, it would seem that 
attachment relationships have the potential to change across time despite 
their generally coherent nature. 
In relating this review of the attachment process to the primary 
self-concept dimensions of Significance and Competence, a close theoretical 
linkage seems obvious. With respect to the dimension of Significance, it 
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was noted that the self was formed primarily as a function of evaluational 
interactions with others. If one's prototypical way of relating to· others 
throughout life relates directly to the quality of the individual's early 
attachments to primary caregivers, then it seems _reasonable to conclude 
that such attachments provide the core of continuity in development most 
closely linked to interpersonal relatedness (Rutter, 1979a,b ). It then 
follows that these attachments subsequently shape the Significance 
dimension of the self-concept. However, in contrast to the Significance 
dimension, the theoretical linkage of the attachment process to the 
Competence dimension of the self-concept seems more complex. On the 
surface, such a linkage could be accounted for by noting that Competence, 
perceptions of the ability to perform and master environmental demands, 
results from close positive attachments, since such attachments provide a 
secure base from which children can openly explore their environments 
(Ainsworth and Bell, 1970; Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Sroufe, 1979). 
A closer examination of the attachment process suggests that its generally 
coherent nature seems more intimately linked to Fraiberg's earlier 
discussed prerequisite conditions of stability and continuity. The 
connection between the Competence dimension and Fraiberg's notions are 
subtle but critical. If the attachment process hinges on the parent's 
predictable availability ( continuity) in conjunction with an environment 
39 
which features a lack of serious change or stress (stability), then such a 
predictable and relatively stress-free milieu may provide infants with an 
intuitive sense of control over their own environments. 
It is precisely this perceived control which _may represent the most 
rudimentary aspect of the Competence dimension of the self-concept. 
Goldberg's (1977) analysis of contingency experiences seems to support 
this view of early infant competence. She argues that infant competence 
initially must be learned and maintained by contingency experiences. 
Contingency experiences are defined as "experiences which are controlled 
by or dependent upon the infant's behavior. The amount of control the 
infant actually has is less important than the infant's perception of a 
relationship between behavior and its consequences" (Goldberg, 1977, p. 
164). Roberts and Maddux (1982) have made similar observations 
regarding what they call response-contingent stimulation. In this scheme, 
infants perceive competence to the extent that they are able to elicit and 
thereby anticipate appropriate caretaking responses from their respective 
environments. This discussion suggests that even if a newborn infant's 
cognitive, perceptual and social repertoire is intact, feelings of competence 
may be significantly hindered by an unresponsive caretaker. Conversely, a 
handicapped infant may experience feelings of high competence in the 
presence of a responsive caretaker and a highly predictable environment 
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(Ainsworth, 1979; Ainsworth and Bell, 1974; Lewis and Goldberg, 1969). 
It therefore appears that the attachment process as it relates to 
perceived control may play a vital role in shaping the most fundamental 
aspects of the Competence dimension of the self.:concept. In a broader 
sense, this earliest form of Competence is able to develop into a variety of 
other competencies including the ability to explore, effectively relate to 
others, and maintain a level of ego resiliency (Arend, Gove, and Sroufe, 
1979; Block and Block, 1980; Dweck, 1977; Garmezy, Masten and 
Tellegen, 1984; Halverson and Waldrop, 1974). Thus, the most elemental 
roots of emotional resilience must also in part derive from the attachment 
process (Anthony, 1987; Antonovsky, 1974; Egeland and Sroufe, 1981; 
Sroufe, 1978). However, in order to more fully understand how an 
individual is able to develop the capacity for highly sophisticated, 
emotionally resilient behaviors, it seems necessary to trace the theoretical 
origins of Competence as they relate to various adaptive control processes. 
The Adaptive Control Process - Parallel Structures 
In attempting to investigate structures related to adaptive control 
competencies, it seems apparent that the concept of emotional resilience 
does not possess a well-defined theoretical lineage. Nevertheless, the 
provision of an historical theoretical perspective is possible through a 
"bootstrapping approach." Such an approach must examine and 
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meticulously build on the writings of a diverse group of theorists and 
researchers, then forge a conceptual hybrid which will formally come to be 
known as Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. Since the term "historical" is 
being used in a conceptual rather than purely chro~ological sense, theorists 
in this section will be reviewed in order of idea development. 
One of the first theorists to shed light -on this construct was 
Sigmund Freud, whose psychoanalytic theory has. permeated modern 
thinking regarding personality development (Freud, 1946; Hall, 1954; Hall 
and Lindzey, 1970). Freud proposed that man's behaviors could best be 
described within a tension reducing model. According to Freud, instincts 
were the most important determinants of behavior. These inborn instincts 
were contained in the id, which represented the individual's original system 
of personality. Behavior was then directed toward reducing instinctual 
tensions via utilization of the primary process. The goal of the primary 
process was to avoid painful tension and to obtain pleasure. Unfortunately, 
the id functioned on a totally unconscious level and was not in direct 
contact with reality. Therefore the id, operating alone, would not have 
been able to accomplish its goals effectively or rationally. Subsequently, the 
ego came into existence because of the individual's needs, which required 
more realistic transactions with the external demands of reality. The 
superego was the third and last system of personality to be developed. The 
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superego represented introjected societal norms and values. In some 
respects, it was similar to the ego in that it attempted to exercise control 
over the id's constant striving to gratify instinctual needs. However, unlike 
the ego, the superego did not merely postpone 9r rechannel instinctual 
gratification but tried to block it permanently. On its own, it was just as 
maladaptive and irrational as the id. Freud then conceptualized the 
dynamics of personality as representing the interplay among these three 
major forces: the id - the biological component, the superego - the social 
component, and the ego - the psychological component. The ego, as the 
only component that was in touch with external reality, was considered to 
be the executive of personality, it operated by means of the secondary 
process, which essentially represented realistic practical thinking. The ego 
was capable of formulating adaptive plans to satisfy needs and, by creating 
compromises among the demands of the id, superego and external reality, 
to reduce tensions. The "tools" or mediating functions by which the ego 
was able to accomplish its goals were called defense mechanisms. 
In Freud's theoretical scheme, the operation of sophisticated 
defense mechanisms was the key to optimal effective and adaptive 
functioning. Thus, through Freud's conception of the ego, the defense 
mechanisms of the ego, and the secondary process, a rather broad setting 
may be seen for a variety of forms of adaptive control. More specifically, 
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the Freudian concept of a defense mechanism represents the theoretical 
prototype of all personality control, which in turn may be considered· as the 
earliest and most primitive conceptual ancestor of the current notion of 
emotional resilience. 
Along similar lines, George Klein (1954) ·who clearly was 
influenced by psychoanalytic thinking, developed tlie concept of co~itive 
controls ( or delay mechanisms). Similarly to Freud, Klein saw man as 
being in a constant struggle to gratify inborn needs. Cognitive controls 
were seen as the governing mechanisms that regulated the path and strategy 
of need satisfaction. In Klein's view, the adaptive force or strategy used by 
these cognitive controls usually involved the delaying of needs gratification 
through detouring or rechanneling needs energy in conformity with 
immediate reality. As such, Klein's cognitive controls appeared to be very 
similar to Freud's defense mechanisms. However, Klein differentiated the 
two concepts by noting that effective cognitive controls did not necessarily 
reduce one's tension levels. Instead, they resolved problems which at times 
could even increase tension, yet their overall impact usually led to creative 
cognitive reorganizations. He reasoned that cognitive controls originated 
within the individual's defenses but eventually achieved autonomy. 
Therefore, Klein viewed these cognitive controls as promoting a creative 
form of control as opposed to the restrictive control imposed by Freud's 
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defense mechanisms. Klein derived many of his theoretical notions from 
the results of experimental laboratory studies ( e.g., artificially induced 
need state experiments). Eventually, he concluded that one's "cognitive 
disposition" toward adaptively controlling needs gr~tification could be the 
key intervening personality variable in accounting for personality 
consistency in human beings. Therefore, individuals were seen as being 
predisposed toward functioning with a certain level of. control. Control by 
constriction was at one end of this continuum. Individuals whose behaviors 
favored this end of the continuum were viewed as being overly-controlled, 
rigid, compulsive and perhaps, as Freud would have noted, dominated by 
their superegos. The other end of the continuum was labeled flexible 
control, which connoted loose, impulsive undercontrol and perhaps id 
dominated behavior. Adaptive control was seen as functioning somewhere 
between these two extremes. 
The writings of Robert White (1959, 1976) regarding the concept 
of competence seemed to move away from biologically oriented notions of 
control and, as such, viewed flexible adaptation in a more positive and 
optimistic light. White viewed competence as the ability to exert control 
over one's life and to interact effectively with one's environment. 
Competence was characterized as a learned motive or directed urge rather 
than merely a biological drive. White saw the urge to attain competence as 
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lying at the root of the individual's physical and mental accomplishments. 
Individuals typically developed in the direction of improving their 
effectiveness in dealing with the environment and thereby promoting their 
own personal feelings of efficacy. The seeking .of feelings of efficacy 
would then lead to the building of actual competence in dealing with the 
environment. This search, also, typically would lead to the development of 
a subjective "sense of competence" which, according to White, was a very 
important aspect related to the organization of an individual's personality 
and ego identity. This sense of competence was demonstrated most clearly 
in the confidence with which the individual approached new experiences. 
As discussed earlier, other theorists have also pointed out that this sense of 
competence ( or perceptions of competence), rather than objectively 
attained competence levels, forms the actual basis for developing feelings 
of efficacy which in turn become internalized into the individual's self-
esteem structure (Burns, 1979; Rogers, 1951; Rosenberg, 1979, Wylie, 
1974). 
Overall, White's theory of competence was similar to Klein's 
theory of cognitive controls in its proactive stance and focus on cognitive 
oriented adaptive strategies. White viewed man as possessing adaptive 
strategies of learning. The four major aspects of these strategies included: 
"cognitive - the securing and processing of relevant information, 
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motivational - adequate satisfying of aroused motives, affective - the 
enhancing of positive feelings... and active - discovering and attempting 
competent actions" (White, 1976, p. 212). In some respects, White's 
theoretical formulation of competence (as representjng flexible adaptation) 
diverged radically from that of Freud or Klein. For example, White 
would have argued that many of a 2-year-old chlld's behaviors, such as 
negativism and defiance, in fact represent a heroic struggle for 
independence and the urge to be efficacious. Similarly, this toddler's toilet 
training triumphs would be better described by his or her concept of 
competence than that of control of needs-gratification. 
Lois Murphy's (1962) formulation of coping patterns in part 
represented a refinement of White's competence motive. Through her 
Coping Project, a comprehensive longitudinal study which carefully 
scrutinized how 32 children were able to deal with the new demands and 
difficulties of their everyday lives, Murphy carefully generated a theory 
which · focused on how these children were able to develop flexible 
adaptational modes. She defined coping as "the process of developing ways 
of dealing with new and difficult situations which cannot be handled by 
reflexive, habitual, or automatic functional responses" (Murphy, 1962, p. 
6). Once such methods were consolidated, competence and adaptation 
resulted. As such, coping was viewed as a precursor to competence. 
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Serving as the first link in the chain toward developing a sense of 
competence, successful coping could be seen as leading to enhanced self-
esteem. 
Murphy also delineated many different strategies that children used 
for coping effectively. Although the number and pattern of strategies 
varied from child to child, they included: the ability to orient, explore and 
appraise the environment, the potential to develop reality testing skills, and 
the capacity to set limits to the demands and pressures of the environment 
by responding with delay or caution. This cautious familiarization process 
protected the child against over-stimulation. Children who coped 
effectively were also characterized as being autonomous and flexible. 
Autonomous children were described as possessing a good awareness 
regarding the demands of their situations, an accurate recognition of their 
own limitations such that they could respond to offers of help when 
appropriate, and "the capacity to explore new opportunities for 
gratification and to use them for growth" (Murphy, 1962, p. 253). These 
children had a wide range of pleasure resources and therefore could more 
easily accept a substitute when frustrated. In short, they could find 
potential gratification in most new situations. Adults and peers reacted 
more positively to this type of child as well. 
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Murphy's notion of flexibility was also closely related to that of 
autonomy. Flexibility implied the capacity to respond appropriately in 
varying ways to different situations and demands. This flexibility 
manifested itself as a freedom in "distributing energy" and usually involved 
a creative restructuring of the environment. Cognitive and affective 
flexibility was important in developing the "capacity for recovering and 
restoration of perceptual clarity... and emotional well being" (Murphy, 
1962, p. 260). Flexibility also involved the capacity to delay or postpone 
gratification and to utilize a variety of defense mechanisms. In Murphy's 
view, defenses were a part of the overall coping effort, since they assisted 
in dividing a complex situation into manageable parts. This was 
accomplished through repressing the excessive threat and focusing on the 
part of the situation that could be mastered. Underlying all aspects of 
flexibility, there appeared to be the child's sense of ability to control what 
he or she would react to, how much he or she would accept and express, 
how much he or she would respond to or invest in a situation, how close he 
or she would let others come, and what demands others would be allowed 
to impose. Anxiety and stress were thereby controlled and effectively 
managed. 
Similarities to Murphy's copmg theory may be seen in Klein's 
proactive notion of control, the cognitive restructuring emphasis noted by 
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both Klein and White, and the Freudian role of defense mechanisms. 
Furthermore, in line with Klein's concept of cognitive dispositions, 
Murphy characterized children as being predisposed toward functioning 
somewhere on the continuum between active and p~ssive coping. Children 
whose behavior favored active coping constructively and creatively shaped 
and transformed their environments, were more assertive, and were 
excited by new challenges. In contrast, children who favored passive 
coping strategies were shaped by the environment, experienced new 
challenges as stressors, and aimed at maintaining old balances. Of course, 
active coping was considered by Murphy to be the more adaptive strategy 
pattern. Murphy (1962) noted that these coping predispositions in children 
probably were linked to inborn constitutional factors interacting with 
complex learning situations. They were seen, for most children, as 
coherent and consistent tendencies observed in early infancy, fairly well 
established by age 3, and perhaps persisting through adulthood. Murphy's 
theoretical construct of coping ( especially related to aspects of autonomy 
and flexibility) may therefore represent a giant conceptual step toward 
formulating a relevant theory of emotional resilience. 
Although the writings of Kurt Lewin generally predated most of 
the aforementioned theorists by several years, his work may best be viewed 
at this point in the "conceptual chronology." Lewin's (1935, 1936, 1951) 
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innovative field theory utilized mathematically oriented models to 
represent psychological reality. He characterized field theory as "a method 
of analyzing causal relations and of building scientific constructs" (1951, p. 
45). Lewin believed that the behavior of a person was a function of a field 
of interrelated conditions and forces that existed at the· time the behaviors 
occurred. Lewin's mathematical formulations were represented 
topologically by spatial regions such that the boundaries of these regions, 
rather than their respective sizes or shapes, were their most important 
characteristics. Within this context, Lewin defined the person as being an 
entity set apart from everything else in the world. The separation of the 
person from the rest of the universe was accomplished by drawing an 
enclosed figure. The boundary of the figure defined the limits of the 
person. The next step in representing psychological reality was to draw 
another bounded figure which was larger than and enclosed the person. 
The region between the boundary of the person and that of the larger 
figure was conceived as the psychological environment. The psychological 
environment consisted of all those psychological factors, external to the 
person, that determined behavior. The life space consisted of the two 
regions, the person and the psychological environment. It included the 
totality of possible facts which were capable of determining the behavior of 
an individual. Lewin also postulated two important properties of the 
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person. The property of "differentiation" suggested that one was separated 
from the rest of the world by a continuous boundary. At the same time, 
the person was included as part of the rest of the world, which Lewin 
referred to as the "part-whole relationship" property. 
Lewin maintained that the structure of the· person and the 
psychological environment was differentiated into · a number of regions. 
Furthermore, the number of regions in both areas tended to increase with 
age (differentiation tendency) which reflected the greater psychological 
complexity of the adult as compared with the child. If the adaptive 
requirements of a given situation demanded that the person undergo any 
form of cognitive restructuring, his or her most immediate problem, in 
Lewinian terms, would have been to allow two or more of his 
differentiated regions to access or influence one another. Since each 
differentiated region was separated from another by boundaries that acted 
as resistors or barriers to accessibility, it was primarily the properties of 
these region boundaries that determined one's ability to adapt flexibly and 
in effect become "connected." Lewin (1936) postulated two boundary 
characteristics, permeability and elasticity. Permeability referred to the 
notion that a boundary resembled a permeable membrane or screen more 
than it did a wall or rigid barrier. Excessive boundary permeability 
implied impulsive undercontrolling tendencies, similarly to Klein's notion 
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of flexible control or Freud's id. Excessive boundary impermeability 
suggested rigid overcontrol, as seen in Klein's notion of control by 
constriction or Freud's superego. The other major characteristic of 
boundaries was referred to as elasticity. Boundary ~lasticity was defined as 
"the capacity of a boundary to change its characteristic level of 
permeability-impermeability depending upon impinging psychological 
forces and to return to its original modal level of permeability after the 
temporary accommodation-requiring influence is no longer pressing" 
(Block and Block, 1980, p. 47). Obviously, greater elasticity implied 
greater adaptive recoverability. 
Lewin thus creatively conceived within a tight mathematical model 
a notion closely related to emotional resiliency via his formulation of 
boundary elasticity. In addition, the concept of need ( either inborn or 
learned) was Lewin's basic motivational concept. Needs typically released 
energy and increased tension in the individual. The greater the tension, the 
greater was the force exerted on the boundary of a region (Lewin, 1951). 
In general, tensions tended to spread to neighboring regions such that 
differences of tension between regions were diminished. However, 
whether tension differences would actually be equalized in two given 
regions was dependent upon the regions' respective level of fluidity or 
rigidity. Lewin noted that fluidity involved the force (or tension) 
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necessary to produce a certain change in a region. The smaller the force 
or influence necessary, the more fluid the region. The bigger the force 
that was necessary, the more rigid the region. Whereas elasticity involved 
boundary permeability change characteristics,. the fluidity-rigidity 
dimension involved the characteristic ability of reg10ns to change. 
However, neither extreme of the fluidity-rigidity -dimension represented 
adaptive modes. Again, the fluidity end of the continuum represented 
undercontrol, whereas the rigidity pole represented overcontrol. Overall, 
in Lewin's field theory formulations striking similarities are noted to that 
of need states seen in Freud and Klein, the need for cognitive restructuring 
abilities represented in Klein, White, and Murphy, and the notion that 
energy and tensions in a psychological system are equalized and evenly 
distributed, which Murphy illustrated in her concept of flexibility. 
In an effort to develop a viable theory of emotional resilience, the 
writings of various personality theorists, clinicians and philosophers have 
been reviewed. Therefore, focusing on the area of field dependence - field 
independence seems to be a rather unlikely topic to introduce at this point. 
The early work on field dependence - field independence focused on 
perceptual and intellectual functioning. Orginally, researchers in the 1950's 
viewed field dependence and field independence as tendencies to use one's 
body or field as referents for perceiving an upright perceptual stimulus 
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(Witkin and Goodenough, 1976). These early studies sought to clarify the 
processes underlying perception of the upright stimulus. They did, in fact, 
confirm that there were individual differences in the manner of perceiving 
such stimuli. These self-consistent individual differences in the tendency to 
use the external visual field itself as a primary referent or the body itself 
came to be known respectively as field dependence -and field independence 
(Witkin and Goodenough, 1976, 1977). Individual differences were also 
noted in one's ease or difficulty in separating an item from an organized 
field or overcoming an embedded context. Field dependence and field 
independence were again designated as being linked to perceptual analytical 
abilities which manifested themselves pervasively throughout an 
individual's perceptual functioning. However, subsequent research on this 
dimension has been extended to the domain traditionally subsumed under 
personality (Witkin and Goodenough, 1977). 
Field dependent and field independent cognitive styles currently 
seem best conceived as tendencies to function with less or greater autonomy 
of external referents manifested in both the cognitive and social domains. 
Associated with these contrasting tendencies, field dependent people display 
more of the interpersonal competencies involved in getting along with 
others, whereas field independent individuals do well in cognitive tasks, 
particularly in the spatial domain (Witkin and Goodenough, 1976). 
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Specifically, it seems that field dependent individuals make greater use of 
external social referents when situations are ambiguous, are more attentive 
to social cues, manifest an interpersonal orientation, show strong interest in 
others, prefer to be physically close to people, are. emotionally open, tend 
to undercontrol impulses, and gravitate toward social' situations (Witkin 
and Goodenough, 1977). In contrast, field independent individuals 
typically manifest an impersonal orientation, are not very interested in 
others, show both physical and psychological distancing from others, 
prefer non-social situations, tend to overcontrol impulses, and evidence 
relatively unsophisticated social skills. Nevertheless, these individuals 
typically possess greater skills in cognitive analysis and restructuring, the 
ability to act on the field rather than adhere to its dominant properties 
(Witkin and Goodenough, 1977; Witkin, Goodenough and Oltman, 1979). 
Since the clusters of characteristics found in field dependent and field 
independent individuals have components that are respectively useful in 
dealing with particular situations, neither style can be viewed as inherently 
positive or negative, as their value can be judged only with reference to 
their adaptiveness in a particular situation. The same argument could be 
offered for many of the previously discussed bipolar constructs ( e.g., 
fluidity-rigidity, flexible control-control by constriction, id-superego). 
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In order to better understand the enlarged picture of 
self-consistency in psychological functioning, it should be noted that the 
field dependence-independence dimension is currently subsumed within the 
framework of the theory of psychological differentiation (Witkin, 
Goodenough and Oltman, 1979). The differentiatfon construct was 
introduced into the general area of field dependence~independence research 
in 1962 to accommodate new research findings associated with individual 
differences in perceiving the aforementioned upright stimulus in space. 
The implications of the theory of differentiation for interpersonal behavior 
have been receiving steadily increasing research attention in recent years. 
Briefly stated, differentiation, which is currently considered a high-order 
individual differences construct, is a salient formal property of a 
psychological system (Witkin, Goodenough, 1976; Witkin, Goodenough 
and Oltman, 1979). A less differentiated system 1s m a relatively 
homogeneous state. In a system that is more differentiated, greater 
heterogeneity is noted. A system that is more differentiated also shows 
greater self non-self segregation, which implies definite boundaries 
between an inner core of attributes and an outer core. As such, particular 
attributes are identified as one's own and recognized as being distinct from 
those of others. This sense of separate identity enables the person to 
function relatively autonomously. In contrast, in a less differentiated 
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system there is greater connectedness between self and others. Differences 
in the degree of self non-self segregation lead to differences in the extent to 
which the self or the external field is likely to be used as a referent for 
one's behavior. These differences regarding one's tendency to rely on the 
external field or on the self as primary referents · are the essential 
characteristics described by field dependent and field independent cognitive 
styles. 
A further distinction may be drawn between people who are fixed 
with regard to the characteristics associated with a field dependent or field 
independent style and those who are mobile and have access to the 
characteristics of both styles (Goodenough and Witkin, 1977; Witkin and 
Goodenough, 1976). As had been noted, relatively field dependent and 
field independent individuals seem to make their main developmental 
investments in different psychological areas ( e.g., social or cognitive 
domains respectively). In effect, their psychological growth proceeds 
along different lines. However, some field independent individuals who 
possess refined restructuring skills and display autonomy in interpersonal 
behavior also develop sophisticated social skills that are more commonly 
found in field dependent individuals. The converse is also possible, 
although less likely. Thus, while some individuals are fixed in their 
prototypical use of a field dependent or field independent mode, others are 
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able to adopt either mode as required by the situation at hand. 
The work of Witkin, Goodenough and others related to field 
dependence-independence dimensions and the concept of mobility seem to 
broaden understanding of flexible adaptation and move the current 
investigation closer to a viable theoretical formulation of emotional 
resilience. Despite the initial focus of this research, which seemed far afield 
from that of exploring personality oriented issues, striking similarities 
were apparent relative to the cognitive restructuring focus seen in the 
writings of Klein, White, Murphy and Lewin, to the notion of autonomy in 
Murphy's work, and to the Lewinian constructs of differentiation, part-
whole relationships, regional boundaries, and connectedness. It seems 
especially noteworthy to observe that the highly theoretical formulations of 
Lewin developed in the 1930's would to some extent be "experimentally 
validated" by seemingly unrelated research conducted nearly half a century 
later! 
Perhaps the most contemporary and useful theoretical formulation 
related to the concept of emotional resilience stems from the writings of 
Jack and Jeanne Block, whose landmark longitudinal studies of more than 
100 children have been the focus of nearly 4 decades of research (Block 
and Block, 1980). In examining their constructs of ego-control and ego-
resiliency, it seems apparent that the Blocks were influenced by most of the 
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theorists and researchers who have thus far been reviewed in the Adaptive 
Control section. After years of rigorous research efforts and subsequent 
data support, the Blocks have concluded that there exists a continuity of 
individual adaptation in one's early years and over. time (Arend, Gove and 
Sroufe, 1979; Block and Block, 1980). In support of this conclusion, they 
posit two broad characteristics of ego functioning -which they believe are 
enduring structural aspects of personality that are closely related to 
resourceful adaptation; ego-control and ego-resiliency. They define ego-
control as the ability to control impulses, to temper aggression, and to 
suppress the urge for immediate gratification or relief from frustration 
(Block and Block, 1980). It is therefore the preferred threshold of an 
individual with regard to the expression or containment of impulse feelings 
and desires. Although the Blocks suggest that the antecedents of ego-
control are strongly related to genetic and constitutional factors, they also 
believe that children develop preferred ego-control modes via socialization 
experiences (Block, 1971). Some children learn "too well" and thus 
become ego overcontrollers. They are described as typically being 
constrained, emotionally inhibited, conforming, and unduly delaying of 
gratification. Ego overcontrol seems conceptually linked to such 
aforementioned constructs as; the superego, control by constriction, 
rigidity, excessive boundary impermeability, and a field independent 
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cognitive style. In contrast, some children develop ego undercontrolling 
tendencies which are related to such behaviors as spontaneity, 
impulsiveness, distractibility, and the inability to delay gratification. The 
construct of ego undercontrol seems conceptually linked to: the id, flexible 
control, fluidity, excessive boundary permeability, and a field dependent 
cognitive style. As had been noted with these other bipolar constructs, each 
pole of the ego overcontrol-ego undercontrol dimension may possess 
qualities that are adaptive in · particular circumstances, although, on the 
whole, being prototypically fixed at either continuum end may be 
maladaptive. 
This discussion directly leads to the notion of e1:o-resiliency. 
whose definition will serve as the cornerstone for the currently evolving 
construct of emotional resilience. 
Ego-resiliency when dimensionalized is defined at one extreme by 
resourceful adaptation to changing circumstances and environmental 
contingencies, analysis of 'goodness of fit' between situational demands 
and behavioral possibility, and flexible invocation of the available 
repertoire of problem solving strategies (problem solving being 
defined to include the social and personal domains as well as the 
cognitive). The opposite end of the ego-resiliency continuum ( ego-
brittleness) implies little adaptive flexibility, an inability to respond to 
the dynamic requirements of the situation, a tendency to perseverate or 
to become disorganized when encountering changed circumstances or 
when under stress, and a difficulty in recouping after traumatic 
experiences. (Block and Block, 1980, p. 48) 
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Maintaining an ego-resilient posture also implies the ability to 
modulate one's level of ego-control in situationally appropriate ways. The 
ego-resilient person is therefore resourceful in new and unfamiliar 
situations, can maintain an integrated performance while under stress, and 
is less likely to become overloaded in the face of -competing stimuli. 
Conversely, the ego-brittle individual maintains a- rather rigid pattern of 
adaptation, may become immobilized in responding. to new situations or 
stress and is easily overloaded by competing demands. As had been noted 
with ego-control, the Blocks suggest that the antecedents of ego-resiliency 
seem likely to involve genetic and constitutional factors complexly 
interacting with experiential influences (Block, 1971 ). Therefore, ego-
resiliency reflects a coherent and enduring aspect of personality which 
varies widely from person to person. Furthermore, as a reflection of the 
most versatile adaptive modulator thus far reviewed, the construct of ego-
resiliency represents a highly sophisticated synthesis of the more salient 
aspects of the previously discussed adaptive control processes ( e.g., 
defense mechanisms, cognitive controls, competence, coping flexibility, 
boundary elasticity, and mobility). 
In relating this "landscaped" review of adaptive control processes 
to the Competence dimension of the self-concept, the theoretical linkage 
seems critical. It would appear, as noted earlier, that the Fraiberg 
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attachment prerequisite conditions provide infants with the opportunity to 
develop the most primitive aspects of early Competence involving 
perceived control. It is precisely this provision of a predictably 
appropriate and responsive environment that not 011ly provides the infant 
with a sense of control, but may intuitively introject an orderly set of limits 
as well. This intuitive limit setting process would then set the stage for the 
development of appropriate internal impulse control s.ystems. The nature 
and quality of these early "braking" systems seem to be intimately linked to 
the eventual development of flexible and sophisticated adaptational modes 
involving emotionally resilient competence behaviors. Thus, one's 
Competence could be developmentally charted from its inception as an 
infant's sense of perceived control (feeling in control of the environment), 
which serves as the main precursor to developing appropriate impulse 
controls (being in control of oneself). This development, in turn, may 
eventually lead the individual to developing a repertoire of adaptive 
efficacious behaviors ( exerting control over the environment). 
The Unfolding Self within a Resilience Continuum 
With such a rich theoretical reservoir serving as a backdrop, it 
seems clear that the structural foundation of the self-concept is developed 
through the progressive growth of the attachment process. Specifically, the 
attachment process is integrally linked to the development of the 
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Significance dimension of the self-concept and to early structures involved 
in the development of the self-concept's Competence dimension. In 
contrast, a variety of adaptive control processes seem more closely 
involved m refining the Competence dimension of the self-concept (see 
Figure 1). The antecedent processes of attachment and ·adaptive control in 
tandem seem to provide the core of continuity most closely linked to 
emotional development and the unfolding of the self-concept. One major 
by-product of these two interactive processes which plays a mediational 
role in self-concept development is the construct of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency, which may at this point be formally defined by the investigator 
as follows: It is the dynamic and coherent capacity of the individual to 
modify behaviors and adaptive modes in accordance with the contextual 
demands of reality, to react resourcefully, creatively, and in an organized 
manner to environmental problems or changes, to flexibly cope with and 
recover from the stress of such changes within a reasonable time frame, to 
persistently and appropriately engage and exert control over one's physical 
and interpersonal environment, and to actively maintain or enhance one's 
self-concept in the face of negative competition from stressful experiences 
or circumstances. 
Therefore, the construct of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency 
represents a powerful proactive mechanism which accents innovative and 
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energetically adaptive behavioral response predispositions. However, its 
definition does not preclude the possibility that emotionally con~ruent 
behaviors that seem maladaptive may be manifested prior to the 
mobilization of an individual's resilience resources .. Emotional congruence 
is defined as a state of general conformity between one's emotional 
behaviors and triggering circumstances. As such, it· represents an expected 
response parameter. For example, fearful or depressed behaviors are 
deemed congruent when conditions warrant such emotions. Similarly, a 
general sense of happiness or a positive self-image may also be viewed as 
congruent in the presence of a benign nurturing environment. In contrast, 
emotionally incon~ruent behaviors are viewed as unexpected or 
unwarranted responses relative to one's general life circumstance. Thus, 
the individual who develops a genuinely positive self-image in the face of a 
rejecting hostile environment may be viewed as manifesting emotionally 
incongruous behavior. Along the same lines, the individual who develops a 
poor self-image within the context of a benign nurturing environment may 
also be viewed as emotionally incongruent. The key point regarding the 
congruence-incongruence dimension suggests that it is difficult to fully 
ascertain the degree of adaptiveness of a given behavior without first 
determining the context in which the behavior is being manifested. As 
Nobel Laureate Sir Peter Medawar once commented, "It is not informative 
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to study variations of behaviors unless we know beforehand the norm from 
which such variants depart" (Garmezy, 1981, p. 214). Although a 
seemingly obvious point, this notion runs counter to the prevailing thought 
. underlying traditional adaptive behavior and personality assessment 
practices which typically define adaptive behavior by . the expectations or 
standards of others (Sparrow, Balla, and Cicchetti, 1984). In such a 
"bedrock" view of reality, the adaptiveness of various behaviors is 
measured on a one dimensional absolute basis and outside the context of an 
individual's personality characteristics, past life experiences, present 
environment, and family value system. 
The proposed theoretical system makes no judgment regarding the 
adaptiveness of either congruent or incongruent behaviors before it takes 
into account these important contextual factors. It is possible for a resilient 
individual to manifest emotionally congruent behaviors which on the 
surface appear to be undesirable (e.g., a period of depression). Expected 
episodes ot stress provoked psychological disruption may indeed be viewed 
as natural and initially adaptive (Barron, 1963; Flach, 1988). However, the 
truly resilient individual will eventually utilize resourceful adaptational 
mechanisms in order to resist incapacitation, restore equilibrium to a 
premorbid baseline within a reasonable period, and perhaps, through 
cognitive restructuring strategies, achieve an even higher plane of 
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adaptational functioning. Therefore, such hardy individuals must at some 
point manifest emotionally incongruous behaviors, that is, unexpected 
behaviors in the direction of health. Emotionally healthful behavior in the 
absence of substantial adversity provides no assurance that the individuals 
under observation possess resilient resources, since in effect they represent 
the "unchallenged" (Anthony, 1987). A contrasting point would also 
suggest the possibility of intense and/or prolonged stre~s exposure which is 
capable of tota11y and permanently incapacitating even the hardiest of 
individuals (Garmezy and Rutter, 1983). Subsequently, in the absence of 
emotiona11y incongruous behaviors, obtaining a valid reading of one's level 
of resilience is difficult, particularly if environmental conditions are 
extremely positive or negative. 
Overall, in the currently proposed theory of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency, each individual falls somewhere on a continuum of adaptability 
risk which ranges from Highly Invulnerable ( e.g., the unexpectedly 
healthy) to Highly Vulnerable (e.g., the unexpectedly unhealthy). A 
considerable body of research supports the existence of such a continuum 
(Garmezy and Masten, 1986; Masten and Garmezy, 1985; Murphy and 
Moriarty, 1976; Werner and Smith, 1982). However, individuals who 
consistently manifest emotionally congruent behaviors may at best be 
tentatively classified as either functionally vulnerable or, in the case of the 
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unchallenged, functionally invulnerable. As attempts are made to 
operationalize this newly conceived construct, the notion of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency may eventually come to represent the ultimate life 
"survivability" index. In addition to profiling the unfolding self process as 
illustrated in Figure 1, Table 1 provides an integrative conceptual overview 
of the various adaptive control process structures that have been reviewed. 
Having forged a coherent theoretical perspective for the study of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency, it seems appropriate to more closely examine the 
environmental and hereditary factors which impact on this conceptual 
hybrid. 
Theoretical and Applied Risk Research 
Risk Research Back~ound 
In delineating a conceptual model for understanding emotional 
development, the two theoretical cornerstone processes of attachment and 
adaptive control were viewed as being integrally involved in self-concept 
formation. The focal mediational role played by the construct of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency was implicitly presumed to have genetic origins 
interacting with environmental factors. In a larger sense, the entire 
process was seen as being complexly affected by hereditary and 
environmental factors. However, shifting from the theoretical origins of 
Adaptive Emotional Resiliency to field based research investigations will 
Adaptive Modulators 
Ego Defense Mechanisms 
(Freud) 
Cognitive Controls 
(Klein) 
Competence 
(White) 
Coping 
(Murphy) 
TABLE 1 
A Review of Salient Adaptive Control Processes: 
Parallel Structures Within A Conceptual Chronology 
Bipolar Dimensions 
Id .......................... Superego (* ) 
Sophisticated Primitive 
Defenses ................. Defenses(**) 
Flexible Control by 
Control. .................. Constriction ( *) 
Adaptive Maladaptive 
Control.. ................. Control(**) 
Not Addressed (* ) 
Efficacy .................. Inefficacy(**) 
Not Addressed (* ) 
Active Coping ......... Passive Coping (* *) 
Adaptation 
Sophisticated Defenses 
Adaptive Control 
Efficacy 
Active Coping 
(* ) Relative Dimension - neither end of continuum is inherently adaptive or maladaptive 
(**) Absolute Dimension - continuum has clear adaptive and maladaptive directions 
Adaptive Modulators 
Boundary Elasticity 
(Lewin) 
Mobility 
(Witkin, Goodenough) 
Ego Resiliency 
(Block, Block) 
Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency 
(Joseph) 
Table 1 ( continued) 
Bipolar Dimensions 
Fluidity ................... Rigidity(*) 
Elastic .................... Inelastic(**) 
Field Field 
Dependence .............. Independence ( *) 
Mobility .................. Fixity(**) 
Ego Ego 
Undercontroller. ........ Overcontroller (*) 
Resilient.. ................ Brittle(**) 
Emotional Emotional 
Incongruence ............. 0:mgruence (* ) 
Highly Highly 
Invulnerable ............. Vulnerable(**) 
Adaptation 
Elasticity 
Mobility 
Resiliency 
Invulnerability 
(* ) Relative Dimension - neither end of continuum is inherently adaptive or maladaptive 
(**) Absolute Dimension - continuum has clear adaptive and maladaptive directions 
-...J 
0 
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again require a careful gleaning from a relatively recent body of empirical 
studies. These studies generally have focused on what has come to be 
known as risk research (Garmezy, 1981). 
The risk research field has only recently ~ecome a viable area of 
study. Prior to 1970, only a few researchers, most ·notably Block and 
Martin (1955), Block and Turula (1963) and Murphy (1957, 1960, 1962), 
had systematically attempted to study children who . were at risk for the 
development of psychopathology. A closer examination of the term "risk" 
suggests two connotations (Hersov, 1974). One connotation implies 
activity as in "risk taking." The other is a passive statistical concept applied 
to particular groups as being "at risk." All human beings are exposed to 
various hazards throughout their lives, as Vaillant (1977) noted in his 
detailed longitudinal study of healthy individuals. A similar study 
concluded that "no especially blessed individual turned up in this 
assessment; the luckiest of the lives here studied had its full share of 
difficulty and private despair" (Vaillant, 1977, p. 3). In contrast, the 
hazards referred to in some contemporary risk research involve two focal 
points; the risk from exposure to severely detrimental environmental 
experiences (both acute and chronic) and the risk of inheriting highly 
maladaptive characteristics. However, before exploring the complex facets 
of these two areas, a brief historical review is in order. 
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Preordained Risk - Childhood Past and Present 
Prior to the 20th century, just being a child was in itself a high-
risk venture (Langer, 1974). "The history of childhood is a nightmare 
from which we have only recently begun to awakep. The further back in 
history one goes, the lower the level of child care, and the more likely the 
children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized and sexually 
abused" (DeMause, 1974, p. 1). Over the centuries, adults were much 
more likely to victimize their children than to protect and nurture them. If 
children manifested emotional problems during these "dark ages," they 
would typically be labeled as "possessed" or "wicked," having apparently 
failed to meet the expectations of their family or society (Despert, 1965). 
Despert noted that only in recent years have adults modified their views of 
problematic children in favor of a more compassionate and understanding 
position. It would seem that the middle class focus of most Western 
cultures in the latter half of the 20th century has become child-oriented. In 
such a view, nurturing parents are seen spending time with and respecting 
their children, listening to them, and providing them with economic and 
social advantages. Unfortunately, this popular image of the dedicated 
parent and the idyllic existence of the modern day family seems to describe 
only a minority of children and their families (Feiner, Gillespie and Smith, 
1985). 
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Rexford (1969) points out that while it is true that Western society 
has become "less openly murderous" with children, a more insidious form 
of abuse and neglect has taken its place. Lasch (1979) shares Rexford's 
concern about the child-rearing ambivalence, insensitivity and self-centered 
qualities seen in many contemporary parents. Feiner ef al. (1985) concur; 
they suggest that many parents voluntarily choose work over child rearing. 
The obvious result involves large numbers of children who currently 
receive "pillar-to-post" day-care outside their own homes or who from an 
early age may be literally raising themselves since they are largely 
unsupervised for prolonged periods (Rutter, 1981). Other serious child 
hazards have currently become commonplace as well. For example, more 
than a million children yearly experience the divorce of their parents and 
thus become added to the millions of children already living in single 
parent homes (Norton and Glick, 1979). Many more grow up in so-called 
intact homes that are characterized by high levels of parental conflict which 
may be even more emotionally hazardous to children than divorce (Emery, 
1982; Feiner, 1984). More children are subject to abuse and neglect 
(Gelles and Strauss, 1979), are born to teenage mothers (Magrab and 
Danielson-Murphy, 1979), and/or live in poverty (Feiner et al., 1985). 
The presence of any one of these stressors increases the likelihood that 
others will follow ( e.g., parental strife may lead to divorce which may then 
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lead to economic difficulties). Furthermore, in the presence of real or 
anticipated turmoil, the suicide rates of young and adolescent children in 
the United States have nearly tripled in the past generation (Coleman, 
Butcher and Carson, 1988; Pfeffer, 1981). By eve1_1 the most conservative 
estimates, as many as twenty percent of all children may currently require 
intensive mental health services (President's Commission on Mental Health, 
1978). It therefore seems fair to note, as had been. the case for earlier 
generations, that many of today's children are certainly no strangers to 
exposure to material, physical and particularly emotional risk. 
Given this alarming state of affairs, it is not surprising that mental 
health practitioners and researchers historically have focused their attention 
on vulnerable individuals and their psychopathological behaviors (Vaillant, 
1977). Murphy (1962) elaborated on this point: 
It is something of a paradox that a nation which has exalted in its rapid 
expansion and its scientific technological achievements, should have 
developed so vast a 'problem' literature: a literature often expressing 
adjustment difficulties, social failures, blocked potentialities, and 
defeat... In applying clinical ways of thinking formulated out of 
experience with broken adults, we were slow to see how the language 
of adequacy to meet life's challenges could become the subject matter 
of psychological science. Thus there are thousands of studies of 
maladjustment for each one that deals directly with the ways of 
managing life's problems with personal strength and adequacy. The 
language of problems, difficulties, inadequacies, or antisocial or 
delinquent conduct,· or of ambivalence and anxiety is familiar. We 
know that there are devices for correcting, bypassing, or overcoming 
threats, but for the most part these have not been directly studied. (p. 
3) 
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Murphy was one of the first researchers in the field to point out this 
apparent researcher-practitioner predisposition toward accenting deviance 
and assuming the inevitability of maladaptive outcomes for children 
growing up in unhealthful settings. This focus has until recently been 
rigidly adhered to despite considerable research eviderice of the tenuous 
nature of predicting outcomes for children in high..:risk settings (Lebovici 
and Diatkine, 1974; Rutter, 1979b; Werner and Smith, .1982). The illusion 
of an inevitability of outcome may have been generated from retrospective 
studies which have, in fact, been fairly predictive (Escalona, 1974). The 
incidence of such stressors as neglect, abuse, loss, disruption and trauma 
usually has been found to be statistically higher for psychiatric than for non-
psychiatric populations (Brown, Sklair, Harris and Birley, 1973; Gersten, 
Langner, Eisenberg and Simcha-Fagan, 1977). However, prospective 
studies have not fared as well in predicting which vulnerable individuals 
among a high-risk population will adapt and which will succumb to deviant 
outcomes (Garmezy and Nuechterlein, 1972). Favorable outcomes for 
children exposed to various forms of intense risk ( e.g., pathological 
parenting, family turmoil, poverty, abuse, biological insult, loss) have 
been surprisingly common yet difficult to predict (Anthony, Koupemik 
and Chiland, 1978; Escalona, 1974; Etaugh, 1980; Fraiberg and Bennett, 
1978; Gaensbauer, 1980; Garmezy, 1971, 1981; Rutter, 1979b; Ward, 
1981; Werner and Smith, 1982). 
Preordained Resilience 
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With the recent burgeoning of risk research, increased interest has 
been seen in the study of apparently stress-resistant children. Despite their 
abilities to thrive and function adaptively in the face of overwhelming 
-
adversity, these children have been curiously neglected (Antonovsky, 
Maoz, Dowty and Wijsenbeek, 1971; Block and Block; 1980; Chess, 1971; 
Clark and Clark, 1979; Krystal, 1968; Murphy and Moriarty, 1976; Sobel, 
1973; Waddington, 1966). In recent years such children and their adult 
counterparts have been described as "invulnerable" (Anthony, 1974; 
Garmezy, 1974a,b). Garmezy (1976) noted two key components in the 
lives and psychological make-up of such children; the presence of sustained 
and intense life stresses and the maintenance of mastery and competence 
despite such stress exposure. 
Goertzel, Goertzel and Goertzel (1978) documented the great 
achievements of famous individuals who overcame significant adversity 
during their childhoods and, for some, throughout their adult lives. 
Although an examination of the lives of such prominent invulnerables as 
Einstein, Edison and Kafka may be of interest, it offers little insight into 
the heroic struggles of the vast majority of invulnerables who have 
managed to overcome equally traumatic life experiences without the benefit 
of extraordinary talents and/or intellect. 
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The ability of these 
11 extraordinary ordinaries" to lead relatively normal lives reflects a 
remarkable level of accomplishment that deserves a greater research focus. 
Early mythological views of invulnerability may also provide a valuable 
guiding light for such studies. 
The notion of invulnerability dates back -to the mythology of 
ancient man where immunity from illness and injury· was granted to or 
obtained by certain individuals (Anthony, 1974). These myths fell into two 
general categories. In the first group, invulnerability was fostered by a 
mother who was usually overprotective and able to manipulate and insulate 
her child's environment. The story of the warrior Achilles fits this profile. 
In the second group of myths, the hero was continually exposed to various 
risks rather than protected from them. Overcoming each risk seemed to 
strengthen the hero's confidence and competence, thus self-generating 
greater levels of immunity. The story of Hercules was an example of this 
category. In both instances, the immunity was limited yet the 
self-generated immunity of the latter story group seemed longer lasting and 
generally more viable. 
A contemporary fictional analysis of the 
vulnerability-invulnerability continuum was provided by Jacques May, a 
disease ecologist, who described three dolls (Anthony, 1974). One doll was 
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made of glass, one of plastic, and the third of steel. As each was exposed to 
an equally strong blow from a hammer, the glass doll broke down 
completely, the plastic doll evidenced a permanent scar, and the steel doll 
remained intact. In this analogy, vulnerability .was represented as a 
function of the intensity of the external risk (inipact of hammer) 
interacting with the internal constitutional characteristics of the dolls. For 
this particular external threat, the glass doll's constitution placed it in a 
highly vulnerable state. Furthermore, past experiences such as being 
chipped or cracked due to mishandling could have left it in an even greater 
state of susceptibility. Thus, vulnerability was seen as stemming from an 
accumulation of risk experiences which interacted with internal 
constitutional factors. To complicate matters, one could alter the level of 
vulnerability for any of the dolls by applying a protective coating or by 
changing the nature of the external threat. In this context, if the risk 
stemmed from a massive temperature change instead of a hammer blow, 
the level of vulnerability for each doll would need to be reassessed. 
Environmental Risk - The Concept of Stress 
The vulnerable-invulnerable continuum needs to be examined from 
the aforementioned dual focus that typically has been utilized in risk 
research: the risk from exposure to severely detrimental environmental 
experiences and the risk of inheriting highly maladaptive characteristics. 
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The initial and perhaps primary focus for most risk researchers 
has been to examine the risk from exposure to severely detrimental 
environmental experiences. As a throw-back to an earlier era when 
behaviorism reigned supreme and one's environment was considered to be 
a key or even the sole -factor in development, this area has generated 
intense research interest (Gersten et al., 1977; Rabkin and Struening, 
1976). Simply stated, exposure to severely detrimental environmental 
experiences may be equivalently viewed as exposure to stressful 
experiences. The study of such experiences would at first seem to be 
straightforward, thus allowing for ready access to an empirical inquiry of 
stress-resistant children. However, a closer examination of the concept of 
stress offers no such clarity. 
In recent years, the term "stress" has enjoyed widespread 
popularity. Daily conversations focus on stressful experiences, media 
reports are filled with stressful events, and stress education centers abound, 
yet there seems to be little consensus regarding how this concept should 
be used or defined (Mason, 1975; Selye, 1983a). Therefore, an in-depth 
analysis which initially focuses on the derivation of this term may begin to 
shed light on this rather elusive phenomenon. 
The term stress, derived from the Latin, was used as early as the 
14th century (Rutter, 1983). By the 17th century, it implied hardship or 
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adversity as it related to human experience (Hinkle, 1973). Furthermore, 
Hinkle noted, during the 18th and 19th centuries the term took on a more 
scientific description as an external force or pressure imposed on an object 
or person. This eventually led to its adoption .as a precisely defined 
scientific term used in the areas of physics and engineering. In this 
context, it was applied to the notion of elasticity and the distorting 
predispositions of solid bodies. By the late 19th to early 20th century, the 
the term was finding its way into the medical and mental health fields. For 
example, the non-scientific anecdotal observations of Osler in 1910 ( cited 
in Hinkle, 1973) pointed out the deleterious effects of such stressful 
experiences as hard work and worrying on one's physical and mental well 
being. As an interesting aside, Hinkle's (1973) historical analysis of the 
concept of stress noted that the "specific cause of disease" model of 
medicine, which had been largely created and influenced by Pasteur during 
the 19th century, was being replaced in modern medicine. Its replacement 
was the notion that disease was as much a function "of the adaptive 
reactions of the host as ... of the damaging effects of pathogenic agents" 
(p.31). The evolving concept of stress was to contribute heavily to this 
change in medical philosophy. 
The work of Cannon in the early part of the 20th century laid the 
foundation for a large number of empirical research investigations. 
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Cannon's experiments related observations of bodily changes which were 
connected to physical sensations and emotional reactions (Dohrenwend and 
Dohrenwend, 1974). Cannon (1929) viewed living organisms as striving to 
maintain a homeostatic condition and seeking restoration to this desirable 
original state after any disturbing external force became ·apparent. Cannon 
described stress as a stimulus and provided the scientific basis for arguing 
that stressful life events could prove harmful. 
Selye (1956a,1980) advanced Cannon's work by detailing the 
response of laboratory animals to a variety of threatening stimuli ( e.g., 
heat, cold, trauma). He described the concept of stress as a pattern of 
physiological responses which he termed the "general adaptation 
syndrome" (GAS). Selye (1956a) defined this syndrome as a set of non-
specific physiological reactions to various noxious environmental agents. 
The GAS specified three stages that reflected changes in responsiveness in 
the pituitary, adrenal, thymus, and gastrointestinal tract areas when stress 
was prolonged. In Stage 1, the alarm stage, noxious stimuli resulted in 
disturbances in various physiological functions. These disturbances 
represented the body's protective reaction in preparing itself for "flight or 
fight" survival behaviors. In Stage 2, the resistance stage, the body's 
defenses were mobilized to contain the noxious stimuli. In effect, the body 
attempted to force itself to return to a stable equilibrium. However, if the 
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noxious stimuli were to persist, the stage of exhaustion would ensue. In 
this final stage, failure of the body's defenses resulted in serious bodily 
damage or even death. Whether an individual actually reached the stage of 
exhaustion was determined by the personal resources available to the 
individual to contain the external threat in conjunction with the severity 
and chronicity of the threat itself. 
Selye (1980) formally viewed stress as the specific biologic result 
of any non-specific demand upon the body. He labeled such demands as 
stressors (situations, events or people who produce the stress reaction) and 
their effects as "wear and tear" on the person's body which required an 
extra effort of adaptation. Although Selye's 1936 conceptual formulation 
of stress was highly influential for many decades, it reflected a vague 
"chameleon like" quality. For example, Selye distinguished the state of 
stress from the GAS syndrome by noting that the presence of the state was 
manifested only by the appearance of the syndrome (Selye, 1956b). This 
distinction suggested that a stimulus may be considered a stressor only if it 
results in a stress reaction. In this complex formulation, this apparent 
circularity may have ultimately proved to be the theory's greatest 
explanatory strength. Selye (1974) also noted that stressors may result in 
either positive or negative behavioral effects. Thus, much like the Chinese 
character for the word "crisis" which can be used to denote both danger 
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and opportunity, Selye's "two edged sword" viewpoint brought forth the 
possible role of individual differences in determining stressful reactions. 
Selye's major emphasis upon physical trauma resulting m 
biochemically induced debility also seemed to conyerge with the work of 
Franz Alexander, who in the 1930's studied the relationship of personality 
characteristics to psychosomatic diseases (Rabkin and Struening, 1976). In 
retrospect, Selye's physiologically pathological viewpoint of stress may 
have been initially oversimplified; however, it eventually led to 
psychologically oriented studies where such views were powerfully 
expanded. His elusive "non-specific" view of stress resulted in dramatizing 
the complex nature of this phenomenon. Therefore, although Selye's 
earlier formulations did not readily account for psychological stressors, 
they did seem to lay the conceptual groundwork for their study. It should 
be noted that Cannon's stimulus oriented views, which portrayed stress as 
an external force, was in sharp contrast to the Selye response oriented view 
of stress, which accented biochemically induced physiological changes 
(Rutter, 1983). Subsequent stress researchers have also been divided along 
these lines (Engel, 1985). The question therefore remains as to whether 
stress represents a stimulus condition or a response pattern. 
Although current thinking has not resolved these contrasting views 
regarding the inherent nature of stress, contemporary evidence suggests an 
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overlap of ideas and the more generalized notion that stress probably 
contains elements of both stimulus and response (McGrath, 1970). As a 
stimulus condition, it may refer to events or situations that impose 
adaptational demands upon the individual as a fun~tion of their newness, 
rapidly changing status, or threat potential (Garmezy, 1981). As a 
response pattern, physiological consequences are noted while adding the 
behavioral possibilities of performance deterioration, fatigue, and the 
tendency toward disrupted and disorganized behaviors (Gunderson and 
Rahe, 1974). To complicate matters further, distinctions regarding the 
particular consequences of various stress conditions or response patterns 
may be blurred by the idea of individual differences. For example, an 
imposed stimulus does not invariantly generate a particular effect. One of 
the first researchers to articulate this principle was Wolff (1953), who 
defined stress "as the interaction between the external environment and the 
organism with the past experiences of the organism as a major factor" (p. 
v). By expanding on Wolffs ideas, many researchers subsequently have 
incorporated a psychological component into their stress research 
endeavors (Appley and Trumbull, 1967). Prominent among these 
researchers was Lazarus (1966), who argued that outside powerfully 
intense universal stressors ( e.g., death of a loved one, war combat), the 
individual's cognitive appraisal of the situation or event determines its 
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stressfulness. Indeed, Lazarus undoubtedly would have concurred with 
John Milton who observed in his 17th century epic, Paradise Lost, that 
"the mind is its own place and in itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of 
heaven." Since individual perceptions of threat . vary widely, Lazarus 
added that a variety of psychological stimuli potentially could result in 
similar stress responses. Interestingly, this hypothesis seems to serve as a 
close psychological parallel to the non-specific physiological stress response 
paradigm that was proposed by Selye. 
At present, there is considerable empirical support for the 
mediating role of cognitive processes in psychological stress (Gersten et al., 
1977; Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus, Averill and Opton, 1970; Lazarus, Cohen, 
Folkman, Kanner and Schaefer, 1980; Lazarus and Launier, 1978; 
Mandler, 1975; Meichenbaum, 1977). This more recent psychological 
focus has also paved the way for a broader understanding and inclusion of 
social and cultural factors within the stress research field. Due in part to 
its presumed ability to suppress the body's immune systems, the notion of 
psychological and socially induced stress precipitating or affecting 
susceptibility to chronic or infectious diseases and even death has gained 
widespread acceptance among scientists from a variety of fields (Engel; 
1971; Kobasa, 1979; Lynch, 1976; Rahe, Bennett, Romo, Siltanen and 
Arthur, 1973). Dodge and Martin (1970), expanding on this view, 
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observed that most modern diseases are etiologicaJJy linked to excessive 
stress. They further noted that such stress is a product of sociaJJy 
structured situations that are inherently embedded in modem technological 
societies. Toffler popularized these ideas when he predicted that individuals 
were destined to become overwhelmed by an accelerating rate of social and 
cultural change and thus would suffer from "future shock." He defined 
future shock as "the distress both physical and psychological that arises 
from an overload of the organism's physical adaptive system and its 
decision making processes" (Toffler, 1970, p. 290). Other prominent 
researchers have since maintained similar arguments (Elkind, 1981; Hinkle, 
1974). 
The thread that binds these views together suggests that stress 
results primarily from the unprecedented rapid but often uncontrolled and 
unanticipated social change and impermanence that sets modern society 
apart from previous eras. It also seems clear that the number and variety of 
events or situations that directly or indirectly impose such adaptational 
demands upon children may be limitless. However, most childhood 
environmental stressors could be categorized in one or more of the 
following major risk areas; entrance events ( e.g., birth of a sibling), exit-
loss events ( e.g., death of a loved one), issues related to school or child 
care setting, issues related to characteristics of the caregiving environment 
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( e.g., parenting skill levels, marital, legal, financial, work, and/or personal 
factors), issues related to the social milieu (e.g., family, peer, and/or 
community support), physical-medical factors, environmental stability 
factors (e.g., number of family moves), traumatic experiences (e.g., 
universal stressors ), goodness-of-fit issues, idiosyncratic stressors, issues 
related to chronic high frequency thematic stressors and the multiplicity of 
chronic or acute stressors (Anthony, 1986; Anthony and Koupernik, 1970, 
1973, 1974; Anthony, Koupernik and Chiland, 1978; Cobb, 1976; Cooper, 
1983; Delongis, Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; Dohrenwend and 
Dohrenwend, 1974; Dohrenwend, Krasnoff, Askenasy and Dohrenwend, 
1978; Garmezy and Rutter, 1983; Humphrey, 1984; King, Stanley and 
Burrows, 1987; Peplau and Perlman, 1982; Rook, 1984; Rutter, 1979b; 
Selye, 1980, 1983a,b; Soloman, 1985; Terr, 1979; Werner and Smith, 
1982). 
The negative linkage of these environmental demands to the 
development of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency seems striking. Each of 
these stressors (individually or in various combinations with one another) 
may undermine the development of the self-concept by eroding either the 
attachment process (Garmezy, 1981; Lipsitt, 1983; Maccoby, 1983) or the 
adaptive control process (Dweck, 1977; McNamee and McNamee, 1981; 
Watts, 1978; Zautra and Reich, 1980). Since, as noted previously that 
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Adaptive Emotional Resiliency represents the major by-product of these 
two interactive processes, their erosion must also directly inhibit the 
development of effective adaptational modes. Ineffective adaptational 
resources may in turn intensify and prolong str~ss exposure, thereby 
setting the individual on a "negative trajectory" toward pathological 
emotional development. Of course, the present analysis of environmental 
risk as it relates to Adaptive Emotional Resiliency requires the balance of 
evaluating hereditary risk factors. 
Inherited Risk - Temperamental Factors 
The second broad area of hazard which concerns contemporary 
risk researchers involves the risk of possessing highly maladaptive 
inherited characteristics. An "internal" risk focus might have been ignored 
had the risk research field been viable in America prior to the late 1960's. 
In this pre-risk era, mainstream American psychology was invested in 
emphasizing the environment as the major and perhaps sole influence in 
human development (Skinner 1938, 1953). Such emphasis openly rejected 
the possibility of built-in predispositional tendencies in accounting for 
human behaviors. However, within this behavioristic wilderness, an 
occasional voice rang out that focused on the individual's biological 
inheritance. One early voice was that of Cimbal (1927), who characterized 
a particular group of children as being "cowards of living." He described 
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these children's prototypical behaviors as pervasively fearful, timid and 
withdrawn from early infancy through adulthood. These individuals 
avoided the unfamiliar, since even mildly novel situations were often 
experienced as stressful. Although Cimbal's work ~as largely ignored in 
the United States, it represents one of the earliest accounts of inherently 
vulnerable children in the social science literature. -
By the early 1960's, there was a growing feeling among some 
factions of the American psychology establishment that simplistic 
behavioristic views could not adequately account for many of the 
complexities involved in human cognitive and emotional development 
(Allport, 1961; Kendler and Kendler, 1962). In the emotional areas, 
pediatric researchers such as Thomas, Chess and Birch (1968) investigated 
personality traits in children that were presumed to be related to later 
difficulties in adjustment. They coined the term "difficult child" to 
describe a temperamental constellation seen in particular children who 
typically manifested poor adaptability, negative mood states, a low 
threshold for arousal, intense reactions when aroused and vanous 
irregularities in biological functioning. These studies identified nine 
temperamental traits or preferred behavioral styles of children by 
longitudinally following 133 individuals from early infancy through their 
adulthood (Chess and Thomas, 1986). The studies of Thomas, Chess and 
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their colleagues laid the groundwork for modern day views which typically 
consider temperament to reflect early developing personality traits or 
individual differences that are thought to be relatively enduring across time 
and situations (Thomas and Chess, 1977). According to Buss and Plomin 
(1984), such traits are presumed to be largely biologically inherited, with 
the term "biological" loosely defined to include -prenatal and perinatal 
events. Thus, inherited traits typically were seen by .many researchers as 
being modified by environmental influences. Yet the earlier an 
individual's stylistic behavioral preferences surfaced in childhood, the 
more likely the behavioral styles were thought to reflect inherited 
predispositions. In addition to the Thomas and Chess temperamental 
categories, other categorical schemes have been developed to account for 
stable long term temperamental characteristics (Goldsmith, 1987). 
However, long term correlations of temperamental characteristics typically 
have been diminished by environmental factors which tend to modify the 
development of these inherited traits (Buss and Plomin, 1984). 
Subsequently, Buss and Plomin have argued that genetically determined 
temperamental characteristics merely influence development, they do not 
determine it. As such, they represent "tendencies that nudge development 
in one direction rather than another" (Buss and Plomin, 1984, p. 105). 
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In rev1ewmg the variety of temperamental tendencies in the 
literature, four basic categories seem most relevant to the discussion of 
Adaptive Emotion Resiliency and risk research. The first of these four 
temperamental dimensions will be referred to as inhibitory control. The 
earlier review regarding adaptive control focused heavily on various 
environmental contingencies associated with the· development of self-
regulating processes. One critical aspect that was omitted from this 
discussion involved the individual's inherited predisposition toward 
developing proper internal inhibitory controls. Buss and Plomin (1975) 
initially conceived the impulsivity trait as possessing a variety of 
components. The first component was called inhibitory control, which 
involved resistance to temptation and delay of gratification. In this scheme, 
inhibitory control was regarded as the braking system which controlled 
one's tendencies to act. Although such controls may act as brakes for other 
emotional behaviors, they seem to have substantial predictive significance 
in risk research as a unique temperamental dimension. This dimension 
involves the regulation of one's: attention span, distractibility tendencies, 
motoric activity levels, persistence in completing tasks, intensity of 
reaction, and impulse inhibition (Goldsmith and Campos, 1982; Rothbart 
and Derryberry, 1981; Thomas, Chess, Birch, Hertzig and Korn, 1963). At 
the extreme maladaptive end of this dimension are children who have been 
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described as being hyperactive or possessing an Attention Deficit Disorder 
(Cantwell, 1982). These children seem predisposed to highly maladaptive 
functioning in both their school and home settings as well as being high-
risk for developing psychopathology later in their Jives (Garmezy, 1977; 
Garmezy, Masten, and Tellegen, 1984; Huessy and Cohen, 1978; Lambert, 
1982). Rothbart and Derryberry (1981) have· suggested that the 
aforementioned self-regulating tendencies may represent the individual's 
level of neural arousal. Medical researchers have offered similar 
arguments that the inhibitory power of neurons promotes adaptation 
(Pribham, 1971; Restak, 1984; Shepherd, 1974). Furthermore, these 
researchers have implied that neuronal inhibition, which represents internal 
control coping efforts at the molecular level, may play a more important 
role than excitatory processes in most generalized brain functions. A 
dramatic illustration of this notion was reflected in the widely accepted 
work of Melzack and Wall (1983), who proposed that even incoming pain 
signals triggered by severe injuries or illnesses may be inhibited by brain 
mechanisms under certain circumstances. Thus, the self-regulating process 
of inhibitory control, which is intimately linked to various adaptive control 
mechanisms, clearly seems to possess a bio-genetic temperamental 
component. 
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Mood state is the second temperamental dimension which seems 
relevant in discussing risk research. Although mood has usually connoted 
transient feeling tones that normally represent emotional reflections of 
one's actual situation, it seems that not all mood states are precipitated or 
maintained by such circumstances. Lewis and Michalson (1983) have used 
the term mood to reflect prototypic non-transient emotional states that are 
presumed to be more closely related to the in-born temperamental 
characteristics of the individual than to eliciting events or circumstances. 
Because of the long term nature of these emotional states, they seem to 
possess the capacity to influence perceptions of one's environment which 
often affect the individual's subsequent behaviors (Bower, 1981). 
Consequently, the mood state dimension reflects predisposed individual 
differences related to the expression of primary and derivative emotions 
such as fearfulness, anger, joy, sadness, distress, soothability, shame, and 
mood stability (Cattell, 1965; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1962; Thomas et al., 
1963; White, 1976). The self-generating long term nature of mood states 
emphasizes their relevance in studying risk research, particularly as they 
impact on the attachment process. 
In addition to infant and pediatric researchers, behavioral 
geneticists made major strides in promoting the field of temperament. They 
focused on early developing personality traits that presumably were 
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derived from evolutional processes (Buss and Plomin, 1975). Such innate 
pre-programmed traits were considered highly adaptive and indeed 
necessary for survival. One of the earliest researchers to present this 
perspective was Diamond (1957), whose research on animals led to 
theoretical generalizations which described basic temperamental traits 
thought to be shared by all primates, including humans. He referred to one 
of these key traits as affiliativeness. Wilson (1978), another prominent 
animal researcher, proposed an even more extreme view of the importance 
of genetics in accounting for the social behaviors of humans. In a return to 
Darwinism, Wilson's sociobiological viewpoint suggested that human social 
behaviors were a function of evolution which has resulted in providing 
humans with genetic endowments stemming from a natural selection 
process. Similarly, other researchers have proposed that the early 
developing personality trait of social orientation possesses an evolutionary 
heritage (Bell, 1968; Gottesman, 1966). Various terms have been used to 
refer to this temperamental dimension ( e.g., affiliativeness, sociability-
shyness, extraversion-introversion, friendliness-unfriendliness). In its most 
basic form, social orientation refers to an individual's propensity to prefer 
the presence of others to solitude (Eysenck, 1947). Specifically, the social 
orientation dimension represents predisposed individual differences related 
to seeking out relationships with others as manifested by a variety of 
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behaviors including; approach-avoidance tendencies, verbal and tactile 
interactiveness, playfulness, trust tendencies, and social responsiveness. 
The principal significance of the social orientation dimension lies in its 
potential adaptive value as it relates to the attac.pment process. Thus, 
complementing the earlier discussion regarding various environmental 
contingencies associated with the formation of · attachments, there is 
considerable research support for the position that individual differences in 
one's ability to develop appropriate social attachments may in part be 
determined by an instinctual-genetic temperamental component 
(Ainsworth, 1973; Bowlby, 1969; Schaffer and Emerson, 1964; Sugarman, 
1977). In addition, such psychobiologic social tendencies may have a direct 
bearing on an individual's ability to cope with stress (Kagan, Reznick and 
Snidman, 1987; Lipsitt, 1983). 
Whereas the dimensions of inhibitory control, mood state and 
social orientation represent relatively "clean" internal risk factors that 
result primarily in eliciting responses from caretakers and others, the 
dimension of coping tendencies places a greater emphasis on the 
individual's predisposed ability to negotiate the environment effectively as 
a function of responsiveness to various environmental contingencies and 
demands. Although this dimension is action oriented, it more heavily 
accents reactivity capabilities which seem to be influenced by· a greater mix 
96 
of internal and environmental factors. As a result, it should be 
characterized as representing a set of personality characteristics or stylized 
behavioral preferences that develop from a more nearly equal balance of 
inherited predispositions interacting with environmental experiences. As 
discussed in an earlier section, Murphy (1962) defined coping as "the 
process of developing ways of dealing with new and difficult situations 
which cannot be handled by reflexive habitual, or automatic functional 
responses" (p. 6). Coping was viewed by Murphy as a process of 
strategies or behaviors that were aimed at managing one's world by 
responding to the demands of novel situations, opportunities, obstacles or 
conflicts. Gilmore (1974) added that such challenges or opportunities 
could also pose a threat to one's self-esteem. Along similar lines, Gibson 
(1960) and Gibson's (1982) affordance oriented psychology offered an 
additional perspective. They noted that all human beings are born with the 
innate ability to perceive. This ability keeps the individual in touch with 
information about opportunities in his environment, which then allows the 
individual to meet his needs. The Gibsons called these opportunities 
affordances. However, the affordability of an object was seen as varying 
with the ability of the individual to perceive its affordance. In sharp 
contrast to Piagetian views and to the Rogerian notion of phenomenology, 
the Gibsons felt that affordances were not constructed by the perceiver but 
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instead were present to be accurately perceived. Consequently, they 
viewed adaptive coping as the ability to correctly perceive and utilize 
affordances that are offered by the environment. 
The coping tendencies dimension is therefo.re viewed as reflecting 
individual differences related to the possession of internal mechanisms that 
are used to master potentially threatening environmental demands. As 
such, it represents the prototypical way an individual is. able to respond to a 
variety of survival and growth demands in order to manage the 
environment. This temperamental constellation is most vividly manifested 
by behaviors involving: alertness levels, tendencies toward autonomy or 
flexibility, problem solving or memory capabilities, hopefulness - the 
tendency to "expect well", communication and organizational skills, 
sensation or opportunity seeking, and adaptation tendencies in response to 
change or competition (Carver and Scheier, 1985; Farley and Farley, 1972; 
Garmezy, 1974c; Gilmore, 1974; Murphy, 1962; Zuckerman, Bone, 
Neary, Mangelsdorff and Brustman, 1972). 
The primary significance of this dimension relative to the risk 
research field lies in its potential value for the adaptive control process. In 
complementing the earlier analysis regarding the various environmental 
contingencies associated with the most sophisticated stage component of the 
adaptive control process ( e.g., exerting control over the environment), 
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research evidence supports the existence of preprogrammed biogenetic 
tendencies toward establishing mastery and competence (Watson, 1967; 
White, 1976). These predisposed adaptive capability levels must also be 
viewed as impacting on the individual's ability to .control stress exposure 
(Garmezy, 1981; Murphy and Moriarty, 1976). The· coping tendencies 
dimension, as well as the previous three dimensions, could be viewed as 
characteristics that are capable of being partially developed in response to 
stressful demands. However, all four temperamental dimensions are 
primarily considered to be stress producing or reducing internal 
characteristics of the individual. It should also be noted that such inherited 
traits as physical and health characteristics of the individual as well as 
cognitive aspects of development including intelligence, creativity, 
motivation, and curiosity may presently be considered relevant internal 
risk factors (especially related to the coping tendencies dimension). These 
traits are not traditionally considered in most discussions regarding the 
fields of personality or temperament (Anthony, 1974; Heider, 1966). 
As a close parallel to the environmental risk section, the risk of 
inheriting highly maladaptive characteristics is viewed by the investigator 
as having a substantial impact on the development of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency and on the eventual unfolding of the self-concept. The 
temperamental dimensions of mood state and social orientation are seen as 
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development were independent of each other (Sheppard and Willoughby, 
1975). Along similar lines, environmental and hereditary risk have thus 
far been discussed as separate factors in the development of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency. However, prospective studies aimed at predicting 
developmental outcomes as a function of examining unilateral risk factors 
have been largely unsuccessful (Escalona, 1974; Shaffer and Dunn, 1979). 
The risk research field has subsequently moved toward viewing human 
development as a complex dynamic interaction between hereditary and 
environmental forces (Kent and Rolf, 1979). At present, contemporary 
risk research provides empirical support for this transactional model of 
development (Sameroff and Chandler, 1975). The transactional model 
emphasizes that human behaviors unfold as a function of continuous, 
multidirectional interactions between internal person characteristics and 
environmental agents (Bowers, 1973; Endler and Magnussen, 1976; Rutter, 
1979a). Therefore, developmental outcomes must stem directly from a 
careful analysis of these complex chains of reciprocal transactions. 
Similarly, a comprehensive review of environmental and hereditary risk 
related to Adaptive Emotional Resiliency must require an analysis of 
adaptive or maladaptive transactional chains. 
One approach to illustrating such complex interactions involves an 
examination of the early and long term consequences of a particular 
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maladaptive chain that results in an attachment process breakdown. This 
analysis could be initiated by noting an observation from the earlier 
discussed Ainsworth related research which involved the idea that certain 
inherent characteristics of infants may have a direct. bearing on their ability 
to become attached (Egeland and Sroufe, 1981). In contrast, much of the 
-
bonding and attachment literature focused on the environment, since the 
infant was regarded as a passive victim of external forces. As a result, in 
most attachment studies, infants were purposefully ignored since their role 
in the attachment process was considered to be largely irrelevant. Yet 
researchers such as Bell (1968) and Sroufe (1979) have suggested that 
many parental behaviors may be elicited by their child's own 
characteristics and behaviors. For example, the difficult child as described 
by Thomas, Chess, and Birch (1968) who manifested poor adaptability and 
an irregularity in biological functioning was often restless, colicky, overly 
aroused and subject to digestive difficulties. Such problematic behaviors 
were seen as increasing the chances of eliciting negative caretaking 
responses, which in turn could negatively impact the attachment process. 
Following this line of reasoning, a growing number of researchers 
have noted that certain characteristics of children may predispose parents 
to battering or neglect (Sameroff and Chandler, 1975). Parents who are 
abusive will typically be abusive to only one or two of their children, not 
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all of them. Individual children may therefore differ in their ability to 
interact socially, face potential threat or arousal, and derive security from 
the presence of a caretaker. The child who enters the world with physical 
or temperamental difficulties ( e.g., anoxia, low birth weight, blindness, 
socially unresponsive tendencies) or develops them shortly after birth may 
be at greater risk in the attachment process since these difficulties often 
overtax the resources of some parents and may in turn· precipitate an acute 
emotional crisis (Fraiberg, 1975; Sameroff, 1975). There is evidence 
linking traumatic high-risk births with a host of subsequent severe 
psychological and behavioral difficulties such as schizophrenia and criminal 
activities (Mednick, 1970, 1971). Seen in this light, many of the 
retrospective studies noted earlier, such as Klein and Stern (1971) or 
Shaheen et al. (1968), seem more meaningful in that early separations were 
probably not in and of themselves an important causal factor in the 
documented abuse and neglect cases. Instead, they were most likely a by-
product of the perinatal complications. These complications, when paired 
with parents who were also predisposed to be high-risk caretakers by 
virtue of their low socio-economic status, highly stressed demeanors, 
poorly educated backgrounds, adolescent ages, or personality disorders, 
combined to violently break down the attachment process, making the 
parent and child virtual "biological strangers." When factors such as these 
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merge, the attachment process may be severely disrupted. The subsequent 
effects on the child are often disastrous, resulting in such problems as 
failure-to-thrive syndrome, severe depression or suicide (Aleksandrowicz, 
1975; Chatoor and Egan, 1983; Dtotar, Nowak, Mal9ne and Eckerle, 1985; 
Kashani et al., 1981; Schrut, 1964). Of course, these are· extreme and easy 
to see effects of the failure of the parent-infant transactional attachment 
process. Less severe disruptions in the attachment process probably occur 
in the same way, but in such cases fewer factors are in play or multiple 
factors may be subtle and respectively less marked. In recalling the 
conclusion that one's prototypical way of relating to others throughout life 
is linked directly to the quality of the individual's early attachments to 
primary caregivers, it seems clear that any level of disruption in the early 
transactional chain involving the attachment process may have significant 
implications for the eventual development of interpersonal relatedness 
competencies. 
The second part of this illustrative discussion closely examines the 
long term consequences of such an extended maladaptive transactional 
chain. In the previous section dealing with environmental risk, the notion 
of social support deficits was listed as one of many possible sources of 
environmental stress. However, present research evidence suggests that 
this potential stressor is neither ordinary nor solely environmental in 
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nature. Whereas social bonds have long been considered a key element in 
promoting psychological well being, the pervasive lack or inadequacy of 
such bonds has resulted in chronic feelings of loneliness for many 
individuals (Rook, 1984). In contemporary American life where divorce, 
mobility, uprootedness, living alone and detached independent 
self-sufficiency have become acceptable middle class norms, loneliness has 
become one of the more serious yet sometimes unrecognized stressors of 
society (Lynch, 1976; Peplau and Perlman, 1982). In accenting this view, 
Gordon (1976) wrote, "Knowing no limits of class, race, or age, loneliness 
is today a great leveler" (p. 16). Some national quality of life surveys, for 
example, suggest that as many as one in six Americans have reported that 
they did not possess a single friend in whom they could confide or to whom 
they could turn in times of trouble (Campbell, 1981). In related surveys, 
an average of 40 percent of the respondents indicated that their basic 
shyness had been causally related to serious personal difficulties in their 
lives (Pilkonis and Zimbardo, 1979). Given the scope and potential impact 
of these concerns in discussing a major extended maladaptive transactional 
chain result, a careful analysis of loneliness is in order. 
Loneliness traditionally has been defined as being without 
companionship (aloneness) or as the experience of sadness from being 
alone. However, a closer look at this phenomenon suggests that it possesses 
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considerable complexity. It is generally assumed that loneliness or 
aloneness results in a negative affective state, yet this may not always be the 
case. Since loneliness is considered to be a highly subjective experience 
involving cognitive mediating factors such as causal attributions and 
expectations, feelings of loneliness are often more a function of such 
. 
cognitive appraisals than that of the individual's actual social environment 
(Goetz and Dweck, 1980; Peplau, Micelli and Morasch, 1982; Revenson, 
1981). Thus, being alone does not necessarily result in feeling lonely 
(Nisenbaum, 1984). There may even be aspects of aloneness that are 
positive and adaptive, a position supported by selected theorists, clinicians 
and philosophers. They have viewed feelings of aloneness as representing a 
basic condition of life which although painful at times, may also be a 
creative constructive state which leads to self-discovery, self-renewal and 
reflection (Larson, Csikszentmihaly and Graef, 1982; Moustakas, 1961; 
Suedfeld, 1982; Thoreau, 1947). Solitude and meditational activities were 
seen as helping some persons to develop a sense of individuality by 
bringing them in closer touch with their inner feelings. 
Despite the adaptive qualities of loneliness and its 
phenomenological status, however, many of the same researchers have also 
suggested that periods of aloneness in one's daily life usually lead to 
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feelings of boredom, irritability, sadness and a generally negative affective 
state. In fact, the prevailing wisdom in the loneliness literature suggests 
that it is nearly always an aversive experience, particularly if one perceives 
his or her aloneness as involuntary. Rook (1984) supports this view in her 
definition of loneliness as "an enduring condition of emotional distress that 
arises when a person feels estranged from, misunderstood, or rejected by 
others and/or lacks appropriate social partners for desired activities, 
particularly activities that provide a sense of social integration and 
opportunities for emotional intimacy" (p. 1391). Investigators have 
represented a variety of theoretical camps, including psychodynamic 
(Fromm-Reichman, 1959), phenomenological (Rogers, 1973), sociological 
(Slater, 1976), cognitive (Peplau et al., 1982), ethological (Bowlby, 1969, 
1973) and interactionist (Weiss, 1973). They concur with Rook's view of 
loneliness as a generally maladaptive state which often leads to depression, 
alcoholism, adolescent delinquency, aggressiveness, stress related physical 
illnesses, suicide, a variety of psychiatric disorders and other self-defeating 
maladaptive behaviors (Andersson, 1984; Asher, Hymel and Renshaw, 
1984; Asher and Wheeler, 1985; Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Lynch, 1976; 
Shaffer and Fisher, 1981; Werner, 1978). 
The ethological and interactionist positions seem to hold the 
greatest promise in examining loneliness as one major result of an extended 
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maladaptive transactional chain related to the attachment process. 
Representing the ethological camp, Bowlby (1969, 1973) viewed loneliness 
as stemming from the individual's inability or difficulty in attaching to a 
significant other. The writings of Lynch (1976) and Sullivan (1953) 
echoed this theme in viewing the need for intimate human contact and 
companionship as having adaptive survival value. Human companionship 
was seen by these individuals as acting as a natural tranquilizer in reducing 
harmful emotional stress. Weiss (1973) expanded on this attachment 
perspective by viewing loneliness as representing either of two types of 
affective states. Emotional isolation suggested the absence of attachment 
figures, whereas social isolation reflected an absence of meaningful 
friendships. According to Weiss' interactionist position, these relational 
deficits were caused by the interaction of situational environmental 
variables (e.g., being widowed or moving to a new city) with the internal 
personality characteristics of the individual (e.g., shyness). It seemed that 
some individuals were predisposed to becoming chronically lonely as a 
function of possessing maladaptive inherited personality characteristics. 
When individuals who possessed these characteristics found themselves in 
situations involving circumstantial isolating factors, the experience of 
loneliness became possible. Research by DeJong-Gierveld and 
Raadschelders (1982) has also suggested that Weiss' typology involving 
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affective states related to meaningful friendship deficits stems primarily 
from the emotional isolation of attachment deficits. Thus, it appears that 
the early transactional chains involving attachments to primary caretakers 
may set the stage for a complex chain of events. Thi$ chain heavily impacts 
on the eventual development of interpersonal relatedness competencies 
throughout adulthood. 
It is clear that a lack of social support can become a major risk 
factor in a given transactional chain of events. Conversely, there is 
considerable research support for the position that a rich network of 
family, friend and community support is a major protective factor m 
mediating the effects of stress exposure (Cobb, 1976; Gove, 1973; 
Nuckolls, Cassel and Kaplan, 1972; Soloman, 1985; Stokes, 1983; Stokes 
and Wilson, 1984; Thoits, 1982). In general, protective factors such as 
social support may adaptively alter the direction and quality of various 
transactional chains or, at the very least, minimize the impact of negative 
transactions. In addition to the stress-buffering effects of social support 
and the previously discussed adaptive temperamental traits, other key 
internal and environmental protective factors play an "inoculative" role in 
promoting emotional health and adaptive functioning in children. These 
factors include: social competence (Anderson and Messick, 1974; Baumrind 
and Black, 1967; Halverson and Waldrop, 1974; O'Malley, 1977), 
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attendance in a superior school system (Rutter, 1979b), school related 
competence in the academic, behavioral and interpersonal spheres 
(Garmezy, Masten and Tellegen, 1984), good intelligence and adequate 
communication skills (Garmezy and Rutter, 1983; Werner and Smith, 
1982), biological intactness involving a robust physique, good health and 
central nervous system integrity (Heider, 1966; Werner and Smith, 1982), 
emotionally intact and supportive caretakers and a positive relationship 
with at least one parent (Rutter, 1979a), if parent(s) are pathological, 
formal recognition of their condition by the community (Chiland, 1974), 
membership in a low density family and/or being first born (Drotar et al., 
1985; Pollitt, 1973; Waldrop and Bell, 1966), maintaining high but 
appropriate levels of energy and activity and an internal locus of control 
(Gal and Lazarus, 1975; Heider, 1966; Werner and Smith 1982), and 
exposure to some recoverable level of stress which may foster a "steeling" 
effect (Garmezy and Rutter, 1983). Of course, some of these factors are 
inter-related and all are subsumed under the previously discussed 
categories of environmental and/or hereditary risk. On a basic level, many 
protective factors could be viewed as direct, indirect, or interactive 
reflections of one's ability to become attached to significant others or to 
develop adaptive controls. 
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The present examination of risk and protective factors that impact 
on transactional chains does not provide for the aspect of luck, a largely 
ignored phenomenon in science. Although no formal scientific definitions 
of luck are well accepted, it would seem that luck often plays a key positive 
or negative role in precipitating major life transactional chain sequences. 
Poets may refer to luck as a very delicate yet elusive fabric woven with the 
thread of circumstance. Statisticians would consider luck to be 
unaccounted for variance. . Social scientists may view it as representing 
chance or random events. Many personal characteristics, as well as events 
or circumstances, seem generally uncontrolled, unanticipated and entirely 
random. Boarding a plane that soon will crash has little to do with one's 
personality characteristics, adaptive traits or past experiences, yet being in 
such an unfortunate place may override all other considerations in 
determining one's fate. Along similar lines, an individual's destiny in life 
may be largely determined by the family that brings him or her into the 
world. At least from a statistical standpoint, the prospects for exposure to 
extremely high stress levels, maladaptive behavioral consequences, and 
limited opportunities seem more likely for a racial minority child born to 
an economically disadvantaged family living in an inner city environment 
than for a white child born to an economically advantaged family in a 
comfortable suburban milieu (Dohrenwend, 1973; Eaton, 1978; Escalona, 
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1974; Syme and Berkman, 1976). Although such circumstances do not set 
individuals on an invariant course, they certainly can weigh heavily for or 
against adaptive growth (Lazarus and Launier, 1978). Ironically, the more 
unlucky individuals seem in this regard, the more. likely it is that such 
individuals may need to rely on luck to change the transactional direction 
of what would seem to be their probable developmental fate. Indeed, the 
scientist Stephen J. Gould has taken the extreme position that the entire 
species of man has survived more as a function of random events than of 
natural selection (Gould, 1989). In contesting Darwin's theory, Gould 
views man's very survival as a matter of luck. 
A more complex aspect of luck involves what could be referred to 
as the goodness-of-fit dimension. Children have no choice regarding who 
their parents will be, their birth order, what school they will attend, or 
what neighborhood they will be raised in. It seems less obvious, however, 
that common protective factors such as good intelligence or a positive 
social orientation are not invariably protective or adaptive in all 
circumstances. For example, an energetic socially extroverted boy born 
into a family of passive introverted individuals may find his gregarious 
nature to be a liability in such a setting. Consequently, many of the 
aforementioned protective traits or circumstances are protective to the 
extent that they foster a congruence between the characteristics and the 
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environment of the individual (Chess, 1970; Haggard, 1973). A good 
individual-environment match may represent a major stress-buffering 
protective factor, whereas a poor fit is likely to represent a significant 
stress producing risk factor which may trigger a m~ladaptive transactional 
chain of events (Caplan, 1983; Lazarus and Launier, 1978; Pervin, 1968). 
Therefore, the goodness-of-fit dimension represents · an additional layer of 
complexity in analyzing the pinball-like role of luck as it precipitates 
protective or risk-laden processes. 
A final point may be made regarding the potential importance of 
luck as a major developmental outcome factor. Although an earlier section 
discussed the notion that certain individuals seem predisposed to surviving 
high-risk circumstances as a function of their resilient characteristics, it 
seems equally clear to nearly all risk researchers that no individual is 
totally invulnerable (Anthony and Cobler, 1987). This position suggests 
the possibility of exposure to profoundly chronic and/or intensely severe 
stress which is capable of permanently incapacitating even the hardiest of 
individuals. For example, Werner and Smith (1982) pointed out that many 
truly resilient children who grew up in pathological families manifested the 
highly adaptive tendency to actively seek out emotional and social support 
from appropriate role models in their communities ( e.g., teachers, 
ministers, neighbors). However, in an environment where no such caring 
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individuals exist, even the most affordance-receptive child is likely to be 
left unattached and unsupported. Thus, the accurately perceived 
environmental opportunities envisioned by the Gibsons' affordance 
oriented psychology also seems to be captively. delimited by factors 
involving random circumstance. It would seem that even the most resilient 
individuals may not be able to overcome the unlucky "assignment" of an 
affordance-impoverished environment, thereby .condemning such 
individuals to what Freud referred to as "too searching a destiny." 
An Integrated Synthesis of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency 
The current research endeavor has delineated a coherent 
theoretical perspective for the study of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. 
The conceptual model that has been proposed emphasizes the antecedent 
processes of attachment and adaptive control as providing the core of 
continuity most closely linked to emotional development and the unfolding 
of the self-concept. The construct of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency is seen 
as representing the major by-product of these two antecedent processes; it 
plays a key mediational role in self-concept development (see Figure 2). 
Within this theoretical context, emotional development was 
portrayed as unfolding along transactional lines. The example used to 
illustrate this scheme involved a parent-infant attachment relationship. 
Subsequently, development was described as a sequential dynamic process 
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£.!gure 2. A schematic illustration or the mediational role played 
by Adaptive Emotional Aesiliency as it relates to self concept 
development. 
114 
115 
of continuous and mutual interaction between genetic and 
social-environmental forces. Experiences in the womb and shortly after 
birth were viewed as an important beginning but not an irreversible part of 
the process. Yet these beginning experience~ took on increased 
importance, since single events such as an early separation of the infant 
because of physical problems were seen as potentially resulting in long 
lasting effects on parental attitudes and behaviors .. Early separations, 
maladaptive constitutions or other stressors that impacted on parental 
attitudes and resources could, by themselves or in combination, start a 
chain of events leading to serious long term alterations in the attachment 
process. This "domino-effect" scenario was seen as a reasonable premise 
since the parents' initial attitudes (whether self-imposed or elicited by the 
child) could eventually be incorporated into the child's self-image and thus 
become actualized and represented as self-fulfilling prophecies (Joseph, 
1979). 
The attachment literature review further concluded that 
experiences in the womb and in the first 12 to 18 months after birth 
represented a highly predictive and crucial (but not irreversible) period of 
development which in large part set the direction, quality and momentum 
for the parent-infant attachment relationship to unfold. This momentum 
oriented model implicitly assumed that, given a relatively unchanging 
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environment, the perpetuation of good or poor development was in reality 
an indirect rather than direct effect of these early experiences because of 
the aforementioned self-fulfilling prophecies which tended to reinforce and 
propel complex chains of events. Nevertheless, future social-emotional 
development should to some extent be viewed as open-ended, since the 
reverse assumption 
can lead, on the one hand, to a belief that if all has gone well in the first 
years of life, all will continue to go well. The later years, when for 
example, parental interest and affection are no less important, may not 
receive the same care and attention. On the other hand, a history of 
early adversity may lead to an underestimation of what might be done, 
and hence a tendency to inaction. (Clark and Clark, 1979, p. 148) 
The open-ended nature of the proposed theoretical paradigm 
provides a major focus for the concept of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. 
It highlights the idea that all children fall somewhere on a continuum of 
adaptability risk as a function of their resilience resources. Furthermore, a 
small percentage of children seem to function consistently at unexpected 
points in this continuum. A child's social-emotional development is 
therefore envisioned as a journey through a complex honeycombed route 
which at times may be pleasant and scenic, at other times monotonous or 
even hazardous. Each child must negotiate and endure these conditions 
within a uniquely woven fabric of planned action and circumstance. Some 
children seem to sail spectacularly through life with the wind at their backs 
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while others seem to be constantly bucking strong headwinds while facing 
grave obstacles in every direction. Children who can effectively utilize 
internal resilience resources and/or those subject to serendipitous 
circumstances are able to gather early momentum .and consequently seem 
more likely to weather and capably negotiate the obstacles that they must 
face. On the other hand, children with limited resilience resources who are 
also subject to chronic misfortune seem perpetually to- face uphill struggles 
while desperately attempting to maintain some meager degree of 
momentum. These latter children can often be "derailed" by even the 
smallest obstacles. Of particular interest are those children who travel the 
rockiest of roads yet finish the journey in great style. Because of these so-
called invulnerables, many researchers have "implied that there is no set of 
adverse early experiences from which children have not recovered" (Clark 
and Clark, 1979, p. 136). 
In delineating the variety of protective variables which foster 
emotional survival and growth, two cardinal factors seem to have the 
greatest bearing on an individual's potential to maintain, nudge or re-direct 
major developmental transactional chains in a positive direction. The first 
of these protective cardinal factors is a healthy self-concept which is 
modulated by the other factor, a robust level of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency. From a developmental perspective, the self-concept is largely a 
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reflection of how well an individuaJ's Adaptive Emotional Resiliency has 
been functioning. 
Historically, science has ignored the field of human emotions. 
However, it seems that with the full realization of sqciety's "Future Shock" 
destiny, the Western world must currently acknowledge the reality and 
consequences related to poverty, suicide, physical and drug abuse, crime, 
deadly illnesses, war, environmental dangers and a host. of other destructive 
epidemics. Understanding and enhancing human emotional development 
may result in harnessing the productive energies of individuals while 
simultaneously diminishing the impact of negative emotional developmental 
patterns that may underlie maladaptive conditions and behaviors. 
Stress Assessment 
Background 
Although the physical effects of stress may currently be measured 
by a wide variety of established physiological and biochemical procedures 
(Carruthers and Path, 1983), the scientific measurement of stress as a 
psychological variable remains in its infancy. 
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the earlier research into 
environmental risk, the study of stressful life events as they relate to 
disease etiology and psychological disorders, or life events research, has 
become the empirical focus of contemporary risk researchers 
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(Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974, 1980; Rabkin and Struening, 1976). 
The two central issues related to life events research involve an 
examination of the properties that determine the degree of stressfulness of 
specific life events and the issue of identifying th~ particular pathological 
consequences of stressful events. The latter area boasts of a richer history 
and has therefore been researched more extensively. This is particularly 
true within the context of examining stressful life events related to disease 
etiology as seen in the work of Cannon (1929), Selye {1946) and Wolff 
(1953). Wolft's interactive approach and that of the psychologically 
oriented stress researchers who followed set the stage for an appreciation 
that social factors could trigger physiological reactions in the central 
nervous system and thereby influence the course of a disease process 
(Hinkle, 1974). This premise has gained widespread empirical support 
from a variety of scientific fields. 
Meyer (1951), an early pioneer m such research, in the 1930's 
advocated the use of the life chart to aid in establishing medical diagnoses. 
Meyer believed that the life chart, which tracked life events, could be 
etiologically linked to a variety of medical disorders. He also pointed out 
that such events need not be dramatic or catastrophic to have pathogenic 
consequences. Even normal and necessary life events ( e.g., school 
graduation) could have negative consequences. Meyer's development of 
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the life chart represented a first attempt in the social science literature to 
quantify environmental stressors formally. 
Subsequently, the contributions to this area of most life events 
researchers have involved their attempts to de.monstrate a temporal 
association between the onset of illness and a recent increase in the number 
of stressful events experienced by a given individual. The prototypical 
research tool used in such studies has been a 43 item .checklist which was 
empirically derived from clinical experience by Holmes, Rahe and their 
associates (Hawkins, Davies and Holmes, 1957; Rahe, Meyer, Smith, Kjaer 
and Holmes, 1964). The 43 life events represented fairly common 
situations that stemmed from family, personal, occupational and financial 
matters. It was assumed that these events were all stressful in that they 
' 
required some level of adaptive response from the individual. The 
underlying principle suggested that their stressfulness was related to the 
level of significant change and the amount of disruption that each life event 
imposed on the individual's ongoing life pattern. This approach established 
an emphasis on rapid change away from the individual's homeostatic steady 
state and was unconcerned with the psychological meanings attached to life 
events or their socially desirable character (Holmes and Masuda, 1974). 
In its original form, known as the Schedule of Recent Experience 
(SRE), scores consisted of the number of items checked over a ten year 
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period. The impact of these events was presumed to be additive. 
Consequently, the more events that were checked, the greater their overall 
impact. The other underlying assumption for the SRE suggested that social 
· events represented precipitating factors which influenced only onset rather 
than the type of illness (Rahe, 1974; Rahe, et al., 1964). Due in part to the 
studies of Stevens (1966), whose research in psychophysics involved the 
measurement of subjective magnitude estimations of· experience, Holmes 
and Rahe (1967) were able to apply such work to the non-metric field of 
psychosocial phenomena. This subsequently brought greater precision to 
the modified SRE as a measuring instrument of life events. 
In the original SRE, events such as the death of a spouse were 
weighted equally with more benign events. An estimate of the magnitude 
of each event in relation to its adaptational or readjustment demand upon 
the individual was clearly needed. Subsequently, weights, referred to as 
life change units (LCU), were assigned to each item of the SRE based upon 
ratings by a sample of judges. They were asked to rate the life events as to 
the relative degree of necessary readjustment (Masuda and Holmes, 1967). 
This modified version of the SRE, named the Social Readjustment Rating 
Scale (SRRS), was developed in order to measure the intensity and length 
of time necessary to adjust to a particular life event (Holmes and Rahe, 
1967; Vinocur and Selzer, 1975). As an example, the SRRS assigned its 
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highest life change unit score to the death of a spouse (e.g., LCU=lOO) and 
its lowest score to a minor violation of the law (e.g., LCU=ll). Marriage, 
considered a moderately stressful event, was assigned the LCU value of 
50. As was the case for the SRE, the SRRS wa$ unconcerned with the 
socially desirable character of a given event. Instead; it aspired to be a 
measure of pure change. 
The SRRS and comparable derivative checklists, usually covering 
the previous 6 to 24 months, have been utilized as objective measures of 
stressful life events (Holmes and Rahe, 1967; Paykel, Prusoff and 
Uhlenhuth, 1971; Tennant and Andrews, 1976). For the most part, life 
event instruments have been used in prospective and retrospective studies. 
They have generally established a pattern of modest but statistically 
significant relationships between mounting life change and the occurrence 
or onset of: sudden cardiac death (Engel, 1971; Rahe and Lind, 1971), 
myocardial infarction (Rahe and Paasikivi, 1971; Theorell and Rahe, 
1971), illness in various Navy personnel (Gunderson and Rahe, 1974), 
tuberculosis (Rahe et al., 1964), leukemia (Greene, Young and Swisher, 
1956), diabetes (Holmes and Masuda, 1974), and minor health changes 
(Holmes and Holmes, 1970). In short, measures of mounting life change 
have been empirically connected to the entire spectrum of chronic diseases 
and illnesses that afflict modern society. They also seem to enhance 
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predictions for the course that an illness will take, including recovery 
(Rabkin and Struening, 1976). 
Although life event scales such as the SRRS have considered 
psychogenic disorders to be subsumed under · the broad heading of 
"disease," much of the earlier cited research which evaluated the 
relationship of life change to the occurrence of disease focused on the 
notion of disease within a medical context. In contrast, a growing body of 
research has established a strong link between recent stressful life events 
and the development of psychological and adaptive disorders in adults. For 
example, the impact of stressful life changes has been associated with; 
teacher absenteeism and performance (cited in Holmes and Masuda, 1974), 
beginning a prison term (Holmes and Masuda, 1974), job loss (Kasi, Gore 
and Cobb, 1975), an increase in psychiatric symptomatology (Meyers, 
Lindenthal, Pepper and Ostrander, 1972), acute schizophrenia (Brown and 
Birley, 1968; Brown, Sklair, Harris and Birley, 1973), and depression 
and suicide attempts (Lloyd, 1980; Paykel, 1974a,b, 1978). Rutter (1983) 
also concluded that life events preceding psychiatric illness were more 
likely to be "garden variety" disruptions ( e.g., marital discord, problems at 
work, incompatible relationships) rather than dramatic crises. 
In sharp contrast to these adult studies and despite some isolated 
attempts to apply the Holmes and Rahe methodology to children (Chandler, 
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1981; Coddington, 1972a,b; Cohen-Sandler, Berman and King, 1982), 
there appears to be a paucity of stress assessment devices and related 
evidence regarding the links of stressful life events to psychological 
disorders in children (Colton, 1985; Yamamoto, .Soliman, Parsons and 
Davies, 1987). Some possible causes for this research "vacuum" involve 
complex intertwined factors related to definitional diagnostic issues, 
developmental considerations, individual perceptual differences, and the 
question of a cognitive bias. 
Historical Assessment Barriers 
Psychological measurement related to cognitive processes ( e.g., 
intelligence tests) has been viewed by some prominent researchers as the 
crowning achievement in the psychometric field (Cronbach, 1970; Jensen, 
1980). In contrast, the psychological phenomenon of stress traditionally 
has been associated with emotional processes (King, Stanley and Burrows, 
1987). As such, it has most likely suffered from a previously discussed 
cognitive bias which has persisted in the educational and social scientific 
communities of the Western world (Anderson and Messick, 1974; Zigler 
and Trickett, 1978). Lewis and Michalson (1983) point out that this bias 
has emphasized the importance of cognitive variables in measuring 
individual differences and the developmental status of children at the 
expense of attention to emotional variables. 
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Another major factor which has dampened efforts to develop 
useful stress assessment devices involves the idea of individual differences. 
In a position originally articulated by Wolff (1953) and Selye (1956a), it 
became clear that specific stress conditions did no.t invariably generate a 
universal response pattern for all individuals. Instead, a number of studies 
have proposed that the individual's cognitive appraisal of the situation or 
event determines its stressfulness (Anthony and. Koupernik, 1974; 
Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974; Field, McCabe and Schneiderman, 
1985; Garmezy and Rutter, 1983; Gunderson and Rahe, 1974; Humphrey, 
1984; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, et al., 1980; Maddi and Kobasa, 1984). 
This cognitive "intrusion" into the stress field suggests that an individual's 
perceptions of threat may vary widely. Consequently, a variety of 
psychological stimuli can result in similar stress responses. Conversely, a 
particular stimulus condition may evoke a variety of responses. 
Researchers such as Rabkin and Struening (1976) have attempted to 
develop a comprehensive model for viewing the variables that are 
presumed to be responsible for determining an individual's idiosyncratic 
perceptions of potential stressors. However, the suggestion that cognitive 
appraisals act as mediators in determining stressful reactions has 
represented a formidable stress assessment challenge. 
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Adding to the perplexity of individual differences in the perception 
of stressors, the issue of the effect of developmental differences on the 
potential impact of stressors on children needs to be addressed. Anthony 
(1974) has noted that "stress as experienced by the child and stress as 
estimated by the adult observing the impact of the stress on the child are 
frequently of very different orders of magnitude'r (p. 106). Similarly, 
Yamamoto (1979) observed that numerous significant stressors 
experienced by children in school were related to what many adults would 
perceive as minor incidents ( e.g., being picked last for a team, ridiculed by 
a classmate). For some students, the negative impact of such events was 
more potent than stressors thought by adults to be salient, such as the birth 
of a sibling. Thus, obtaining a valid estimate of the "child's eye view" of 
stressful life events has proved to be a treacherously difficult process 
(Colton, 1985). 
Assessing developmental perceptual differences is further 
complicated because children typically lack the intellectual maturity and 
reasoning skills that are possessed by most adults (Flavell, 1982). A lack of 
reasoning power in conjunction with a relatively egocentric posture make it 
difficult for children to tolerate frustrations or to delay their need for 
immediate gratification (Piaget, 1963; Sheppard and Willoughby, 1975). 
Egocentricity also seems closely related to the complementary observation 
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that children, particularly those younger than 8 years of age, tend to think 
in dichotomous "black and white" terms (Elkind, 1981; Hughes, 1989). 
Subsequently, child attributions regarding negative events are relatively 
undifferentiated and often result in internalized self-blame. These 
developmentally oriented limitations impact negatively on a child's ability 
to cope with life's inevitable "assaults." 
Children's efforts to cope are also hampered by what Bums (1979) 
has referred to as psychological selectivity. Psychological selectivity stems 
from the limited options and environmental restrictions that are imposed 
on children. For example, most children are highly dependent on their 
primary caretakers and have limited control over selecting where they will 
live, whom they will live with or deciding which school to attend. In fact, 
children are often punished for attempting to utilize the same types of 
stress reducing behaviors that are considered to be acceptable and effective 
for adults (Humphrey, 1984). Therefore, adaptational efforts are 
substantially hindered by a child's relative inability to conceive, develop, 
and/or implement an appropriate coping plan. To the extent that stress 
assessment efforts have failed to take developmentally oriented limitations 
into account, child's eye view measures of potential stress impact have yet 
to be developed. 
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Even if an abundance of psychometrically valid and reliable stress 
assessment devices were available, researchers would still face difficulty in 
examining the connection of measured stress to psychological disorders in 
children. The primary concern in establishing such l_inks relates as much to 
issues of diagnostic clarity as it does to a lack of · appropriate stress 
assessment instrumentation. The lack of clarity regarding a consensual 
definition for the concept of stress and its ambiguous nature was discussed 
in an earlier section. However, this lack of clarity seems minimal in 
comparison to the considerable confusion that exists in diagnosing 
psychopathology in children (Clarizio and McCoy, 1976; Lebovici and 
Diatkine, 1974; Munsinger, 1983). Using the medical model, mental health 
clinicians have traditionally viewed health as an absence of sickness 
(Anthony, 1974). Along similar lines, anomalous behaviors have often 
been viewed as prime evidence for a maladaptive pathological condition. 
Currently, such views increasingly are being called into question since 
many so-called unusual behaviors are not necessarily maladaptive, whereas 
many frequently encountered behaviors may not always be adaptive (Flach, 
1988). 
The challenge to properly assess risk factors for the purpose of 
diagnosing maladaptive conditions 1s particularly troublesome m 
populations of children. The main difficulty arises because psychological 
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disorders in children, such as depression, are more difficult to identify 
since they are likely to be masked by what appears to be developmentally 
commonplace behaviors (Joseph, 1979; Kashani et al., 1981). This is 
particularly true of younger children, whose idio~yncratic behaviors are 
often the norm. Furthermore, when significant behavioral symptoms do 
appear in younger children, they are frequently transitory and thus less 
noticeable. The consequences of possessing a psychological disorder are 
also less clear, since in contrast to adults, there are few areas of measurable 
breakdown in children that are systematically observed. Young children 
are not employed nor do they have marital or financial obligations. In 
addition, they cannot drive a motor vehicle or travel independently. In 
fact, children have few if any formal responsibilities which can be reliably 
used as an adaptive behavior gauge. In further contrast to adults, empirical 
links between childhood physical illness and emotional pathology related to 
environmental stressors have also been lacking (Rutter, 1983). 
Subsequently, schools offer the most promising settings for formal 
systematic analysis and detection of maladaptive behaviors or conditions in 
children (Battle, 1982; Chiland, 1974; Salvia and Ysseldyke, 1991). The 
school milieu would therefore serve as an excellent backdrop in efforts to 
develop and validate a norm referenced, nomothetically oriented stress 
assessment device. 
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Adopting an Organizing Structure 
Given the scope and complexity of the various assessment barriers 
discussed, stress assessment researchers may be aided by adopting an 
appropriate scientific perspective as an organizing framework. The 
multidisciplinary field of developmental psychopathology may represent 
. 
the perspective of choice. Developmental psychopathology has been 
defined as "the study of abnormal behavior within a context of measuring 
the effects of genetic, ontogenetic, biochemical, cognitive, affective, social, 
or any other ongoing developmental influence on behavior" (Rolf and 
Read, 1984, p. 11). As an interdisciplinary science field which is closely 
related to risk research, developmental psychopathology focuses on 
adaptive and maladaptive individual patterns by drawing upon many 
different areas of research including: developmental, academic and clinical 
psychology as well as psychiatry (Cicchetti, 1984). The key objective in 
this newly burgeoning discipline is to merge and thereby strengthen the 
efforts of clinicians and researchers. 
In the process of making clinical predictions regarding the 
psychological status of individuals, two major approaches have been 
identified (Baughman, 1972). On the one hand, clinicians traditionally 
have relied on idiographic approaches for prediction. Such approaches 
have permitted practitioners to gather and intuitively evaluate information 
131 
which is usually qualitative in nature (Allport, 1937). In this case, the 
clinician develops a rich detailed case study profile of an individual via the 
subjective interpretation of data gathered through interviews, biographical 
accounts, etc. In contrast, because of advances. seen in psychometric 
instrumentation in recent decades, a statistical or nomothetically oriented 
predictive approach has been widely utilized in predicting psychopathology 
(Chandler, 1985). In this approach, predictors are . usually quantifiable 
scores which are weighted and then combined into a predetermined "best-
fitting" mathematical prediction model. It would seem that the idiographic 
approach provides an in-depth sensitive view of a given individual. 
However, it has been criticized as being a time consuming, unreliably 
subjective decision making process which has little generalizable utility 
(Meehl, 1954). The nomothetic approach to decision making has been 
viewed as a more objective, reliable and practical process, although not all 
salient personal characteristics that are critical to understanding a given 
individual are readily quantifiable. Nomothetic approaches have also been 
criticized for providing trivial, insensitive and oversimplified profiles of 
individuals (Aiken, 1971). Despite these concerns, the principal underlying 
assumption for using nomothetic devices suggests that human beings possess 
traits which are reflective of various behavioral predispositions or 
personality characteristics. Nomothetic device proponents believe that such 
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traits can be validly measured and used for the purposes of classification 
and prediction since they presume that there are general laws of behavior 
which are universally applicable (Lanyon and Goodstein, 1971, 1982). 
Developmental psychopathology supporter.s would be likely to 
advocate that a viable stress assessment device should employ a combination 
of idiographic and nomothetic features which would provide equal utility 
for clinicians and researchers (Garmezy and Masten, 1986). Given the role 
of idiosyncratic cognitive appraisals in determining perceptions of potential 
stressors, it would initially seem that stress assessment would be relegated 
to the domain of ipsative devices, case study materials or other idiographic 
techniques. Fortunately, a considerable body of research evidence 
supports the validity of utilizing nomothetic approaches in objectively 
measuring potential stressors in children (Dobzhansky, 1962; Garmezy, 
1981; Sandler and Ramsay, 1980; Tennant, Smith, Bebbington and Hurry, 
1979; Yamamoto and Phillips, 1981). The most obvious category of events 
which highlight this position has been referred to as universal stressors 
(Appley and Trumbull, 1967). Such stressors involve life threatening 
circumstances or the loss of attachment figures and seem to have aversive 
consequences for nearly all human beings, since individuals cannot control, 
ignore or often even anticipate them (Engel, 1971; Garmezy and Rutter, 
1983; Rabkin and Struening, 1976). As the intensity of an event increases, 
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the less important the individual's internal characteristics ( e.g., cognitive 
appraisals, self-concept) become in determining a response to the event. 
This is particularly true as the time period that is necessary for an 
individual to activate a response is shortened. As the activation period 
increases and/or as the intensity of the event decreases, individual 
differences play a more important role. 
Nomothetically cataloguing stress response· potential for less 
intense stressors also may be possible, since it has been observed that many 
stress triggering events or circumstances are learned vicariously (Coleman, 
Butcher and Carson, 1988; Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1980). 
Subsequently, where cognitive appraisals play a larger role in determining 
stress responses, it is possible to establish a modal pattern of reactivity, 
since the stressfulness of many events may in part be determined by group 
norms and cultural expectations (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1980; 
Garmezy, 1981; Lazarus and Launier, 1978; Mechanic, 1970, 1974). 
While some researchers have asserted that this collective environmental 
impact varies from culture to culture (Hinkle, 1973; Paykel, Prusoff and 
Uhlenhuth, 1971), others have noted striking cross-cultural similarities 
(Holmes and Masuda, 1974; Miller, Bentz, Aponte and Brogan, 1974; 
Yamamoto and Davis, 1982). As a direct consequence of developmental 
selectivity issues, it appears that the nature and impact of stressors become 
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more personalized with age. Hence, children's perceptions of the 
stressfulness of various life events seem particularly uniform within and 
across cultures (Maccoby, 1983; Yamamoto, Soliman, Parsons and Davies, 
·1987). 
Despite the commonalities seen in stress responsiveness and the 
obvious nomothetic assessment opportunities that accompany these central 
tendencies, it should be recalled that a select group of children develop in 
ways that are unexpected, given an examination of their experiential 
history. The major point remains that individual differences in response to 
stressors, even universal stressors, is a well-documented phenomenon 
(Field, McCabe and Schneiderman, 1985; Gunderson and Rahe, 1974; 
Humphrey, 1984; Maddi and Kobasa, 1984). How this apparent assessment 
barrier may be transformed from representing a source of measurement 
error to becoming a dynamically new and useful fount of information will 
be addressed in the upcoming Present and Future Assessment Opportunities 
section. 
Developmental psychopathology proponents would be likely to 
advocate that a viable stress assessment device should maintain a clearly 
delineated theoretical structure which explicitly defines the concept of 
stress. Similarly to the concept of anxiety, stress has been broadly used to 
describe an individual's reactions to environmental demands (Rabkin and 
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Struening, 1976). Although numerous definitions of stress have been 
offered in the literature, the elusive nature of this phenomenon has iimited 
the degree of precision that may be utilized in generating a workable 
definition. Consequently, in keeping with the. theoretical viewpoint 
underpinning the concept of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency, stress will be 
analogously viewed as a transactional process: Perhaps the most 
parsimonious definition that reflects this perspective i~ seen in the work of 
Mechanic (1983). He suggests that "stress results when the demands of a 
situation are greater than the individual's or group's capacity to deal 
comfortably with it. Such imbalances may exist in the perceptions of 
situations, in the objective facts, or both" (p. 125). The key focus for 
Mechanic was to examine objective events and perceptions in tandem, since 
each makes an important contribution to the stress equation. A substantial 
imbalance ( either real or perceived) between demand and response 
capability is therefore the critical element in the proposed definition of 
stress. This imbalance upsets the person's equilibrium, strains physical 
and/or psychological processes, and eventually imposes adaptational 
demands. Adaptational coping is a reactive response to stress. Thus. the 
essence of stress involves real and/or perceived demands which overtax the 
individual's resources. The interaction of three factors determines whether 
a homeostatic imbalance will ensue. The first factor involves the objective 
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component, that is, the inherently stressfl!l aspects that are embedded 
within each demand. The second component reflects the individual's 
perceptual predispositions. The person's internal resources and related 
ability to adapt to the event or circumstance completes the triad. The 
manner in which these factors merge determines the stressfulness of a 
given event or situation. 
The Operationalizini Process 
The practical importance of establishing a solid conceptual footing 
becomes apparent as the proposed definition of stress lends itself to directly 
resolving some of the key methodological issues in the stress assessment 
field. For example, one major controversy has involved the original 
Holmes and Rahe assessment premise. This premise suggested that the 
stressfulness of life events was related primarily to the level of significant 
change and the amount of disruption that events imposed upon the 
individual, irrespective of any psychological meanings attached to such 
occurrences. In contrast, it has been suggested that social undesirability 
and the presumed upset caused by the event should serve as the major 
criteria for determining its stressfulness (Gersten, Langner, Eisenberg and 
Simcha-Fagan, 1977; Paykel et al., 1971; Vinocur and Selzer, 1975). The 
debate regarding which approach is more likely to reflect valid stressors is 
resolved by examining the current conceptual structure. Within this 
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framework, all events are viewed as complex transactional chain processes 
which have the potential to possess desirable benign as well as undesirable 
components ( e.g., perceived threat, upset, or challenging demands). These 
latter qualities may result in an imbalance in the person's homeostatic 
adaptational system. A job promotion may represent a positive opportunity 
for a given individual. In contrast, the same promotion may entail a 
degree of stress provoking threat, since promotions often involve a longer 
work week, greater responsibility, etc. By the same token, being fired 
from a job potentially may possess the same complex dynamic components 
of opportunity and/or threat. Although cognitive appraisals of the event in 
conjunction with the person's adaptational resources play a significant role 
in determining its stressfulness, the inherent properties of the event itself 
cannot be ignored. Consequently, for most individuals in Western society, 
the experience of losing one's job will be perceived as more stressfully 
taxing than the adaptational demands associated with the typical job 
promotion. 
It has been asserted that a simple count of life event occurrences 
may be as effective as summing life event scores that have been weighted 
(Gersten, et al., 1977; Hutton and Roberts, 1990; Sandler and Block, 1979). 
However, developmental psychopathology purists would be likely to 
demand that a sophisticated stress assessment device should establish a 
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greater degree of precision m reflecting stress exposure. It seems 
unreasonable to assume, for example, that the long term impact on a child 
of being hospitalized for a week is likely to be equivalent to the impact on a 
child of suddenly losing a parent who is killed in -an automobile accident. 
Assigning equal score weights to these two events seems unproductive. 
Instead, what is needed in the stress assessment field is a sensitive 
instrument that is able to weight and thus differentiate events of differing 
magnitudes of potential impact. Subsequently, as a function of determining 
modal response parameters, the establishment of magnitude scores which 
reflect a best guess as to how, on average, most individuals would respond 
to given events should lie at the heart of a nomothetically oriented 
approach (Anthony, 1974; Chandler, 1985; Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 
1980; Dohrenwend, Krasnoff, Askenasy and Dohrenwend, 1978; Tennant, 
et al., 1979). 
Along related lines, a nomothetically oriented instrument approach 
would recognize that personalized complex transactional chain processes 
underlying most events need to be more accurately assessed (Kasi, 1983). 
Assigning the same event score to two unrelated children whose parents 
have divorced does little to shed light on the potential stressfulness of each 
child's experiences. A more responsive device could incorporate clusters 
of items which as a group would add precision in measuring the 
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multifaceted aspects of the complex phenomena involved. Because of 
practical considerations, however, this multifaceted analysis would by 
necessity be limited to high impact areas such as family finances, child 
care, divorce, attachment losses, and caretaker personality characteristics 
and attitudes. In keeping with the proposed theoretical structure, and with 
-
other factors being equal, event processes that are likely to be perceived as 
disruptive to attachments or to result in a perceived loss of control warrant 
higher magnitude rating assignments. In all cases, however, a 
determination of magnitude should be a function of an event's net severity, 
intensity, and chronicity rated within the context of developmental 
considerations. Such ratings should also be subject to empirical validation. 
The last major category of environmental stressors subject to close 
scrutiny involves what will be referred to as chronic event processes. This 
area has been largely ignored in traditional stress assessment. As had been 
previously noted, Meyer (1951), a life events research pioneer, and 
contemporary researchers such as Rutter (1983) and Lazarus (1984) have 
observed that many pathogenic life events that precede psychiatric illness 
are more likely to be mundane yet chronically disruptive processes as 
opposed to dramatic and discrete crises. While traditional stress assessment 
measures have focused on major life events (Holmes and Rahe, 1967), it 
would seem that the majority of stressors that challenge an individual's 
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ability to maintain homeostasis involve ongoing minor annoyances that 
have been referred to in the recent research literature as "daily hassles" 
(Anthony, 1986; Delongis, Folkman and Lazarus, 1988). 
Lazarus (1984) defines daily hassles as "experiences and conditions 
of daily living that have been appraised as salient and harmful or 
threatening to the endorser's well being" (p. 376). In contrast to 
universally stressful major life events, daily hassles are in greater part 
affected by cognitive appraisals. Although daily hassles are usually 
undramatic and generally less intense than major life events, their ability to 
strain and insidiously wear down individuals seems connected to their 
omnipresent nature (McLean, 1976). In an attempt to further delineate 
daily hassles, Gruen, Folkman and Lazarus (1988) have compared central 
hassles with noncentral hassles. Central hassles reflect important ongoing 
themes or problems in an individual's life. For example, an overweight 
person's continued inability to lose weight may represent a central theme 
which negatively impacts on self-image. Fighting heavy traffic in the daily 
drive to work may also result in a great deal of frustration; however, for 
most individuals, this would clearly serve as an example of a noncentral 
hassle. In keeping with the theoretical perspective that was noted in 
assigning potential stress magnitude ratings, central hassles that are 
perceived as disrupting attachments or resulting in a perceived loss of 
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control warrant higher magnitude ratings than noncentral hassles which 
presumably have no such connections. 
The relative potency of chronic stressors is underscored by 
preliminary evidence which suggests that daily hassles may serve as better 
predictors of subsequent maladaptive psychological symptoms than major 
life event scores (Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer and Lazarus, 1981). In recent 
years, some clinically useful efforts have been made to assess daily hassles 
in older children and adults (Brantley and Jones, 1989; Hutton and Roberts, 
1990; Kanner et al., 1981). Although these scales seem nomothetically 
oriented, they are essentially ipsative devices. A nomothetically anchored 
instrument which assesses a combination of major life events, chronic daily 
hassles and other relevant stress producing factors in the lives of children 
would be of great utility to both researchers and clinicians yet awaits 
development (Colton, 1985; Delongis, Coyne, Dakof, Folkman and 
Lazarus, 1982). 
In reviewing the developmental psychopathology perspective that 
has been utilized thus far, it seems clear that risk research reflects the basic 
elements related to investigating psychopathology (Garmezy and Masten, 
1986). As Garmezy (1976) had noted, the two focal points in risk research 
involve the risk from exposure to severely detrimental environmental 
experiences and the risk of possessing highly maladaptive inherited 
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characteristics. This later category of risk reflects another area that has 
been largely ignored in traditional stress assessment. An internal risk focus 
suggests the existence of built-in predispositional tendencies that are closely 
related to stress exposure potential. Parents have .been viewed by many 
researchers as reliable and valid sources of information regarding their 
-
children's behaviors and temperamental traits (Buss and Plomin, 1984; 
Chess and Thomas, 1986; Lyon and Plomin, 1981; McDevitt and Carey, 
1978). Furthermore, research evidence suggests that parents' perceptions 
of their children's temperament and personality characteristics strongly 
predict the quality of parent-infant interactions and later child development 
related to adjustment and emotional resiliency (Egeland and Brunnquell, 
1979; Goldberg, 1977; Werner and Smith, 1982; Wise and Grossman, 
1980). Despite this promising evidence, there is virtually no existing body 
of assessment instrument literature which deals directly with the 
measurement of a child's stress exposure as a function of that child's 
temperamental characteristics. However, it should be noted that the 
Parenting Stress Index (Abidin, 1983) addresses this area within the context 
of primarily assessing parent stress levels. The Coping Inventory (Zeitlin, 
1978) and the Stress Response Scale for Children (Chandler, 1986) are 
concerned with the measurement of children's personality characteristics 
but seem to be essentially measuring coping styles rather than stress 
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exposure potential, since they consider these characteristics as responses to 
stress rather than as stress producing internal characteristics. 
Present and Future Assessment Opportunities 
The assessment of internal risk and prot~ctive factors add an 
important dimension to the empirical study of developmental 
psychopathology. In reviewing the broad scope of the present 
investigation, it seems likely that cognitive appraisals. and temperamental 
variables are largely responsible for the individual differences seen in 
response to stress exposure. Yet, the basis for providing a uniquely 
dynamic source of diagnostic information is circumscribed within this 
elusive variance, thereby converting measurement threat to measurement 
opportunity. 
The presently offered model of stress and its relationship to 
Adaptive Emotional Resiliency suggests that a nomothetically oriented 
measure of stress cannot directly reflect developmental outcomes. Instead, 
a more reasonable expectation for such a scale is to predict the likelihood 
of adaptation or psychopathology by objectively measuring potential 
vulnerability to stress exposure. The primary reason for this apparent 
limitation involves the aforementioned issue of individualized reactivity to 
stressors. Personalized predictions are further complicated in that attempts 
to directly measure adaptation or psychopathology via life events, for 
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example, seem unrealistic since developmental outcomes result from 
complex ongoing transactional processes. These processes are composed of 
seemingly limitless sequences of obvious and subtle exchanges between 
individuals and their environments. As a group, these transactions would 
be difficult to measure without the benefit of extensive direct observation, 
longitudinal interviews, and other costly and impractical idiographic 
techniques. Even if such efforts were contemplated, objective 
quantification and analysis would still be extremely complex. Thus, rather 
than attempting to measure the endless miles in an individual's complex 
journey through life, a practical nomothetic device could utilize key 
predictors ( e.g., major life events, daily hassles, child temperament, 
characteristics of the caregiving environment) as signposts along the route 
which identify and predict crucial momentum events and directional trends. 
Subsequently, such signposts would reflect developmental tendencies and 
therefore be symptomatic of the entire journey. Since a stress scale would 
only reflect the actuarial probability for adaptive or maladaptive emotional 
outcomes, the earlier noted measurement variance related to individualized 
responsivity could actually serve as a dynamically interpreted embodiment 
of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency, the relative relationship of emotional 
mastery to stress exposure. 
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For most children, the issue of unexpected variance is likely to be 
inconsequential, since a well-constructed nomothetic instrument measuring 
potential vulnerability to stress exposure should function as a fairly good 
predictor of critical developmental outcomes. These outcomes would 
include such personal competence areas as: the self-concept, school 
functioning, and interpersonal relatedness. However, when expected 
outcome parameters that are predicted by a stress scale do not coincide 
with actual outcomes, the level and direction of the incongruence may 
largely represent the child's self-righting tendencies as delineated by the 
concept of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. The expanded development of a 
stress assessment instrument into the dynamic multidimensional realm of 
emotional mastery accomplishments may indeed be welcomed by the field 
of developmental psychopathology. 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter II addressed the first goal of the study, the development of 
a viable theory of emotional resilience. It accomplished this objective by 
providing a coherent theoretical framework for studying the concept of 
Adaptive Emotional Resiliency, the capacity of the individual to maintain 
mastery and competence in the face of exposure to stress. The theoretical 
framework featured three sections. 
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The first section provided a holistic overview of the self-concept 
and its theoretical antecedent processes of attachment and adaptive control. 
The focal mediational role played by the construct of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency in self-concept formation was presumed. to have genetic origins 
interacting with environmental factors. 
The second section of Chapter II closely scrutinized the respective 
contributions made by environmental and genetic risk factors as they 
related to the construct of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. Section two 
concluded by reintegrating these factors into a transactional model of 
development. This transactional synthesis was illustrated by a "loosely 
bound" hypothetical account of a maladaptive parent-infant attachment 
process. 
The third section of Chapter II completed the conceptual overview 
of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency by providing the necessary transitional 
link between the proposed theory and goal two of the study which 
represented an initial step in operationalizing the resilience construct. By 
articulating a theoretical organizing structure for the study of stress 
assessment, this last section of Chapter II offered a background for 
examining the methodology issues of Chapter III which involved stress 
scale development and validation efforts. Consequently, the theoretical 
underpinnings of emotional development as presented in Chapter II 
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supported the need for empirically detailing links of generalized stress to 
psychological disorders in children. 
CHAPTER III 
SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION 
Hypothesis 
As stated in Chapter I, the dual purpose of the study was to 
develop a viable theoretical perspective for investigating the concept of 
Adaptive Emotional Resiliency in children and to begin to operationalize 
this theoretical construct via the development and validation of an 
objectively scored parent interview instrument, the Stressor Risk Scale 
(SRS). Chapter II addressed the first goal of the study by providing an 
integrated conceptual foundation within which to embed the development 
of the SRS. The overall research hypothesis of the study is derived from 
this foundation. The second goal of the study was directed at an 
examination and testing of this hypothesis. 
Conceptually, goal two of the study represents an initial step in 
operationalizing the concept of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency. However, 
before it is possible to assess an individual's level of emotional mastery in 
the face of stress, it is necessary to accurately gauge that individual's actual 
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exposure to stress. Thus, goal two involves a concurrent validity study of 
the SRS. The SRS is designed to assess potential emotional vulnerability in 
the child as a function of stress exposure in three areas: perceived child 
personality-temperament characteristics, history of stress related life events 
of the child and family, and parental personality characteristics and 
attitudes. It is hypothesized that SRS scores will predict and differentiate 
among three groups of children of the same age; these children, by virtue 
of actual adaptive functioning in their respective school settings, are 
presumed to possess a low, moderate, or high-risk emotional and/or 
behavioral status. 
In order to examme this assumption, the first diagnostic study 
group contains children who by special education standards are considered 
to be non-handicapped. These children are presumed to be functioning 
well or at least adequately in their respective settings and are thus expected 
to possess a low risk emotional and/or behavioral status. The second group 
contains children who are presumed to possess a moderate risk emotional 
and/or behavioral posture. Children in this group experience difficulty in 
school. Such difficulties are reflected by formal action taken by school 
officials which may result in: the processing of formal special education 
referrals, grade retentions, implementation of counseling or tutoring 
support services, case study evaluations, and/or the provision of special 
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education services for developmentally delayed, learning disabled, or 
mildly retarded diagnostic conditions. Children who show evidence of 
moderate to severe retardation levels or of sensory impairments or those 
diagnosed as primarily behavior disordered/emoti.onally disturbed were 
excluded from this group. The third group contains· children who are 
presumed to possess a high-risk emotional and/or behavioral status. These 
children experience difficulties in school which lead to case study 
evaluation and the subsequent provision of special education services 
following diagnosis of behavior disorder/emotional disturbance as a 
primary handicapping condition. 
In addition to contributing to the stress assessment field and its 
related p~tential in empirically studying Adaptive Emotional Resiliency, 
the validation of the SRS could be viewed as a much needed means of 
detailing links of generalized stress exposure to psychological disorders in 
children. The discussion presented below regarding the scale's 
development, design features, applications and initial pilot study serves as 
a useful frame of reference for discussing the validation efforts related to 
goal two. 
Development and Description of the SRS Pilot Scale 
As a function of reviewing the research and theory literature 
related to the fields of attachment, self-esteem, stress-risk, social support, 
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adaptive behavior-control, child-developmental psychopathology, and 
emotional resilience, an idea pool of possible items for the SRS was 
created. A portion of this item pool stemmed directly from the clinical 
experiences of the investigator. The idea pool f9r possible items was 
therefore formed primarily on a rational-theoretical basis. Thus, the 
selected test stimuli utilized face validity-common sense considerations in 
conjunction with reflecting on key aspects of the aforementioned research 
and theory literature reviews. The investigator envisioned that this 
instrument would be an objectively scored unobtrusive measure which 
relied upon data provided by informed observers. To a large extent, this 
initial vision and the eventual shape and form of the instrument were 
dictated by the nature of the information to be gathered. The initial group 
of approximately 500 item-ideas for possible inclusion in the scale, seemed 
logically to fall into four categories. The four categories involved items 
related to the child's personality-temperamental characteristics, child and 
family stress related life events, child and family goodness-of-fit issues, and 
parental personality characteristics and attitudes. The goodness-of-fit 
section was eventually discarded, although some of the items from this 
category were retained in other sections. Items were also devised that were 
intended to alert an examiner to the possibility of response distortion 
patterns ( e.g., most often associated with respondents who manifest poor 
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reality contact, defensive or socially desirable responding tendencies). Five 
such items were developed and embedded in the parental personality 
characteristics section. 
Overall, items from the original idea pool. were included in the 
pilot version of the scale based upon their apparent ability to be portrayed 
and measured clearly, simply, and accurately. Ideas involving highly 
complex phenomena ( e.g., a parent's level of sensitivity to a child's needs) 
and items that seemed particularly prone to response set distortions were 
discarded regardless of their import. In many instances, clusters of items 
that measured multifaceted aspects of a given research area were 
significantly reduced to what appeared to be those few items that seemed 
most essential to and representative of that subject matter. This process 
also insured that specific topics were not inadvertently given improperly 
weighted importance. Another significant concern throughout the item 
reduction process was that the eventual scale should not be unwieldy and 
therefore impractical. A target goal of 30 minutes was envisioned as the 
ideal administration time. Subsequently, the final version of the pilot scale 
included 242 items and required an average administration time of about 
35 to 40 minutes per subject. This relatively efficient time range was 
achieved in part as a function of the pilot scale's design which featured item 
presentation in a "flip-style" easel format. The easel format allowed the 
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examiner to control the pace of items administered and the number and 
combination of items exposed to the subject at any given time. The easel 
also displayed items in a clear position to both the subject and the examiner 
while providing the examiner with a set of naturally shielded 
administration and scoring directions. It also served as a natural shield 
while the examiner scored responses on the record -form. In addition, the 
scale's design required minimal demands on subject. response skills; all 
items were read aloud and subject responses were recorded by the 
examiner. 
SRS Section I - Personality 
The first portion of the SRS pilot scale, which attempted to assess 
stress exposure as a function of the child's personality-temperamental 
characteristics, featured 62 items that utilized a modified semantic 
differential technique. In this section, items were presented as sets of 
contrasting words or short phrases which described behavior or personality 
dimensions. Each item offered seven possible rating points which were 
anchored on opposite sides by the aforementioned pairs of contrasting 
words or phrases. After the examiner read each pair, the respondent was 
first asked to decide which word or phrase in each pair was more 
descriptive of his or her child's typical everyday behaviors. The 
respondent was then required to rate verbally the degree to which that 
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word or phrase was descriptive according to the following scheme: a rating 
of 3 suggested that the concept was highly descriptive, a rating of 2 
suggested that the concept was moderately descriptive, and a rating of 1 
suggested that the concept was mildly descriptive. of the child's typical 
behavior. A rating of O suggested an even balance· between the two 
concepts. A reference card which listed these ratings was also displayed to 
the respondent throughout the administration of all the items. From a 
visual standpoint, the seven points featured the O in the middle position and 
the numbers 1, 2, and 3 emanating in an ascending fashion toward each of 
the oppositely anchored concepts. Since the numbers 1, 2, and 3 were 
duplicated in each direction, a simple identification technique was taught to 
the respondent utilizing the letters L and R which signified to the examiner 
whether the numbered rating that was selected for each item occupied the 
position to the left or the right of the 0. This "rating duplication" 
technique greatly minimized the absolute magnitude of differences seen in 
the number ratings of the extreme options. As a result, respondents were 
more inclined to rate accurately the salient aspects of their child's 
personality and behavioral tendencies. Adjectives used with many of the 
concepts were "softened" for the same purpose. The number rating 
duplication technique was also advantageous since it helped to disguise the 
socially desirable response direction of each item. 
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It may have seemed to respondents that each item in the first 
section was assigned symmetrically similar rating points at either end of the 
continuum. In fact, however, these contrasting concept pairs were included . 
in the scale because of their presumed ability to. distinguish personality 
characteristics or behavioral tendencies that were adaptive and protective 
from those that were presumed to be maladaptive. Thus, each item 
featured a continuum of stress exposure risk. At one- end, the personality 
characteristic was viewed as adaptive and protective, since it was assumed 
that possessing such a characteristic tended to elicit positive responses from 
caretakers and others in the child's environment. The concept at the other 
end of the item continuum was assumed to be maladaptive and subsequently 
exposed the child to high-risk levels of stress, since it was thought that 
such a characteristic tended to elicit negative responses from caretakers and 
others. In order to numerically represent this contrast, each item received 
a score rating from 1 to 7 which was directly translated on the record form 
from the subject's response. According to this rating scheme, the higher the 
number, the more stressful the rated characteristic was presumed to be. To 
control for acquiescence-response sets, odd items presented the positively 
scored options on the left side of the continuum, while the even items 
presented the positively scored options on the right side. In the first 
section, three items utilized a two step branching technique because of the 
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investigator's difficulty in establishing a clear single item 
adaptive-maladaptive continuum for each of the three areas. Overall, the 
62 items in Section I were divided into four subsections based primarily 
upon rational and theoretical considerations. The first 18 items formed 
Part A, entitled Inhibitory Control. Part B consisted of the next 13 items, 
entitled Mood State. Part C included the next 15 items and was named 
Social Orientation. Part D, which featured the last 16 items, was labeled 
Coping Tendencies. Five scale scores generated from Section I included a 
score for each of the four subsections and a total score based upon the sum 
of the four subsections. Tables 2, 3, and 4 illustrate Section I items. 
SRS Section II - Life Events 
The second portion of the SRS pilot scale was designed to assess 
stress exposure as a function of examining the stress related life events 
history of the child and family. This portion featured 124 items that were 
measured by a weighted checklist type format. Event items thought to 
require a level of adaptive change and adjustment for the child, as well as 
for members of the child's family, were read to the subject. Events that 
were discretely acute or chronic in nature were represented. Events 
chosen for this section were presumed to have had a direct effect on the 
child or a more subtle indirect effect in cases where they involved 
members of the child's family. Reported events were scored only if they 
TABLE 2 
Sample of Administration Items from Section I - Part A, Respondent Side View 
Ll L2 Ll 0 r , , , 
1 
Rl R2 R3 
I I I I I CR 
. - - - - - - -- - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- -
GOOD PHYSICAL COORDINATION I 3 I 2 I 1 0 I l 2 3 POOR PHYSICAL COORDINATION 
OFTEN MANIFESTS TANTRUMS 3 2 1 I 0 1 2 3 I RARELY MANIFESTS TANTRUMS 
LIKELY TO PERSIST - I I I I I I . UNLIKELY TO PERSIST -RARELY 61 YES UP 3 2 1 0 1 2 
' 
OFTEN GIVES UP 
OFTEN DESTRUCTIVE 
3 2 1 0 I 1 I 2 3 I RARELY DESTRUCTIVE WITH. TOYS WITH TOYS 
APPROPRIATE ATTENTION I 3 I 2 I 1 I o I l I 2 I 3 I EXCESSIVE ATTENTION SEEKING SEEKING ~ ll'I 
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TABLE 3 
Sample of Administration Items from Section I - Part A, Examiner Side View 
STRENGTH OF RATING L3 L2 Ll O Rl R2 R3 
3 - HIGHLY DESCRIPTIVE t-' ' 
2 - MODERATELY DESCRIPTIVE 
1 - MILDLY DESCRIPTIVE 
0 - NEUTRAL BALANCE 13 l2 l1 lo l1 l2 l3f 
7, GOOD PHYSICAL COORDINATION POOR PHYSICAL COORDINATION 
8, OFTEN MANIFESTS TANTRUMS RARELY MANIFESTS TANTRUMS 
9, LIKELY TO PERSIST - UNLIKELY TO PERSIST -RARELY GIVES UP OFTEN GIVES UP 
10, OFTEN DESTRUCTIVE RARELY DESTRUCTIVE WITH TOYS WITH TOYS 
11. APPROPRIATE ATTENTION EXCESSIVE ATTENTION SEEKING SEEKING 
CR 
I--' 
VI 
00 
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TABLE 4 
Sample from Section I - Part A, Examiner Record Form 
SECTION I - PERSONALITY 
Part A: Motoric Activity-Inhibitory Control 
1. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Patient) 
2. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Careless) 
3. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Cooperative) 
4. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Accident) 
5. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Control) 
6. L3 L2 Ll 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Active) 
7. L3 L2 Ll 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Coordination) 
8. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Tantrums) 
9. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Persist) 
10. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Destructive) 
11. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Attention) 
12. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Obedient) 
13. L3 L2 L1 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Span) 
14. L3 L2 Ll 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Eating) 
15. L3 L2 Ll 0 Rl R2 R3 CR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Activities) 
Column 
-1 Totals + + + + + + Tota1-'8rt A 
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had occurred since the child's birth or, in some cases, during the period of 
the child's fetal development. However, there were three types of 
departures from this objective event listing format. Each of these 
departures attempted to build a greater range and degree of item scoring 
flexibility into the scale. 
The first type of departure involved perception oriented items. In 
contrast to fact oriented events ( e.g., family acquires- a pet) which were 
typically easier to verify objectively, perception oriented events relied 
heavily on cognitive appraisals and thus allowed for more personalized 
responses. For example, responding affirmatively to the item "Greatly 
unequal sharing of child care responsibilities between parents" suggests that 
this perception does indeed belong to the respondent even though such a 
perception may be totally unrelated to the actual proportion of time 
committed to child care activities. Approximately one-third of the life 
event items dealt with chronic daily hassle oriented perceptions. Many of 
the items were also worded in such a way as to afford the subject a level of 
privacy while simultaneously revealing important information. 
Consequently, for items such as "Child experiences one traumatic event" 
the subject was not required to reveal the specific nature of the perceived 
experience. Instead, the subject was asked only to report that a traumatic 
experience had occurred. If comfort and trust levels were high between 
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the interviewer and respondent, the specifics regarding an event could be 
discussed in greater detail. The selective use of intentionally inexact item 
wording in Section II also allowed subjects to assess and in effect determine 
the magnitude rating of specific events. In general, building a subjective 
responding component into the life events section was seen as a way of 
enhancing the overall concurrent validity of this portion of the scale, since 
it permitted each subject to attach his or her own personalized meanings 
and reactions to selected items. 
A second type of departure involved the so-called Add ( additional) 
items. Upon completing the administration of the life events in Section II, 
subjects were asked whether there were other events not covered in the list 
that should be noted. This procedure allowed subjects flexibility in the 
reporting of unlisted events that were personally experienced as having 
been stressful to their children or to others in their family. In the case of 
these Add items, the examiner was required to determine a magnitude 
rating for each event. 
The last departure m Section II involved the so-called Ant 
( anticipated) items. The Ant item cluster asked subjects to determine 
which, if any, of the previously listed life events might occur or re-occur 
in the near future. The logic behind Ant items suggested that if an 
individual is anticipating the occurrence of some significantly stressful 
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event such as a divorce or the death of a loved one, then it seemed 
reasonable to assume that the series of events leading up to the anticipated 
event might be equally if not more stressful as the anticipated event itself. 
Ant events were scored as if they had already occurred. The main purpose 
in developing the three item departure formats was· to minimize the 
possibility of omitting potentially salient stressful life events information 
from the profile of a child or family. The record form also provided for a 
full range of possible point scoring options for both the Add and Ant items. 
In Section II, each event item was read to the respondents. 
Subjects then indicated to the examiner whether the event had occurred 
since the birth of their child. If a subject's response for a given item was 
affirmative, then the examiner circled the corresponding point score 
associated with the numbered item on the record form. Circled point 
scores were added in each of four columns. The four column sums were 
then added across the bottom row of the record form, which generated a 
total scale score for Section II. As a function of integrating relevant 
research, theory and the investigator's clinical field · experiences, the 
magnitude of potential impact upon the child of each stressful event was 
estimated and represented numerically through a weighted point system. 
Each item was assigned a score of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 9 points. Similarly to 
Section I, the greater the point score, the more stressful the event was 
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presumed to be in potential negative impact for the child and secondarily 
for the child's family. Events that were rated in the 3, 4, or 5 point range 
were deemed to be very serious stressors. Events that were assigned 6 or 9 
point weights were considered to be "mega-stressor&." In addition, specific 
high impact processes involving such issues as child · care, divorce and 
family finances were represented by clusters of Items which measured 
multifaceted aspects of the complex phenomena involved. The incremental 
weighting that resulted from responses to the item combinations in each 
cluster had the effect of more precisely representing the full potential 
impact of such intricate phenomena. In effect, personalized transactional 
chains were being assessed. As had been previously mentioned, the sum of 
all scored items was represented by one total scale score for Section II. 
Since multiple stressors tend to have a cumulative impact, this score 
represented the totality of potential stressfulness (relative to Section II) of a 
particular child's life. In a broader sense, an item analysis of Section II 
provided a detailed profile of the stress exposure levels of the child's entire 
family from the time of the child's fetal development. Tables 5, 6, and 7 
illustrate Section II items. 
SRS Section III - Parental Characteristics 
The third portion of the SRS pilot scale, which attempted to assess 
the child's stress exposure as a function of examining the personal 
TABLE 5 
Sample of Administration Items from Section II, Respondent Side View 
Parents have different religious backgrounds. 
Parents have different ethnic backgrounds(e.g., one parent is Hispanic and the 
other is Oriental, etc.). 
Child currently watches television: 
a) 0 to 6 hours per week 
b) 7 to 12 hours per week 
cl 13 to 18 hours per week 
d 19 to 24 hours per week 
e 25 or more hours per week 
What other event(s) not covered in the above list have required a significant 
level of change or adjustment on the part of your child or for other members 
of your family? 
Of all the events previously listed, which, if any, of these events may possibly 
occur in the near future (either as a first time occurrence or as a re-occurrence)? 
TABLE 6 
Sample of Administration Items from Section II, Examiner Side View 
111. Parents have different religious backgrounds. (Score 2) 
112. Parents have different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., one parent is Hispanic and the 
other is Oriental, etc.). (Score 3) 
113. Child currently watches television: 
a) 0 to 6 hours per week 
b) 7 to 12 hours per week 
c) 13 to 18 hours per week 
dJ 19 to 24 hours per week 
e) 25 or more hours per week 
114. (Score 3) 
Note: Score 2 for a 
cord response. 
Score-Item 114 
for an e 
response. 
115. What other event(s) not covered in the above list have required a significant 
level of change or adjustment on the part of your child or for other lllelllbers 
of your family? 
(Record additional events on record form and score accordingly using Items 115 to 
121. For example, if an additional event receives a score of 3,then score the 
additional event as Item 117, etc.) 
122. Of all the events previously listed, which, if any, of these events may possibly 
occur in the near future (either as a first time occurrence or as a re-occurrence)? 
(Record anticipated events on record form and score accordin~ly using Items 122 to 
12H. For example, if an anticipated event receives a score of 6, then score the 
anticipated event as Item 127, etc.) 
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TABLE 7 
Sample from Section II, Examiner Record Form 
SECTION II - LI FE EVHJTS 
(circle scored items) 
Column A Column B Col unm C . Column D 
1. 1 33. 3 65. 3 97. 4 
2. 2 34. 2 66. 6 98. 3 
3. 3 35. 3 67. 5 99. 3 
4. 2 36. 2 68. 9 100. 2 
5. 2 37. 2 69. 4 101. 2 
6. 4 38. 2 70. 5 102. 2 
7. 5 39. 2 71. 3 103. 1 
8. 3 40. 2 72. 3 104. 3 
9. 3 41. 2 73. 3 105. 6 
10. 4 42. 4 74. 3 106. 5 
11. 3 43. 2 75. 2 107. 4 
12. 2 44. 2 76. 5 108. 4 
13. 5 45. 3 77. 4 109. 4 
14. 3 46. 4 78. 5 110. 1 
15. 4 47. 3 79. 4 111. 2 
16. 2 48. 4 80. 2 112. 3 
17. 5 49. 2 81. 4 113. 2 (_) 
18. 1 50. 5 82. 6 114. 3 
19. 2 51. 3 83. 3 115. 1 add 
20. 2 52. 1 84. 4 116. 2 add 
21. 2 53. 2 85. 4 117. 3 add 
22. 2 54. 4 86. 3 118. 4 add 
23. 4 55. 2 87. 4 119. 5 add 
24. 3 56. 4 88. 9 120. 6 add 
25. 5 57. 3 89. 2 121. 9 add 
26. 3 58. 4 90. 2 122. 1 ant 
27. 4 59. 3 91. 4 123. 2 ant 
28. 3 60. 4 92. 4 124. 3 ant 
29. 5 61. 3 93. 5 125. 4 ant Col. A 
30. 3 62. 3 94. 3 126. 5 ant Col. B 
31. 3 63. 4 95. 5 127. 6 ant Col. C 
32. 3 64. 3 96. 4 128. 9 ant Col. D 
Total D 
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characteristics of the caregiving environment, featured 56 items in three 
separate divisions. These divisions measured the parent's self-reported 
personality characteristics and attitudes. Section III primarily utilized two 
variations of a 3-point Likert scale format. In Sectjon III-A, 44 statements 
were read to subjects. Subjects were then asked to indicate whether they 
agreed, disagreed or were neutral in their opinion -of each statement. In 
Section III-B, 11 questions were read to subjects. Subjects were asked to 
choose one of three responses which in their opinion best answered each 
question. A twelfth question in this section was an unscored open-ended 
inquiry regarding the numerical size of the subject's confidant network. 
The five previously discussed Distortion Index items were randomly 
embedded in Section III-A but were scored separately as Section III-C. 
With the exception of the five Distortion Index items, each item in Section 
III was chosen because of its apparent ability to discern parental personality 
characteristics, attitudes or behavioral tendencies that were associated with 
positive and protective parenting or negative maladaptive parenting. 
Consequently, as seen in Section I, each item featured a similar but 
abbreviated continuum of stress exposure risk. In order to numerically 
represent this relationship, items received score ratings of 0, 1, or 2 which 
were converted on the record form directly from the subject's response. 
Again, the higher the number rating, the more stressful the rated 
168 
characteristic was assumed to be. In the case of the Distortion Index items, 
however, it was presumed that the higher the number, the more likely it 
was that a subject was engaged in response distortion practices. 
Acquiescence-response sets were controlled in . this section through 
randomly mixed item and response stem placements. 
Section III-A items were chosen to reflect a variety of adult 
personality characteristics and attitudes which seemed highly relevant in 
terms of predicting parenting tendencies as well as in projecting a sense of 
the caregiver's own emotional well-being. As a result, items in Section III-
A dealt primarily with variables related to the assessment of the adult 
respondent's self-esteem, locus of control, anxiety, conflict, depression, 
satisfaction, environmental goodness-of-fit, and social support levels. The 
underlying theoretical notion that guided the development of Section III-A 
was that emotionally vulnerable caretakers may expose their children to 
high-risk levels of stress as a function of their own stress exposure, 
discomfort or pathology. In contrast to Section I, the empirically based 
items that were crafted to measure these relevant areas were presented in a 
randomly scattered fashion throughout Section III-A. 
Section III-A presented a more generalized picture of the adult 
caretaker's emotional status. Section III-B focused on the adult caretaker's 
level of frustration in raising a particular child in conjunction with 
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assessing the level of available social support for that adult. Therefore, the 
items contained in Section III-B were viewed as critically vital in directly 
reflecting reactive stress experienced by caretakers as a function of their 
parental role demands. In isolation, the social support component of this 
section attempted to shed light on a caretaker's ability to weather stressors. 
The task of detecting response distortion patterns, as seen in 
Section III-C, related to the ubiquitous personality assessment problem of 
monitoring the truthfulness of a subject's responses (Crowne and Marlowe, 
1964; Lanyon and Goodstein, 1971, 1982). In addition to not being willing 
to tell the "truth," some respondents may not consciously know the truth 
about themselves and/or their children. Therefore, Distortion Index items 
were constructed with the assumption in mind that a reasonably aware and 
truthful individual would respond to each of these items in a self-effacing 
manner. 
Section III generated three scale scores: a total score for Section 
III-A, a total score for Section III-B, and a Distortion Index score (Section 
111-C) based upon the total score derived from the five response distortion 
items embedded in Section III-A. As was the case for Sections I and II, 
the structure of Section III allowed it to be administered to either parent or 
other knowledgeable caretakers when a parent was not available. The 
wording of several items in Section III was also similar to parts of Section 
170 
II in that it afforded subjects a level of privacy while simultaneously 
providing them with the opportunity to share vital information with the 
interviewer. For example, a subject could indicate that he or she disagreed 
with the statement, "Financially, my family would be about average 
compared to most other families in our community." However, the subject 
was not required to reveal how his or her family differed from other 
families in this respect. A clinically oriented interview following the 
administration of the scale could afford a subject the opportunity to 
provide the interviewer with a more in-depth view of any problematic 
areas that the subject is comfortable discussing. Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 
illustrate Section III items. 
SRS Uses and Applications 
The multidimensional features of the SRS enhance the versatility 
of the scale. The scale provides a comprehensive profile of stress exposure 
risk to the child while simultaneously serving as a highly informative 
profile of stress exposure risk to the child's parents and family. A 
criterion referenced item analysis of each section is of particular benefit in 
this regard. A record form was developed as a straightforward means of 
recording the numerous item responses, directly translating these responses 
into scores, and organizing the scored items into constellations that are 
easily summed and totalled into their respective sections. The record form 
TABLE 8 
Sample of Administration Items from Section III - Part A, Examiner Side View 
STATEMENTS 
NEUTRAL DISAGREE 
13. I'm satisfied with my current role as a parent. 
14. I usually feel rushed. 
15. Life seems to be going quite well for my family. 
16. "1 spouse (or partner) is satisfied with his (her) current job. (If he (she) is 
currently unemployed, respond to the following statement: He (she) has no desire 
to be formally employed.) (Note: If no spouse or partner-Score 0) 
17. It seems that luck usually plays an important role in determining how successful 
one can be. 
18. I'm satisfied with the connunity that I live in. 
19. At times, I get frustrated with my child. 
20. It's usually easy for me to make new friends. 
21. Financially, my family would be about average compared to most other families 
in our c011111Unity. 
22. I'm satisfied with the way my family treats me. 
TABLE 9 
Sample of Administration Items from Section III - Part B, Examiner Side View 
QUESTIONS 
46. What was the mother's initial reaction at learning that she was pregnant 
with this child? 
Felt 
Happy 
Felt 
Neutral 
Felt 
Upset 
47. During the pregnancy with this child, how much support (e.g., affection, 
understanding, advice, help, etc.) did the mother receive from her spouse 
(or partner)? 
Maximum 
Support 
Moderate 
Support 
Minimal 
Support 
48. During the pregnancy with this child, how much support (e.g., affection, 
understanding, advice, help, etc.) did the mother receive from her extended 
family? 
Maximum 
Support 
Moderate 
Support 
Minimal 
Support 
49. With regard to this child's medical health history, how difficult has he (she) 
been to raise? 
Difficult Average Easy 
50. With regard to this child's typical physical activity levels, how difficult 
has he (she) been to raise? 
Difficult Average Easy 
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TABLE 10 
Sample from Section III - Part A, Examiner Record Form 
SECTION III - PAREHTAL CHAMCTERISTICS 
Part A: Attitudes 
Statements 
23. A N D CR 35. A N D CR 
0 1 2 (Happy) 2 1 0 (Count) 
24. A N D CR 36. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Worst) 0 1 2 (Schedule) 
25. A ti D CR 37. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Ethnic) 0 1 2 (Financial) 
26. A N D CR 38. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Doubts) 2 1 0 (Quality) 
27. A N D CR 39. A N D CR 
0 1 2 (Close) 2 1 0 (Spankings) 
28. A N D CR 40. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Quality) 2 1 0 (Tension) 
29. A N D CR 41. A N D CR 
0 1 2 (Happy) 0 1 2 (Job) 
30. A N D CR 42. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Right) 2 1 0 (Sex) 
31. A N D CR 43. A N D CR 
0 1 2 (Treat) 0 1 2 (Family) 
32. A N D CR 44. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Tension) 2 1 0 (Relaxing) 
33. A N D CR 45. A N D CR 
0 1 2 (Quality) 2 1 0 (Upset) 
34. A N D CR 
2 1 0 (Decisions) 
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TABLE 11 
Sample from Section III - Part B, Examiner Record Form 
SECTION III - PARENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Part B: Support-Frustration 
guest ions 
46. Hap Neu Ups CR 51. Dif Ave Eas CR 
0 1 2 (Pregnant) 2 1 0 (Manage) 
47. Max Hod Hin CR 52. Dif Ave Eas CR 
0 1 .2 (Spouse) 2 1 0 (Cues) 
48. Max Hod Min CR 53. Well Adea Poor CR 
0 1 2 (Family) 0 1 2 (Fit) 
49. Dif Ave Eas CR 54. Once Few Rare CR 
2 1 0 (Medical) 0 1 2 (Clubs) 
50. Dif Ave Eas CR *55a. *55b. *55i.:. 
2 1 0 (Activity) 
*Note: This item does not contribute 
to Part B scoring. 
Column 0 Column Sn Totals + + = Totals + + 
- - -
Total-Items 46-54 Sn Part B 
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was also designed to visually facilitate the aforementioned item analysis. A 
major benefit seen i~ utilizing the SRS prior to a clinical interview involves 
the notion that administering such a device could legitimize the gathering 
of a broad range of sensitive information. Within the course of most 
clinical interviews, the interviewer may not possess a · logical reason to 
inquire into certain personal areas since, on the surface, these areas may 
appear to be irrelevant to the concerns at hand. . Such apparently 
unconnected inquiries could be viewed by the respondent as voyeuristic and 
offensive. The SRS was therefore structured to legitimize the elicitation of 
a broad range of information which may not be offered spontaneously and 
may also be more difficult to elicit under less structured interviewing 
approaches. Consequently, the scale promotes a mix of nomothetic and 
idiographic features in the service of establishing a valid profile of 
diagnostically useful information. SRS sections are also ordered to 
promote a general progression from less sensitive to more sensitive items, 
thereby allowing subjects to ease into what is presumed to be more 
personal areas of inquiry. 
A distinctive application of the SRS lies in the interpretation of 
Section I as an independent measure of adaptive functioning. Although this 
section was conceived primarily to reflect stress exposure as a function of a 
child's personality-temperament characteristics, it was previously 
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determined that environmental factors do impact on the development of 
such internal traits. The more benign Sections II and III appear in a given 
profile, the more likely it is that Section I truly reflects internal behavioral 
predispositions. As Sections II and/or III increas~ m risk, the likelihood 
increases that environmental factors have played a · 1arger role in the 
development of Section I characteristics for a given child. In any event, 
Section I behavioral traits reflect the end result of a genetic-environmental 
process. Each item in Section I also possesses a ratable 
adaptive-maladaptive continuum. These features provide support for the 
use of Section I for the purpose of assessing adaptive outcome behaviors. 
Even though no unified theoretical or assessment related notion of 
adaptive behavior has been clearly established, the field of adaptive 
behavior assessment continues to receive increased attention because of 
special education legislative directives (Witt and Martens, 1984). As noted 
in an earlier discussion, many traditional adaptive behavior scales define 
adaptive behavior by the expectations or standards established by the scales' 
authors (Sparrow, Balla and Cicchetti, 1984). These standards are 
independently judged outside the context of a given individual's past life 
experiences, family value system and present living environment. A more 
useful approach to assessing adaptive behaviors in children involves a 
consideration of personal competence as initially proposed by Greenspan 
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(1981) and elaborated upon by McGrew and Bruininks (1990). Section I 
of the SRS provides a representative view of personal competence through 
its assessment of motoric and physical skills, social skills, cognitive skills, 
and emotional skills as reflected in the earlier 1eviewed spectrum of 
personality-temperament characteristics. The uniqueness of utilizing 
Section I as an adaptive behavior measure lies in its ability to be interpreted 
dynamically within the context of various environmental variables, thereby 
setting the stage for the objective assessment of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency. In addition to facilitating this dynamic assessment approach, 
Section I items ( as well as Section III items) are also designed to measure 
"protective" adaptive behaviors. Few parent rating scales focus on the 
prosocial aspects of behavior. Instead, most adaptive behavior rating 
instruments emphasize pathological factors while downplaying or ignoring 
a child's strengths and assets. In the spirit of the developmental 
psychopathology movement, the integrated use of a multidimensional 
system anchored by the SRS could lead to a more favorably balanced 
diagnosis and prognosis for many children who are reportedly engaged in a 
variety of maladaptive behaviors. 
Pilot SRS Study 
In 1988 the initial version of the SRS was piloted on 131 children 
who ranged in age from 3-0 to 10-6. The families included in the pilot 
178 
study were primarily Caucasian (92%) from middle to upper middle class 
backgrounds and resided in five north and northwest Chicago suburban 
communities. Although most of the adult subjects had volunteered to take 
part in the study along with their non-handicapped children, more than one-
third of the children in the sample were undergoing case study evaluations 
for the purposes of establishing eligibility for a variety of special education 
programs. Eventually, 42 children were formally · diagnosed as being 
behaviorally disordered/emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, 
developmentally delayed, hearing impaired, or mildly retarded. The pilot 
interviews were conducted by 11 trained evaluators who were social 
workers, psychologists, social worker interns, or psychologist interns. All 
were employed in the public school sector. 
The major focus of the pilot study was to analyze SRS pilot data 
with the intent of improving the psychometric characteristics of the scale. 
Although items selected for the pilot SRS were initially conceived on a 
rational-theoretical basis, their eventual maintenance and acceptance were 
dependent primarily upon empirically related criteria. However, because 
of the relatively narrow demographic nature of the families who took part 
in the piloting, a conservative approach was taken toward modifying or 
deleting items. 
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The general approach to item analysis required an evaluation of a 
combination of guiding principles. The backbone of this item analysis 
process involved a statistical analysis of the pilot data. Of key importance 
was the extent to which items contributed to the sc~le's reliability. To this 
end, a Cronbach Alpha analysis of items was generated, treating each 
section as a separate scale. Two crucial factors involved a careful scrutiny 
of each item's ability to predict and thereby significantly contribute to its 
respective section score ( e.g., item-total correlations), and each item's 
ability to enhance the overall alpha estimate of the section ( e.g., alpha if 
item deleted statistics). Inter-item correlational patterns were also 
carefully screened. These internal consistency reliability indices were 
deemed to be of particular importance in reviewing items from Sections I 
and III. Since variables were additionally analyzed as a function of 
membership in the diagnostic group, another key factor in the item analysis 
process was related to each item's ability to differentiate the behavior 
disordered/emotionally disturbed group from other populations. This type 
of analysis was viewed as being of utmost importance m eventually 
establishing concurrent validity indices for the scale. 
Statistically evaluated factors related to reliability and validity 
issues were ultimately combined with practical judgments. Consequently, 
items were also evaluated in terms of their ability to provide valuable 
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diagnostic information within the context of their administrative time cost. 
It was therefore possible for an item to measure up poorly in one respect 
but nevertheless be maintained in the scale revision because of its inherent 
strengths in other areas. In addition, items were modified, re-ordered, or 
deleted as a function of examining common patterns of administrative 
and/or scoring difficulties. This was accomplished through a careful 
review of each child protocol and by an analysis · of the solicited and 
unsolicited observations of the examiners and respondents. 
Although Section I data were analyzed via the aforementioned 
guidelines, an additional consideration was introduced into this section's 
evaluation. The concern addressed whether each item had been placed in 
the appropriate subsection. Subsequently, a Cronbach Alpha analysis was 
implemented treating each subsection as a separate scale. A Cronbach 
Alpha analysis was also implemented on the entire scale of 62 items which 
resulted in an Alpha coefficient of .94. Appropriate subsection 
membership for an item was questioned when the item-total correlation 
statistic for the subsection analysis was less than the item-total statistic for 
the entire scale. In such cases, three Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
coefficients were generated between the item and each of the other three 
subsections to determine the rightful placement of the item in the scale. As 
a function of this type of analysis, seven items were relocated, six items 
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were modified, and two items were deleted. Nevertheless, the original 
item order and respective option stem placements of Section I were 
maintained where possible. One additional modification in Section I 
involved the wording and print features of the ex~miner instructions that 
appeared on pages I-A and 1-AE. The revision featured· improved wording 
as well as a more readable display. 
The demographic characteristics of the pilot subjects may have 
played some role in determining responses seen in Sections I and III. 
However, in Section II, these characteristics played a key role in 
determining response patterns for many of the items. Therefore, because 
of the limited range of demographic diversity seen in the pilot sample, the 
statistical analysis of data for Section II had less impact on the outcome of 
the item analysis process. As a result, only two items were deleted from 
the pilot version of Section II. The main emphasis in revising Section II 
involved the aforementioned practical considerations which resulted in the 
following substantive changes; improved examiner scoring guidelines for 
eight items, the re-ordering of twenty-one items, the revision and 
streamlining of nine items, the inclusion of three new items and the 
provision of three additional scoring options. 
An innovative feature created for the Section II revision involved 
the use of total raw scores from Sections III-A and 111-B. These scores 
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essentially represented the caretaker's level of emotional well being 
(Section III-A) and the level of stress experienced by the caretaker as a 
function of parental role demands and available social support (Section III-
B). A problematic or high-risk III-A or III-B score. resulted in an Add 6 
or Add 9 score in Section II. In effect, these Add scores represented the 
child's stress exposure risk as a result of being raised by an emotionally 
high-risk and/or highly stressed caretaker. 
An analysis of Section III-A data resulted m the following 
modifications; a combining of two items, the addition of three new items 
and the deletion of one item. Section III-B modifications involved the 
deletion of two items. The last item in Section III-B remained as a 
qualitatively evaluated option. With regard to modifications seen in 
Section 111-C (the embedded five item Distortion Index), one item was 
reworded, one item was deleted and a new item was added. 
The record form developed for the revised scale was also reduced 
from 13 to 9 pages in length. In addition, the revised record form was 
reorganized to facilitate administration and totalling of subsection and 
section scores. The restructured score summary on page one of the record 
form also facilitated a more clear cut interpretation of Section III as a 
whole and of Section III-C in particular. Although the total number of 
items in the revision increased from 242 to 243 scoreable options, the 35 
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minute administration time for the pilot scale was reduced by 
approximately 5 minutes in the revision because of: the streamlined 
wording and formatting of items, a more effective item clustering and 
ordering, a more efficient record form, and the provision of clearer 
scoring guidelines. 
In attempting to assess the scale's ability to predict emotionally 
vulnerable child and family populations, a concurrent ~alidity study of the 
revised SRS became the next order of business. 
Revised SRS Concurrent Validity Study 
Subjects 
The initial sample involved 336 primary caretakers who were 
interviewed regarding 364 of their children. Twelve of the interview 
protocols were judged invalid, which left 352 valid child protocols that 
were obtained from the remaining 324 respondents. This was possible 
since 28 caretakers were interviewed regarding two of their children. An 
analysis of the 324 caretakers suggested the following relational 
characteristics: 292 were biological mothers, 19 were biological fathers, 9 
were adoptive mothers, 3 were grandmothers, and 1 was an uncle. It 
should be noted that fifty of these caretakers were also single parents. 
From the sample of 292 biological mothers, 26 spouses took part in the 
interviews. However, in all cases, the protocols that reflected the mothers' 
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responses were utilized since it was determined that the mother was the 
primary caregiver for each of their respective children. 
A review of Table 12 which outlines various demographic 
characteristics as a function of membership in the .diagnostic study group 
suggests a more diverse population of subjects relative to the sample that 
participated in the pilot study. With the exception of one subject from 
Seattle, Washington, the families represented in the current validity study 
resided in 43 rural, urban and suburban communities spread over the 
northern half of Illinois. These communities included: (in alphabetical 
order) Alsip, Blue Island, Calumet Park, Chicago, Chicago Ridge, 
Crestwood, Crystal Lake, Dakota, Deerfield, Dixmoor, Elizabeth, 
Frankfort, Freeport, Glenview, Grayslake, Harvard, Highland Park, 
LaGrange Park, Lansing, Libertyville, Lincolnshire, Lincolnwood, 
Lynwood, Morton Grove, Niles, Normal, North Chicago, Northbrook, 
Oak Lawn, Orland Park, Park Ridge, Pearl City, Posen, Rock City, Rolling 
Meadows, Skokie, South Chicago Heights, South Holland, Stockton, Tinley 
Park, Vernon Hills, and Wauconda. 
The 352 children described in the study ranged in age from 3-0 to 
12-11. With the exception of 7 three-year-olds who were still at home full 
time, all of the children were enrolled in nursery school, day care 
programs, and public or private elementary school classes ranging from 
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TABLE 12 
A Comparative Summary of Sample Demographic Characteristics 
Across Diagnostic Groups 
Variable 
Age (Months) 
Mean 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Ethnicity 
White 
Black 
Hispanic 
Asian-Others 
Occupation (H-H) 
Professional 
Exec-Mgmt 
Self-Proprietor 
Tech-Sls-AdSup 
Service 
Craft-Repair 
Operators Labor 
Studt-Unempld 
Unknown 
Group One 
N=133 
91.9 
66 
67 
88% 
3% 
3% 
6% 
37% 
13% 
11% 
24% 
4% 
2% 
6% 
2% 
1% 
Group Two· 
N=113 
91.7 
67 
46 
83% 
5% 
8% 
4% 
33% 
6% 
14% 
13% 
7% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
2% 
Group Three 
N=106 
92.5 
78 
28 
88% 
5% 
5% 
2% 
24% 
9% 
7% 
28% 
9% 
8% 
5% 
7% 
3% 
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Table 12--continued 
Variable 
Education (H-H) 
Some HS/less 
Completed HS 
Post HS-
Some College 
College Degree 
Some Grad Sehl 
Grad Sehl Degr 
Unknown 
Age Group (Yrs) 
(3-4) 
(5-6) 
(7-8) 
(9-12) 
Demogra:ghic Variables 
Grou:g One 
N=133 
1% 
17% 
20% 
24% 
4% 
33% 
1% 
25 
29 
35 
44 
Age (Months) by Diagnostic Group 
Gender by Diagnostic Group 
Ethnicity by Diagnostic Group 
Occupation by Diagnostic Group 
Education by Diagnostic Group 
Grou:g Two 
N=113 
8% 
24% 
18% 
22% 
1% 
26% 
1% 
13 
32 
31 
37 
Statistical Significance 
Grou:g Three 
N=106 
10% 
25% 
20% 
23% 
6% 
14% 
2% 
11 
34 
28 
33 
Q = .9708 (F prob., One-way Anova) 
Q = .0010 (Chi-Square) 
Q = .2399 (Chi-Square) 
12 = .0038 (Chi-Square) 
12 = .0018 (Chi-Square) 
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kindergarten through seventh grade. Nearly half of the entire study sample 
(N = 159) had been formally diagnosed as handicapped. They were receiving 
special education services as a function of being labeled behavior 
disordered/emotionally disturbed (N=:=106), learning 
disabled/developmentally delayed (N=49), or mildly retarded (N=4). 
The 133 children from Group One, the diagnostic study group 
defined as low risk for developing or possessing emotional/behavioral 
disorders, ranged in age from 3-0 to 12-2 with a mean chronological age 
of 7-8 (91.9 months). Group Two, the moderate risk sample, consisted of 
113 children ranging in age from 3-0 to 12-11, with a mean chronological 
age of 7-8 (91.7 months). The 106 children in Group Three, the high-risk 
population, ranged in age from 3-7 to 12-10, with a mean chronological 
age of 7-9 (92.5 months). As can be seen from Table 12, Group One, the 
low risk group, had a fairly equal balance of boys and girls. In contrast, 
Groups Two and Three manifested a gender imbalance which 
unsurprisingly favored boys by a margin of 58 and 74 percent respectively. 
For the purposes of examining developmental trends, four 
normative age groups were established with the intent of creating an 
approximately equal number of subjects for each age group. The youngest 
age group was composed of 3 and 4-year-olds, followed by a 5 and 6-year-
old group, a 7 and 8-year-old group and the oldest group of children 
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consisting of 9, 10, 11 and 12-year-olds. Table 12 also illustrates the size 
of the four normative age groups as a function of their diagnostic study 
group affiliation. 
Procedure 
The parents and guardians of the 352 child subjects were 
administered the SRS within the offices of their children's respective school 
buildings. The investigator conducted 33 of the interviews. The remaining 
319 interviews were conducted by other professional staff members from 
the school district and special education cooperative programs that were 
involved. They included 21 social workers, 5 social worker interns, 5 
psychologists, 5 psychologist interns and 1 special education administrator. 
Each of these individuals was carefully trained by the investigator to 
properly administer and score the SRS. 
As can be seen from an examination of the total sample, two types 
of subjects took part in the study. The first category involved children 
who were scheduled to undergo case study evaluations or re-evaluations in 
order to establish or re-establish eligibility for special education 
programming. The SRS was included in either the social history or 
psychological component of each case study since the type of information 
elicited by the SRS is normally gathered in such evaluations. In the process 
of obtaining standard written consent to conduct these evaluations, parents 
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were informed of the procedures that would be utilized including a 
description of the SRS instrument. Evaluators routinely included the SRS 
in evaluations that were scheduled in their respective settings between 
December 1988 and June 1990. However, be~ause of the lack of 
comprehensive normative information that was available for the revised 
form of the SRS, evaluators were restricted to the use of a criterion-related 
item analysis of each profile for their own diagnostic purposes. It is 
important to point out that this process insured that the SRS scale profile 
would not be a factor in the eventual diagnostic outcome of each case. 
Slightly fewer than half of the subjects in the study (N=l 73) were 
administered the SRS under these realistic "field" conditions. 
The second category of subjects involved 179 presumably non-
handicapped children. With the exception of 7 three-year-olds, these 
subjects were attending regular day care programs or nursery school 
through seventh grade classes. Since such children typically would not be 
involved in any special education evaluation efforts, their parents needed to 
volunteer their support by signing a consent form. The consent form 
emphasized the following three points; their participation was entirely 
voluntary, they could withdraw from the study at any time, and the study 
results for their child and family would remain entirely confidential. 
Between December 1988 and March 1990, a brief letter, which described 
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the study and these accompanying points, 'was sent home with children in 
regular education classes at cooperating public schools. Interested parents 
were asked to sign the consent form on the back of each letter and return it 
to their child's school in order to arrange for an SRS interview. A copy of 
this letter is included in the Appendix. When the same parent was 
interviewed regarding two children, the following procedure was utilized: 
Section I was administered for child 1, Section II was. administered with a 
simultaneous focus on both children, Section III-A was administered, 
Section III-.B was administered with a simultaneous focus on both children, 
then Section I with focus on child 2. 
Statistical Analyses 
The obtained data was analyzed primarily through a multiple 
discriminant analysis technique. Since three a priori defined diagnostic 
groups were established, the analysis focused on the ability of a set of 
metric independent predictor variables of the SRS to discriminate across 
the diagnostic groups. Each of the following sections of the SRS were 
utilized as an independent variable: Parts A through D of Section I, Section 
II, and Parts A and B of Section III. 
First of all, a Chi Square technique was used to assess whether 
statistically significant differences exist across group centroids. The 
following question was addressed: Is there a significant difference between 
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weighted group means of the seven SRS variables when companng 
individuals who belong to each of the three a priori diagnostic groups? If 
significant differences were found, then the analysis proceeded to the next 
step. Discriminant functions were computed using the direct entry format. 
Then a classification matrix was created to assess the predictive accuracy of 
these functions. This involved the establishment of ·sRS cutting scores to 
serve as criterion points in determining to which diagnostic group an 
individual would be most likely to belong as a function of his or her SRS 
profile. The proportional chance criterion model assessed the accuracy of 
the classification's "hit ratio." An analysis of discriminant weights and 
loadings also aided in determining the relative importance of each SRS 
variable in accurately discriminating across the three diagnostic groups. 
Since the SRS revision is still in a developmental phase, a 
secondary objective in statistically analyzing the obtained data was to 
further refine and revise the scale. To this end, an in-depth item analysis 
was conducted. This item analysis process involved an examination of the 
extent to which SRS items contribute to the scale's reliability and criterion-
related validity. Consequently, a Cronbach Alpha analysis of items was 
implemented. Other item analysis procedures as outlined in the pilot study 
section were utilized as part of the overall scale refinement process. 
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Chapter Summary 
Chapter III addressed the second goal of the study, the 
development and validation of an objectively scored, theory based parent 
interview instrument, the Stressor Risk Scale (SRS) . . The SRS was designed 
to assesss potential emotional vulnerability in children as a function of 
stress exposure in three areas: perceived child personality-temperament 
characteristics, stress related life events history of the child and family, and 
parental personality characteristics and attitudes. 
The first part of Chapter III reviewed the scale's development, 
design features, applications, and an initial pilot study. The second part of 
Chapter III described a concurrent validity study of the revised SRS. It 
was hypothesized that SRS scores would accurately predict and differentiate 
among three groups of children presumed to possess a low, moderate or 
high-risk emotional and/or behavioral status by virtue of actual adaptive 
functioning in their school settings. The concurrent validity study's 
research design, sample characteristics, group selection guidelines, and 
procedures for data collection and statistical analyses were also detailed in 
this chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
SCALE VALIDATION RESULTS 
Goal two of the study was crafted in an at!empt to operationalize 
the concept of Adaptive Emotional Resiliency via the development and 
validation of the Stressor Risk Scale. In this chapter, the presentation and 
statistical analysis of data related to this goal is articulated. 
The central hypothesis of the SRS concurrent validity study was 
that the SRS scores would accurately differentiate among three preselected 
groups of children. These groups of children, by virtue of actual adaptive 
functioning in their respective school settings, were presumed to possess a 
low, moderate, or high-risk emotional and/or behavioral status. 
As a starting point with respect to testing the overall hypothesis, 
mean score comparisons of the seven SRS predictor variables across 
diagnostic groups are presented in Table 13. These data also are cross-
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TABLE 13 
Summary of SRS Predictor Variable Mean Scores 
by Gender and Diagnostic Group Membership 
Group One 
SRS N=66 N=67 N=133 
Variables Male Female Total 
PARTIC* 35.7 35.7 35.7 
PARTMD* 37.3 39.8 38.5 
PARTSO*t 29.1 31.9 30.5 
PARTCT* 34.3 36.8 35.5 
TOTLIFE* 37.2 40.7 39.0 
TOTATT* 13.9 15.7 14.8 
SUPFRUS* 3.2 3.4 3.3 
TOTPER* 136.3 144.2 140.3 
Group Two 
SRS N=67 N=46 N=l13 
Variables Male Female Total 
PARTIC* 50.0 48.7 49.5 
PARTMD* 48.1 50.3 49.0 
PARTSO* 35.6 37.2 36.2 
PARTCT* 49.1 45.6 47.7 
TOTLIFE* 67.6 71.8 69.3 
TOTATT*t 21.1 25.1 22.7 
SUPFRUS* 5.7 5.4 5.5 
TOTPER* 182.7 181.8 182.3 
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Table 13--continued 
Group Three 
SRS N=78 N=28 N=106 
Variables Male Female Total 
PARTIC* 64.8 62.1 64.1 
PARTMD* 61.9 62.7 62.1 
PARTSO* 48.0 48.7 48.2 
PARTCT* 59.6 61.1 60.0 
TOTLIFE*t 90.6 105.8 94.6 
TOTATT* 26.8 29.8 27.6 
SUPFRUS* 8.2 8.3 8.2 
TOTPER* 234.3 234.6 234.4 
PARTIC: Section IA ....... .Inhibitory Control 
PARTMD: Section IB ......... Mood State 
PARTSO: Section IC ......... Social Orientation 
PARTCT: Section ID ......... Coping Tendencies 
TOTLIFE: Section 11 .......... Stressful Life Events 
TOTATT: Section IIIA ...... Parental Personality Characteristics 
SUPFRUS: Section 111B ...... Parental Role Frustration 
TOTPER: Section I.. ......... Total Score 
Group One: low risk, Group Two: moderate risk, Group Three: high risk 
*Equality of total group means between diagnostic groups rejected at 
p=.0000 (F prob., One-way Anova). 
tEquality of gender group means within diagnostic groups rejected at 
p<.05 (1-test, independent samples, 2-tail prob.). 
Note: TOTPER was not utilized as a predictor variable for this study. 
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broken across genders within each diagnostic group. Substantial separation 
exists between diagnostic groups in the mean scores of each predictor 
variable. The lowest mean scores for each variable are found in Group 
One (the low risk group). An appreciative increase i!]. mean scores is noted 
for Group Two (the moderate risk group). By far the highest mean scores 
are in evidence for Group Three (the high-risk group). These scoring 
pattern increments seem relatively uniform across the seven variables. 
Comparisons of gender score differences within each diagnostic group 
suggest that the sex of the subjects had no significant bearing on SRS 
scores for four of the seven predictor variables. However, in the case of 
the other three variables, PARTSO (social orientation), TOTLIFE 
(stressful life events), and TOTATT (parental personality characteristics), 
a slightly higher risk profile emerged for females in each of the three 
diagnostic groups. 
Table 14 also provides compansons of predictor variable mean 
scores as a function of diagnostic group membership. However, in contrast 
to Table 13, which separates this information by gender, Table 14 contains 
an analysis of the predictor scores by chronological age groupings in an 
attempt to detect possible developmental trends. Comparisons of age 
differences within each diagnostic group suggest that maturational factors 
do not play a role in determining SRS scores for six of the predictor 
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TABLE 14 
Summary of SRS Predictor Variable Mean Scores 
by Age Group and Diagnostic Group Membership 
Group One 
. 
SRS N=25 N=29 N=35 N=44 
Variables AGEGRP 1 AGEGRP 2 AGEGRP 3 AGEGRP 4 
PARTIC 35.6 37.7 35.7 34.4 
PARTMD 39.6 38.2 39.1 37.7 
PARTSO 31.2 29.2 32.1 29.7 
PARTCT 35.4 33.4 37.2 35.7 
TOTLIFE 31.8 40.7 40.1 41.0 
TOTATT 14.1 15.8 15.6 14.0 
SUPFRUS 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.0 
Group Two 
SRS N=13 N=32 N=31 N=37 
Variables AGEGRP 1 AGEGRP 2 AGEGRP 3 AGEGRP 4 
PARTIC 51.8 51.3 51.2 45.6 
PARTMD 44.0 46.9 54.5 48.0 
PARTSO 35.8 34.8 37.9 36.3 
PARTCT 46.2 47.8 46.3 49.2 
TOTLIFE* 49.0 67.2 67.8 79.7 
TOTATT 21.8 20.0 23.8 24.4 
SUPFRUS 5.0 6.2 5.5 5.3 
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Table 14--continued 
Group Three 
SRS N=ll N=34 N=28 N=33 
Variables AGEGRP 1 AGEGRP 2 AGEGRP 3 AGEGRP 4 
PARTIC 67.1 
PARTMD 63.5 
PARTSO 53.5 
PARTCT 60.5 
TOTLIFE* 82.4 
TOTATT 27.7 
SUPFRUS 8.9 
62.2 67.9 61.8 
57.6 66.4 62.7 
46.9 48.7 47.3 
60.0 57.6 61.8 
90.6 87.3 108.9 
27.6 24.8 29.9 
7.8 8.8 7.9 
AGEGRP 1: 3 and 4-year-olds 
AGEGRP 2: 5 and 6-year-olds 
AGEGRP 3: 7 and 8-year-olds 
AGEGRP 4: 9, 10, 11, and 12-year-olds 
*Equality of AGEGRP means within diagnostic groups rejected at 
p<.05 (F prob., One-way Anova). 
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variables. As expected, chronological age does seem to be related to the 
TOTLIFE variable. A very modest increase in TOTLIFE scores was seen 
in the older children belonging to Group One, whereas substantial 
increases in TOTLIFE scores were noted in the older subjects belonging 
to Groups Two and Three. Nevertheless, it would appear, as suggested 
in Tables 13 and 14, that SRS predictor variable scores are in general more 
closely related to a given subject's membership in a diagnostic study group 
than to his or her gender or age. 
Given the large amount of data collected on the 352 subjects, the 
technique of discriminant analysis (Tatsuoka, 1971) was used to contrast 
the three diagnostic groups. Since the analysis focused on the ability of all 
seven metric independent predictor variables of the SRS to discriminate 
among diagnostic groups, a direct entry format for computing the 
discriminant function was chosen. The direct entry format permitted 
simultaneous evaluation of the discriminating power of all the variables. 
Two discriminant analyses using a direct entry format were 
eventually carried out. The first, a multiple discriminant analysis, was 
performed using all three groups: Group One, the low risk 
non-handicapped group, Group Two, the moderate risk group, and Group 
Three, the high-risk behavior disordered/emotionally disturbed group. 
For the second analysis, the moderate risk group was eliminated and the 
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analysis was performed only on Groups One and Three. This was done to 
provide a clearer contrast between non-handicapped and behavior 
disordered/emotionally disturbed populations. 
The results of the multiple discriminant .analysis involving the 
three group sample are presented in Table 15 and are dis·cussed first. This 
analysis produced two discriminant functions. Each proved to be 
significant in separating the three diagnostic study groups, although the 
first function was substantially more discriminating. When plotting the 
location of the group centroids, a substantial separation of the three study 
groups was noted on the first discriminant function. A Chi-Square statistic 
suggested that Function 1 was highly significant (n=.0000). Also listed in 
Table 15 are the group centroid locations for the second function. 
Although separation was far less marked on Function 2, the Chi-Square 
generated for this function also reached statistical significance (n=.0240). 
Ultimately, this discriminant analysis was able to classify with accuracy 
78.98 percent of the subjects into their preselected groups. A Huberty i 
statistic (Stevens, 1986) determined this classification accuracy result as 
being statistically significant (i=l 7.913, n=.0000). An analysis of the 
standardized discriminant weights and loadings (structure correlations) 
suggested that of the seven predictor variables, PARTIC (inhibitory 
control), PARTCT (coping tendencies) and TOTLIFE (stressful life 
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TABLE 15 
Summary of Direct Entry Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Three Groups 
Group 
One 
Two 
Three 
Group Centroid Locations . 
Function 1 
-1.58647 
0.08612 
1.89877 
Function 2 
-0.13255 
0.29997 
-0.15346 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
SRS Variables Function 1 Function 2 
PARTIC 0.37974 0.21115 
PARTMD 0.18759 -0.01103 
PARTSO 0.17215 -1.01860 
PARTCT 0.32080 0.48526 
TOTLIFE 0.48968 0.19833 
TOTATT -0.00960 0.37566 
SUPFRUS 0.10611 -0.16590 
Actual N 
Group 
Group One 133 
(low risk) 
Group Two 113 
(mod. risk) 
GroupThree 106 
(high risk) 
Table 15--continued 
Classification Results 
Predicted Group·Membership 
One 
114 
85.7% 
20 
17.7% 
0 
0.0% 
Two 
17 
12.8% 
78 
69.0% 
20 
18.9% 
Three 
2 
1.5% 
15 
13.3% 
86 
81.1% 
Percent of "Grouped" cases correctly classified: 78.98% 
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events) were of the greatest importance in discriminating among the three 
study groups. In contrast, TOTATT (parental personality characteristics) 
and SUPFR US (parental role frustration) were of least relative importance 
as predictors, although collinearity issues may. have disguised their 
predictive contributions. 
The results of the second discriminant analysis, involving Groups 
One and Three, are presented in Table 16. Since only the low and high-
risk groups were involved in this analysis, one discriminant function was 
generated. In an examination of group centroid locations, this function 
proved to be highly significant in separating subjects in Group One from 
those belonging to Group Three. A Chi-Square estimate suggested 
statistical significance (12=.0000). In eliminating the more heterogeneously 
defined moderate risk subjects of Group Two, the classification accuracy 
results obtained with this function were better than the results achieved for 
the three groups. In this case, the overall rate of 96.23 percent reflects a 
high degree of precision in classifying both non-handicapped and behavior 
disordered/emotionally disturbed subjects. This classification accuracy 
result was also determined to be statistically significant (z=l4.103, 
]2=.0000). Although the relative importance of the seven predictor 
variables in discriminating between the two groups seemed to mirror the 
pattern that was noted in the three group analysis, the SUPFRUS variable 
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reflected a greater level of importance in this latter analysis. 
In an attempt to further evaluate the relative discriminating power 
of the independent variables, two additional multiple discriminant analyses 
were carried out using a stepwise format (Wilks).. Table 17 provides a 
summary of the first stepwise analysis; the absolute sizes of the significant 
F-values associated with each predictor variable were rank ordered. 
PARTIC, PARTCT and TOTLIFE surfaced again as being able to provide 
a relatively high level of discriminative power in differentiating the three 
study groups. As in the earlier analysis, SUPFRUS and TOTATT 
were of least importance. In this case, the F level for TOTATT was 
insufficient for it to be included in the analysis. Concerns had arisen 
during the item analysis process regarding the effectiveness of TOTATT as 
a predictor variable. Through item analysis, it seemed that of the seven 
predictor variables, TOTATT was most adversely affected when 
respondents obtained a moderate or high Distortion Index score. When 
respondents were engaged in socially desirable and/or defensive 
responding, such tendencies seemed to distort their TOTATT scores more 
than other variables. For these respondents, the TOTATT scores seemed 
to have limited predictive value. Therefore, the second multiple 
discriminant analysis, as seen in Table 18, evaluated only those subjects from 
each group who had obtained a low Distortion Index rating. Subsequently, 
TABLE 16 
Summary of Direct Entry Discriminant Analysis, Two Groups 
Group Centroid Locations . 
Group 
One 
Three 
Function 1 
-1A6076 
1.83284 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
SRS Variables 
PARTIC 
PARTMD 
PARTSO 
PARTCT 
TOTLIFE 
TOTATT 
SUPFRUS 
Function 1 
0.35965 
0.10856 
0.22744 
0.29737 
0.41923 
-0.04294 
0.16410 
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Actual Group 
Group One 
(low risk) 
Group Three 
(high risk) 
N 
133 
106 
Table 16--continued 
Classification Results 
Predicted Greup Membership 
Three 
128 
96.2% 
4 
3.8% 
5 
3.8% 
102 
96.2% 
Percent of "Grouped" cases correctly classified: 96.23% 
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TABLE 17 
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Three Groups 
Variable Entered Equivalent F Significance 
1. PARTIC 171.8520 .0000 
2. TOTLIFE 105.7850 .0000 
3. PARTSO 81.5080 .0000 
4. PARTCT 65.8590 .0000 
5. PARTMD 53.5612 .0000 
6. SUPFRUS 44.8060 .0000 
TABLE 18 
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Discriminant Analysis, 
Three Groups - Low Distortion Index Subjects 
Variable Entered Equivalent F Significance 
1. PARTIC 113.1610 .0000 
2. TOTLIFE 75.5080 .0000 
3. PARTCT 56.3030 .0000 
4. PARTMD 44.3470 .0000 
5. PARTSO 36.3390 .0000 
6. SUPFRUS 30.6960 .0000 
7. TOTATT 26.5030 .0000 
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100 subjects were eliminated from this analysis, which left 252 subjects 
fairly equally divided among the three groups. In evaluating these more 
"truthful" respondents, the TOTATT variable was included in the stepwise 
analysis as the last of the seven variables. Consequently, TOTATT's 
predictive powers were more evident with this sample. 
The last goal of the study was aimed at revising the SRS with the 
intent of further improving its psychometric characteristics. An in-depth 
item analysis was conducted which examined the extent to which SRS items 
contributed to the scale's reliability and criterion-related validity. The 
general approach utilized in this scale refinement process was discussed at 
length in the Pilot SRS Study section. 
The Cronbach Alpha analysis implemented on the 60 items of 
Section I, TOTPER ( child personality characteristics), resulted in an Alpha 
coefficient of .95. A Cronbach Alpha analysis was also conducted on each 
of the four subsections belonging to TOTPER. PARTIC (inhibitory 
control) obtained an Alpha coefficient of .86, PARfMD (mood state) 
obtained a coefficient of .89, PARfSO (social orientation) had an Alpha 
coefficient of .80, and PARTCT ( coping tendencies) resulted in an Alpha 
of .83. A further analysis of this section resulted in deleting one item 
from PARfMD, two items from PARfSO, and the combining of two items 
into one in PARfCT. 
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The Cronbach Alpha analysis implemented on the 128 items of 
Section II, TOTLIFE ( stressful life events), resulted in an Alpha coefficient 
of .90. Items in this section involving child care, school difficulties, 
family finances, and marital issues manifested. the highest item-total 
correlations. Such thematic items were particularly predictive of the 
overall section score when factors related to instability were involved. 
Although only one-third of the items in this section were perception 
oriented as opposed to fact oriented, of the 34 best items in Section II ( as 
determined by item-total correlations), 18 were perception oriented. A 
further analysis of Section II resulted in the deletion of three items, the 
rescoring of three items, and the reformatting and combining of two items 
into a single item. 
The Cronbach Alpha analysis implemented on the 40 items of 
Section IHA, TOTATT (parental personality characteristics), resulted in 
an Alpha coefficient of .86. Items in this section involving self-esteem, 
satisfaction, social support, and anxiety-conflict issues manifested the 
highest item-total correlations. A further analysis of Section IHA resulted 
in the reformatting of one item such that it was transferred to Section IIIB. 
An examination of the five Distortion Index items of Section IIIC, 
DISTORT, which were randomly embedded in Section IHA, suggested that 
no change was required in this subsection. The Alpha coefficient for 
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Section IIIC was .54. 
The Cronbach Alpha analysis implemented on the 9 parental role 
frustration items of Section 111B, SUPFRUS, resulted in an Alpha 
coefficient of .62. Because of the addition of th~ reformatted item that 
was transferred from Section IIIA, SUPFRUS becomes a· 10 item section. 
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter IV, data from the concurrent . validity study was 
presented and analyzed. The seven SRS predictor variables were evaluated 
as a function of gender, age, and diagnostic group membership. The 
statistical procedures that were utilized in the data analyses included; direct 
entry and stepwise multiple discriminant analyses, t-tests, analysis of 
variance, and Chi-Square statistics. In order to further refine the scale, a 
Cronbach Alpha analysis of SRS items was also implemented. The results 
of the item analysis process suggested that the SRS was a highly reliable 
instrument relative to its internal consistency in Sections I, II, and IIIA. 
Although the internal consistency indices for Sections 111B and IIIC were 
lower than desired, both of these sections made an important contribution 
in terms of their ability to provide valuable diagnostic information. 
The statistical analyses of SRS predictor variable data in Chapter 
IV served as the basis for generating summative conclusions regarding the 
concurrent validity study. Consequently, Chapter V details concurrent 
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validity study conclusions related to; scale and subscale discriminant 
accuracy, interrelationships of SRS predictor variables, gender and 
demographic variable effects, administrative considerations, empirical 
support for selected aspects of emotional resilience theory, and links of 
generalized stress to psychological disorders in children. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
As noted in Chapter I, there has been a paucity of evidence 
regarding links of generalized stress and stressful life events to 
psychological disorders in children (Colton, 1985; Yamamoto, et al., 
1987). The development and validation of a stress assessment device was 
viewed as a means of detailing such links. Of particular interest was the 
possibility that certain children were more vulnerable than others to the 
effects of stress. 
Because of the complexity of the intended investigative journey, it 
was necessary to develop a theoretical perspective before undertaking the 
construction of the proposed instrument. Therefore, the first goal of this 
study was concerned with the development of a viable theory of emotional 
resilience. This goal was addressed in Chapter II. A coherent theoretical 
framework emerged which led to the concept of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency. Simply stated, Adaptive Emotional Resiliency represented the 
capacity of the individual to maintain mastery and competence in the face 
of exposure to stress. 
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The newly conceived theory served as the structural foundation 
upon which the stress assessment device was developed and validated. 
Although the objective measurement of emotional resilience was beyond 
the scope of the present inquiry, the second goal of this study represented 
an initial step in operationalizing the construct of Adaptive Emotional 
Resiliency. In pursuing this goal, it was pointed out that before one can 
validly assess an individual's level of emotional mastery in the face of 
stress, it is necessary to gauge accurately that individual's exposure to 
stress. Therefore, goal two of the study was concerned with the 
development of the Stressor Risk Scale (SRS), an objectively scored parent 
interview instrument. The SRS was designed to assess potential emotional 
vulnerability in the child as a function of stress exposure in three areas: 
perceived child personality-temperament characteristics, the stress related 
life events history of the child and family, and parental personality 
characteristics and attitudes. The development and characteristics of this 
instrument were detailed in Chapter III. 
In addition to enhancing the general psychometric properties of the 
SRS, goal two involved a concurrent validity study of the SRS. In the 
concurrent validity study, which represented the major empirical focus of 
the research endeavor, it was hypothesized that SRS scores would predict 
and differentiate across three groups of children. Although no pure 
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underlying continuum of emotional risk was assumed, these groups were 
presumed to possess a low, moderate, or high-risk emotional and/or 
behavioral status by virtue of actual adaptive functioning in their school 
settings. Sample characteristics and group selection procedures were also 
detailed in Chapter III. 
The data reported in the multiple discriminant analyses indicated 
that the SRS was able to discriminate with a high degree of accuracy those 
children who were adaptively functioning in their respective school settings 
from those who were functioning poorly. A fair degree of discriminative 
accuracy was even evident in identifying moderate risk subjects, despite the 
fact that this group had a diagnostically diverse composition. Particularly 
noteworthy in the three group analyses was the fact that few children were 
grossly misclassified. Significant false positives ( e.g., Group One children 
predicted to be in Group Three) were rare, and significant false negatives 
( e.g., Group Three children predicted to be in Group One) did not occur. 
The concurrent validity investigation also identified the respective 
contributions of specific factors of the SRS in predicting emotionally 
adaptive and maladaptive outcome behaviors. Results related to this 
analysis indicated that all seven SRS predictor variables were able to 
classify low, moderate, and high-risk children at statistically significant 
levels. The relative weakness noted in the SUPFRUS and TOTATT 
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variables as predictors should be interpreted cautiously, since it seemed 
likely that their discriminant weights had been partialed out because of a 
high degree of multicollinearity that they shared with other variables ( e.g., 
SUPFRUS was correlated significantly with PARTJC and other Section I 
variables, and TOTATT was correlated significantly· with TOTLIFE). 
Issues related to responding distortion practices also negatively impacted 
on the TOTATT variable. Consequently, the importance of these two 
variables in predicting child outcome behaviors may be greater than the 
current data suggest. 
In contrast, the variables that consistently manifested the highest 
discriminative power were PARTIC, PARTCT, and TOTLIFE. In view of 
the Adaptive Control process as it related to the theory of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency, it was not surprising that PARTCT, the prototypical 
way an individual is able to respond to a variety of survival and growth 
demands in order to manage the environment, was such a powerful 
predictor of stress exposure and related behavioral outcomes. The theory 
underpinning Adaptive Emotional Resiliency also would have predicted 
TOTUFE, the stressful life events history of the child and family, to be an 
important contributor. Furthermore, it would seem from an item analysis 
of TOTLIFE that many of the superior items in this section were related to 
issues of instability. Such evidence clearly supports one of the cornerstone 
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assumptions of the resilience theory related to Fraiberg's (1977) 
prerequisite attachment conditions of continuity and stability. An analysis 
of TOTLIFE diagnostic group scores as a function of chronological age 
groupings provides additional support for one of the central tenets of the 
proposed theory, that emotional development unfolds · along transactional 
lines (Sameroff and Chandler, 1975). In the low risk group, although the 
mean TOTLIFE score was minimal for the youngest· children, it did not 
increase appreciably in the older groups. In the moderate and high-risk 
groups, mean TOTLIFE scores were substantially higher in the youngest 
children, yet substantial increases in the scores of their older counterparts 
were reflected in both of these diagnostic groups. A transactional 
interpretation of these data would suggest that the situational life event 
stresses to which a child and his or her family are exposed in the first 3 to 
4 years of the child's life may set into motion a chain of events which in 
effect creates and maintains its own momentum. If a child's life begins in a 
relatively stress-free environment, his or her future stress exposure will be 
likely to be minimal. On the other hand, a high degree of stress exposure 
in a child's early years is likely to result in an ever expanding web of 
misfortune ov;er time. The mean TOTLIFE score for the 9 to 12-year-olds 
of the low risk group was less than half of the mean score obtained by the 3 
and 4-year-olds group of the high-risk sample. In addition, for the oldest 
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children in the high-risk group, the mean score was nearly triple the size of 
the mean score reported in the same aged children of the low risk group. 
The high quality of the chronic perception oriented items in Section II also 
provided empirical support for the mediating role. of cognitive appraisals 
in psychological stress. This support accented the valu·e of including such 
items in a stressful life events measure. 
The single best SRS variable that predicted · stress exposure and 
related adaptional behaviors was PARI'IC, the individual's self-regulating 
system which controls attention span, motoric activity, reaction intensity, 
and impulse inhibition. Given the critical theoretical role this 
temperamental dimension was assigned in the shaping of the Adaptive 
Control process, it stands to reason that possession of a defective "braking" 
system would serve as the best single predictor on the SRS of maladaptive 
emotional and/or behavioral outcomes in both school and home settings. It 
was noted in Chapter II that at the extreme maladaptive end of this 
dimension were children who had been described as hyperactive. Many of 
these children were diagnosed as possessing an Attention Deficit Disorder 
(Cantwell, 1982) or by the more recent term Attention-deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Parker, 1990). Of the 352 children who 
took part in the validity study, 23 had been formally identified as 
possessing an Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Examination of the 
218 
characteristics of these 23 children validates the contention that such 
children are predisposed to highly maladaptive functioning. In this sample, 
19 were male and 4 were female, a gender imbalance not atypical of 
ADHD populations (Parker, 1990). The average age of the ADHD group 
was 87 months as compared to 92 months for all study subjects combined. 
With regard to diagnostic study group membership, 6 of the ADHD 
children were from the moderate risk group while 17 belonged to the high-
risk group. Five of the 23 ADHD children had been identified as learning 
disabled, 17 were labeled behavior disordered/emotionally disturbed, and 
one child had no formal special education diagnosis. Within their 
respective school settings, 13 of the children required a self-contained 
special education program (5 of these were in segregated day schools), 9 
were receiving special education resource services, and one ADHD child 
was not receiving any special education support. The SRS variable 
PARTIC distinguished this group as higher risk than even Group Three. 
On the surface, the relationship between Sections I, II, and III may 
seem straightforward. Section I represents stress exposure risk to the 
child primarily as a function of his or her own personality characteristics, 
Section II represents stress exposure risk as a function of the stress related 
life events history of the child and his or her family, and Section III 
represents stress exposure risk to the child as a function of parental 
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personality characteristics and attitudes. Although each section makes a 
unique contribution to a child's stress exposure profile, it also seems clear 
that these sections in some instances may be significantly interrelated. For 
example, a high-risk score in Section I typically results in a high-risk score 
for Section IIIB, since children with difficult temperamental characteristics 
often frustrate their parents. Section II results also seem modestly linked 
to Section IIIA responding patterns. High-risk scores on Sections II and/or 
III can result in elevating Section I risk, since environmental factors do 
impact on the development of a child's personality traits. Conversely, the 
more benign that Sections II and III appear in a given profile, the more 
likely that Section I scores reflect a less "contaminated" vision of a child's 
internal behavioral predispositions. Therefore, when analyzing a specific 
SRS profile, it is suggested that careful consideration be given to the 
possible interrelated effects of SRS variables while at the same time 
examining their unique contributions. 
Prior to evaluating the discriminant analyses data, a concern arose 
regarding possible confounding because of the effects of a gender 
imbalance in Groups Two and Three. Research literature suggested that 
the first decade in the lives of males was generally more stressful than the 
first decade in the lives of females (Werner and Smith, 1982). If this was 
an accurate assessment, the ability of the SRS to distinguish high-risk from 
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low risk subjects would be overestimated for any a priori defined at-risk 
groups where there were more males than females in comparison to non-
handicapped populations which were more evenly balanced. It was 
apparent in the analysis of SRS variables that no. consistent differences 
appeared within diagnostic groups as a function of gender for four of the 
seven variables. In the case of PARfSO, TOTLIFE and TOTATT, 
consistent differences were noted. However, within each diagnostic group, 
the higher scores for these three variables which reached or approached 
statistical significance were reported for females. This unexpected and 
unexplained result dismissed the concern that the hit ratio (percentage of 
correctly classified subjects) of the SRS in the validity study was inflated as 
a result of a gender imbalance which favored males in Groups Two and 
Three. Instead, it could be surmised that the hit ratio and resultant 
discriminative efficiency of the SRS were mildly underestimated by the 
study, given the gender imbalance. 
This and other studies (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1988) indicate that 
in elementary age children who are experiencing a variety of difficulties in 
their school settings, males significantly outnumber females. However, the 
results of the current study do not suggest that such differences in school 
functioning are due to greater stress exposure levels in males as defined by 
SRS variables. As an aside, such a conclusion lends support to Humphrey's 
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(1984) detailed examination of various public education discriminatory 
practices directed toward males in their early school years. Perhaps the 
elementary school environment warrants separate treatment in future 
studies as a major environmental stressor. 
In addition to the gender imbalance noted in · Groups Two and 
Three, a mild to moderate imbalance in socio-economic variables was 
noted across the diagnostic groups. Although income levels were not 
systematically evaluated, it would seem that the head of household 
occupation of Group One subjects represented the professional and 
managerial ranks in greater numbers than was seen with the head of 
household occupations of subjects in Groups Two or Three. Head of 
household subjects of Group One also were somewhat better educated than 
Group Two or Three subjects. Although it is believed by the investigator 
that each diagnostic group manifested relatively diverse demographic 
characteristics, it is possible that socio-economic differences among the 
groups could have played a modest role in predisposing Groups Two and 
Three to greater stress exposure. Research evidence has suggested that 
children of families from lower socio-economic backgrounds are exposed 
to higher levels of stress than their more advantaged counterparts 
(Dohrenwend, 1973; Eaton, 1978; Garmezy, 1981; Leiderman, 1983; 
Sameroff, 1975). Studies have also noted that socio-economically 
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disadvantaged children may have greater difficulty in adapting to the 
academic, social, and behavioral expectations of their school environments 
(Escalona, 1974). Therefore, it would not be surprising to find a socio-
economic imbalance when comparing groups of poorly functioning 
students with those who are functioning adaptively in school. In any event, 
the observed socio-economic differences among diagnostic groups do not 
diminish the import of the present study. To the contrary, such differences 
further support the SRS's ability to accurately differentiate among groups 
of children of varied emotional and/or behavioral risk status. 
In Chapter III, it was reported that of the 352 interviews in the 
study, 26 had spouses present. Since it was determined that the mother was 
the primary caregiver in each of the 26 dyads, the protocols that reflected 
the mothers' responses were utilized. The prospect of a dual respondent 
SRS interview presents opportunity as well as challenge. On the one hand, 
the presence of two caretakers, usually the father and mother, offers the 
unique diagnostic opportunity to observe interaction between the couple. It 
also affords caretakers a chance to openly examine their respective views 
regarding child characteristics, family strengths and stresses, and opinions 
related to their relationships and values. In the controlled environment of 
the SRS interview, this process may bring such family issues into clearer 
focus and result in a clarification of future goals and necessary actions. 
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Consequently, the dual interview can be enlightening for both the 
interviewer and the respondents involved. On the other hand, in a joint 
caretaker interview the presence of one's spouse or partner may tend to 
inhibit the open expression of sensitive concerns, particularly if such 
concerns are related to one another. Therefore, simultaneously 
interviewing both caretakers may promote distorted responding tendencies. 
Such distortions seem to impact most heavily on Section III items. An 
obvious but time consuming way to minimize these behaviors would 
involve separate interviews of each caretaker. 
In retrospect, it would appear that the investigation described here 
was an ambitious undertaking. Three major assumptions needed to be 
substantiated in order for the concurrent validity study to be successfully 
carried out. The first assumption involved the underlying theory 
associated with the scale. The SRS needed to possess high quality 
psychometric characteristics in order to function as an accurate predictive 
tool. To the extent that initial item development was largely theory based, 
the theory underpinning the item selection process needed to be on target. 
Thus, the development of an appropriate theory was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to guarantee the validation of the SRS. The second 
major assumption involved the study's overall hypothesis. The proper 
assignment of children to one of three diagnostic groups assumed that 
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specific school manifested behaviors and related school actions were 
associated with and in fact represented underlying low, moderate, or high-
risk emotional postures. The soundness of this hypothesis also hinged on 
the investigator's ability to make the appropriate linkage between school 
actions and diagnostic study group membership. Even if the first two 
assumptions were verified, the study results could still be confounded by a 
lack of accurate and consistent school district classification practices. Since 
the subjects of the validity study were derived from 44 demographically 
diverse communities, this third assumption of classification consistency was 
potentially the most problematic. It represented an aspect of the study 
where the investigator had little control. In fact, there is evidence which 
suggests that some inconsistency exists between school districts in the 
identification and placement of high incidence special education children 
(Achenbach and Edelbrock, 1983). On the other hand, some researchers 
have concluded that children with high incidence school difficulties are 
accurately diagnosed and serviced rather consistently across school districts 
(Wynne and Brown, 1984). Evidence from the present study supports the 
view of these latter researchers and generally confirms all three 
assumptions. 
Overall, the results of the study have established a measure of 
concurrent validity for the SRS. Thus, the study has provided empirical 
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evidence regarding links of generalized stress exposure to psychological 
disorders in children. Since the test results confirmed the study's 
hypothesis, a claim to SRS construct validation can also be made. 
Consequently, the SRS may possess considerable promise as a theory based 
instrument that is able to provide an objective assessment and profile of 
the stress exposure vulnerability of the child-family system. The study 
results also support the use of Section I of the SRS as a- measure of adaptive 
functioning which is sensitive in reflecting healthful, positive traits. When 
assessing children, this unique focus provides a needed balance in 
identifying both adaptive behaviors and maladaptive pathological 
characteristics. 
Future research directions involving the SRS point to a need for: 
additional concurrent validity studies, predictive validity studies, a 
standardization sample which accurately reflects current demographic 
patterns of the United States, a standard score reporting format which can 
be translated into qualitative categories, an abbreviated screening version 
of the scale, and a systematic item analysis procedure designed to provide a 
child-family profile. Ultimately, the development of the SRS represents a 
major step toward establishing a non-biased multi-dimensional assessment 
system aimed at empirically measuring a child's level of Adaptive 
Emotional Resiliency on a vulnerable-invulnerable continuum. 
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APPENDIX 
JANE STENSON SCHOOL 
May, 1989 
Dear Parents: 
Skokie School District 68 is currently participating in a validation study of 
a parent interview scale which measures child and family stresses. As part 
of this project, parents who volunteer will be interviewed in order to gain 
insight into their parenting attitudes and opinions regarding their children, 
other family members, friends and community related issues. This 
interview measure will also ask each parent to describe their child's 
personality characteristics and will survey the past stressful experiences of 
their child and family. The interview will be arranged at a mutually 
convenient time and location and will take approximately 30 minutes. 
Naturally, interview results will remain entirely confidential. In addition, 
since parent participation is entirely voluntary, parents may withdraw from 
the study at any time. 
If you are interested in taking part in this study, please contact Mr. Jack 
Joseph (District 68 psychologist) on Mondays or Thursdays at Stenson 
School (967-9380) or on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, or Fridays at Old 
Orchard Junior High School (676-9010). We appreciate your 
consideration and look forward to hearing from you. 
[265] 
Sincerely, 
Roger Skerritt 
Principal 
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